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ARTICLES
PLEA BARGAIN WAIVERS RECONSIDERED:
A LEGAL PRAGMATIST'S GUIDE TO LOSS,
ABANDONMENT AND ALIENATION
Daniel P. Blank*
T HE doctrine of criminal waiver currently suffers under a
tremendous weight of "theory-guilt." '  Legal scholars have
struggled mightily to explain why, during the course of a criminal
prosecution, the defendant may waive most, though not all, of his
fundamental constitutional and statutory rights. Waiver in the
disposition of criminal charges is so frequently invoked that
commentators have long suggested that "[i]t is waiver of rights that
permits the system of criminal justice to work at all."3
* Assistant Federal Public Defender, Northern District of California. J.D.,
Stanford Law School, 1997. Special thanks to Larry Kupers without whom this
Article could not have been written. Thanks also to Norman Spaulding for his
insightful comments on an early draft.
1. Thomas Grey, Hear the Other Side: Wallace Stevens and Pragmatist Legal
Theory, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1569, 1569 (1990). 1 borrow Professor Grey's phrase to
mean the anxious compulsion on the part of jurists and legal scholars, in the face of a
theoretically incoherent area of law, to propose monolithic explanatory theories in an
effort to bring structure and predictability to that area of law.
2. For example, with a guilty plea, a defendant necessarily relinquishes the rights
to a jury trial, to the assistance of counsel, to raise a defense, and to confront his or
her accusers. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,242-44 (1969) (observing that
entry of a guilty plea involves waiver of the right against self-incrimination, the right
to trial by jury, and the right to confront one's accusers); United States v. Raynor, 989
F. Supp. 43, 44 (D.D.C. 1997) (same). The act of pleading guilty also automatically
forfeits most antecedent claims that a defendant could have raised against the
charges. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973). Moreover, a plea
agreement with the prosecution might include additional waivers of claims that
otherwise would have survived the guilty plea, such as of the right to appeal the
conviction or sentence. See, eg., United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321-
22 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding waiver of right to appeal as part of plea agreement).
3. Michael E. Tigar, Foreword Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the
Citadel, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1970); see also George E. Dix, Waiver in Criminal
Procedure: A Brief for More Carefid Analysis, 55 Tex. L Rev. 193, 194 (1977)
(arguing that the waiver doctrine is too inconsistent and needs to be structured to
serve a predictive function); William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure,
75 Va. L. Rev. 761,762 (1989) (exploring various criminal procedure waiver doctrines
and highlighting the problems associated with their use in protecting the interests of
criminal defendants).
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Despite its ubiquity, most commentators agree that the doctrine of
criminal waiver remains in a "state of unnecessary and undesirable
confusion."4 Caught between the apparent necessity of the practice
and the lack of doctrinal coherence to defend it, courts continue to
vacillate on the nature and extent of criminal waivers in general, on
the justifications for their prevalence, and on what limits if any may be
placed on their exercise and barter. This uncertainty has been
compounded by sloppy terminology confusing the various types of
waiver. Particularly in the context of plea bargaining, the
overwhelmingly predominant method of obtaining criminal
convictions in the United States,5 the Supreme Court itself has lurched
from one decision to the next without providing meaningful guidance
to the lower courts or maintaining any consistent theoretical approach
regarding criminal waiver.6
Most courts recognize, at least in theory, that while the vast
majority of rights may be waived, there are some rights that are not
waivable.7 However, these same courts have been unable to articulate
a cogent explanation for this conclusion. In fact, not much has been
clarified in the thirty years since the Supreme Court held in a trilogy
4. Dix, supra note 3, at 267; see also Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The
Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1293, 1383 (1984)
("[Waiver is] an area in which substantial ink has been spilled and in which
substantial thought remains to be expended."); Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General
Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 478, 480 (1981) ("[T]he law of waiver, when
viewed as a totality, is presently in disarray.").
5. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 n.10 (1970) (estimating that
between 90-95% of all criminal convictions, and between 70-85% of all felony
convictions are by guilty pleas); Roland Acevedo, Is a Ban on Plea Bargaining an
Ethical Abuse of Discretion? A Bronx County, New York Case Study, 64 Fordham L.
Rev. 987, 987 (1995) (estimating that 90% of criminal convictions in the United States
are obtained by guilty plea); Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal
Justice, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 2117, 2121 (1998) (estimating that 80-90% of felony
indictments in federal courts are disposed of by guilty pleas and/or withdrawal of the
charges).
6. See, e.g., Loftus E. Becker, Jr., Plea Bargaining and the Supreme Court, 21
Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 757, 760 (1988) (analyzing the Supreme Court's inconsistent
treatment of "voluntary" guilty pleas); Dix, supra note 3, at 204 (ascribing the current
confusion in the waiver doctrine to its uncritical utilization by the courts, the Supreme
Court in particular); Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea
Process, 40 Hastings L.J. 957, 1020 (1989) (noting that one of the "most conspicuous
features" of current Supreme Court precedent on the issue is the failure to identify
any underlying principle for the decisions); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Pleas of Guilty and
the Loss of Constitutional Rights: The Current Price of Pleading Guilty, 76 Mich. L.
Rev. 1265, 1280 (1978) (commenting on the unsatisfactory state of law respecting the
rights which expire as a result of a guilty plea).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 204 (1995) (suggesting
that while most protections in a criminal prosecution are presumptively waivable,
there may be some that are so integral to the fact-finding process that they cannot be
waived, such as the right to conflict-free counsel); United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d
353, 359-60 (2d Cir. 1995) (joining every circuit that has addressed the issue and
holding that because of the great interests in an expeditious criminal trial, a defendant
cannot waive the protections of the Speedy Trial Act).
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of cases that plea bargains are presumptively constitutional if they are
entered into voluntarily and intelligently, and with the assistance of
counsel.' The Court has subsequently reemphasized the practical
necessity of plea bargaining, asserting that it is "an essential part of
the process,"9 but has failed to articulate any principled justification
for the practice of allowing criminal defendants to lose their most
fundamental rights."
Commentators have anxiously scrambled into the void in an
attempt to discover a singular theory of why and under what
circumstances bargaining away fundamental rights for more lenient
prosecutorial treatment is or is not constitutional." Variously drawn
from principles of due process, contracts, public policy and economics,
these fragmented theories stand in conflict with one another,
supporting contradictory outcomes and provide, despite the promises
of their proponents and the vehemence of their mutual criticism, rules
that apply some of the time, at best.
In light of this uncertainty, criminal waivers such as those included
in plea agreements have multiplied without limit. For example,
& See Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 796 (1970); McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 772 (1970); Brady, 397 U.S. at 757-58. These cases are
collectively referred to as "the Brady Trilogy."
9. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,261 (1971).
10. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 6, at 760 (criticizing the Supreme Court's lack of
principled analysis in deciding cases involving waiver).
11. See, e.g., Richard P. Adelstein, The Negotiated Guilty Plea: A Framework for
Analysis, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 783, 786 (1978) (arguing that plea bargaining is effective
because it makes criminals internalize both the economic and moral costs of a crime);
Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 Cal. L Rev. 652, 652
(1981) (describing plea bargaining as an unfair and irrational process); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 Yale L.J. 1969, 1978 (1992)
(describing plea bargaining as a compromise that is supported by autonomy and
efficiency); Donald G. Gifford, Meaningfid Reformi of Plea Bargaining: The Control
of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. 37, 41 (1983) (lamenting the inherent
deficiencies of plea bargaining); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46
U. Chi. L. Rev. 3, 12-19 (1978) (comparing the concept of plea bargaining to the
medieval European law of torture); Thomas R. McCoy & Michael J. Mirra, Plea
Bargaining as Due Process in Determining Guilt, 32 Stan. L Rev. 887 passim (1980)
(assessing plea bargaining practice in light of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster. 101 Yale LJ. 1979, 19S0
(1992) (recommending that plea bargaining be abolished); Robert E. Scott & William
J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale lIJ. 1909 passim (1992) [hereinafter
Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining] (justifying plea bargain agreements under contract
law and opining that abolishing the practice may prove detrimental to the criminal
justice system); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, A Reply: Imperfect Bargains,
Imperfect Trials, and Innocent Defendants, 101 Yale L.J. 2011, 2011-15 (1992)
(replying to Judge Easterbrook and Professor Schulhofer by re-emphasizing that
under contract law plea bargaining is fair and efficient); Peter Westen & David
Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken Plea Bargains, 66 Cal. L Rev.
471, 538-39 (1978) (applying principles of contract law in advocating the
enforceability of plea agreements); Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1121, 1188-89 (1998) (urging prosecutors to adopt a plea
bargaining theory in order to promote predictability of results).
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federal prosecutors in some jurisdictions recently began to include in
their plea bargain offers a requirement that the defendant waive his or
her rights under Brady v. Maryland12 and its progeny to mandatory
disclosure by the government of material evidence favorable to the
defense.13 Although defense lawyers have argued vigorously against
the fairness of such waivers, 4 no court has yet made a definitive ruling
on whether they are enforceable. In the Northern District of
California, the result has been an impasse between the prosecutors
and defenders that has stalled plea negotiations and threatened to
bring the normal course of plea bargaining to a "screeching halt.'"'5
This Article seeks to resolve the constitutionality of this latest plea
innovation, but not by employing any singular doctrine. Instead,
theories of criminal waiver deriving from the doctrines of
unconstitutional conditions, contracts, property and due process,
despite their potential contradictions, are each recognized as
appropriate theoretical responses in different contexts and are each
used to resolve some part of the question presented in the Article.
This eclectic, communicative approach is one suggested by the
emerging school of legal thought known as Legal Pragmatism, 6 which
proposes that legal theory "begin with existing practice"' 7 and then
consider the range of potential jurisprudential approaches, treating
12. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Although originally intended to promote fairness in
criminal trials, courts have recently extended this duty to disclose "Brady material" to
plea bargain adjudications as well. See United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d
Cir. 1998).
13. See Pamela A. MacLean, Defense Groups Oppose Plea Bargain Waivers, Daily
J. (San Francisco), May 27, 1998, at 1.
14. See id.
15. Pamela A. MacLean, Plea Pact Waiver Creates Turmoil, Daily J. (San
Francisco), Mar. 12, 1999, at 1 [hereinafter McLean, Waiver Creates Turmoil]; see also
Pamela A. MacLean, U.S. Judge Steps Into Plea Deal Fight, Daily J. (San Francisco),
Jan. 20, 1998, at 1 ("This has stalled some plea negotiations and [has] been rejected
outright in others, according to U.S. Public Defender Barry Portman.") [hereinafter
Maclean, Judge Steps Into Fight]; Brady/Giglio Waiver Provision Surfaces in Plea
Agreements, 12 Crim. Prac. Rep. (BNA) 48, 48-50 (1998) (summarizing the arguments
involved in the statement and agreeing that a quick resolution does not appear
probable).
16. Legal Pragmatism is traceable to the philosophers Charles Sanders Pierce,
William James, and John Dewey, as well as to legal theorists Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Benjamin Cardozo, Jerome Frank, and Karl Llewellyn. See Richard A. Posner, What
Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1653, 1654 (1990). For examples of
other contemporary adherents to Legal Pragmatism, see Cornel West, The American
Evasion Of Philosophy: A Geneology Of Pragmatism 5 (1989); Daniel A. Farber,
Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the Twenty-First Century, 1995 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 163 (1995); Thomas C. Grey, Freestanding Legal Pragmatism, 18 Cardozo L.
Rev. 21 (1996); Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1699 (1990); and Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of
Justice, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1811 (1990).
17. Grey, supra note 16, at 41.
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the theories "as perspectives, each of which can add to the
understanding of law."' 8
The current climate of uncertainty engendered by a range of partial
explanations but a lack of coherence in the law of plea bargains and
criminal waiver makes Legal Pragmatism particularly well suited to
addressing the question of whether a defendant may waive his or her
right to Brady material as part of a plea bargain. Notions of free will
and paternalism inherent in the question of whether to preclude or
permit defendants to bargain away their rights are also central to
Legal Pragmatism. 9 Moreover, Legal Pragmatism is especially
sensitive to the "double bind"'2 faced by defendants deciding to enter
into a plea bargain: a rule that prohibited defendants from waiving
their Brady rights would protect them from prosecutorial coercion but
would also deny them a potential bargaining chip in their plea
negotiations. Using an approach based upon Legal Pragmatism, it
appears that the duty of prosecutors to disclose favorable evidence is
one of the few rights that may not be waived as part of a plea bargain.
This approach further suggests that the validity of other more
established plea bargain waivers, such as the waiver of the right to
appeal, should be reconsidered.
Part I of this Article analyzes the constitutionality of plea bargains
and their attendant waivers. Part II discusses the scope of the
defendant's right to material favorable evidence, the recently
articulated duty to disclose such evidence at the plea bargaining stage,
and responses to the articulation of that right. In part III, a taxonomy
distinguishing among the types of waiver is proposed and various
theoretical justifications for criminal waiver are considered and
applied in determining whether defendants should be permitted to
waive their right to Brady material as part of a plea bargain. Finally,
Part IV concludes with a return to Legal Pragmatism, and a call to
reconsider other waivers presumed to be enforceable, such as that of
the right to appeal, under the approach described herein.
I. PLEA BARGAINS AS CRIMINAL WAIVER
Evaluating potential limits on plea bargain waivers must begin with
plea bargains themselves. The Supreme Court has explained that
"[t]he plea bargaining process necessarily exerts pressure on
18. Id. at 26. The applicable metaphor is a symposium of legal theorists, each
bringing a different perspective to the table, reaching consensus after a group
discussion. Id. at 37-38.
19. See, e.g., David Luban, What's Pragmatic About Legal Pragmatism?, 18
Cardozo L. Rev. 43, 59 (1996) (illustrating the use of paternalistic arguments by the
Supreme Court).
20. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 16, at 1699-1704 (discussing "'the problem of the
double bind in the context of contested commodification of sexuality and
reproductive capacity").
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defendants to plead guilty and to abandon a series of fundamental
rights, but we have repeatedly held that the government may
encourage a guilty plea by offering substantial benefits in return for
the plea."'2' It is this permissiveness toward plea bargaining that has
apparently led many courts to assume that all rights are waivable.
This part considers the constitutionality of bargained-for pleas and the
waiver of additional rights as part of the plea agreement.
The practice of plea bargaining is routinely criticized from all sides.
As noted by one commentator: "Scholars have argued for years that
the system of plea bargaining is inherently flawed and unfair to
defendants. On the other hand, policymakers have attempted to 'ban'
plea bargaining in response to the public's loss of faith in a system that
allows 'criminals' to receive 'bargains. "'22
The most common criticisms of the practice of plea bargaining are
that the threat of much harsher penalties after trial is impermissibly
coercive upon defendants and causes them to abandon the procedural
protections of trial; that it is hypocritical to use "an elaborate trial
process as window dressing, while doing all the real business of the
system through the most unelaborate process imaginable;" and that
the inequality of relative bargaining strength between the government
and the defendant renders the plea bargaining process inaccurate and
unfair, especially to poor and unsophisticated defendants.'
Notwithstanding these criticisms, plea bargaining has long been a
fixture of criminal adjudication in the United States.24 Plea bargaining
"is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal
justice system. ' The tension between the perceived flaws in the plea
bargaining process and its overall ubiquity has led to rampant post hoc
justifications by both the courts and the legal academy, including the
benefits to both the state and the defendant, such as efficiency and a
potential for encouraging rehabilitation; proponents further presume
equal bargaining power between parties and characterize the process
21. United State v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 209-10 (1995) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
22. Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Should We Really "Ban" Plea Bargaining? The Core
Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 Emory L.J. 753, 753-54 (1998) (footnotes
omitted); see also id. at 761 ("Observers criticized plea bargaining both as an
incompetent, inefficient, and lazy method of administering justice and as a
compromise of a defendant's right to a jury trial.") (footnote and internal quotation
marks omitted); Schulhofer, supra note 11, at 1979 ("[P]lea bargaining seriously
impairs the public interest in effective punishment of crime and in accurate separation
of the guilty from the innocent.").
23. See Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining, supra note 11, at 1912; see also Langbein,
supra note 11, at 12-13 (1978) (arguing that plea bargaining is as coercive as medieval
torture).
24. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 13 L. &
Soc'y Rev. 247, 256 (1979) ("[Pllea bargaining in the literal sense is at least a century
old. Implicit plea bargaining may be even older.").
25. Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining, supra note 11, at 1912 (emphasis omitted).
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as "merely a choice between unpleasant alternatives that does not
drive defendants to false self-condemnation. '2 6
Nevertheless, the validity of plea bargaining as a principled means
of criminal adjudication remains unexplained. The ongoing
controversy regarding plea bargaining simmering just below the
surface is typified by the recent fractured opinion by the Tenth
Circuit, sitting en banc, overruling a highly publicized panel decision
that had reversed the conviction of a defendant on the grounds that
the U.S. Attorney had violated the federal witness tampering statute
by offering leniency to a co-defendant as part of a plea bargain in
exchange for his testimony. 7 This case turned into a hotly contested
referendum on the validity of plea bargains in which the majority, in
order to defend the practice, ended up in the contorted position that
the government could not be guilty of witness tampering due to the
privilege of sovereign immunity.2 The validity of plea bargains and
their attendant waivers thus remains an unresolved and anxiety-
provoking issue for the courts.
The following section reviews the constitutionality of bargained-for
pleas and their inherent waiver of many of a defendant's most
fundamental rights. Section B then analyzes additional waivers
occurring as part of the plea bargain.
A. Constitutionality of Bargained-for Pleas
Brady v. United States29 was the first of a landmark trilogy of
Supreme Court cases enshrining plea bargaining as a valid mode of
criminal adjudication. Brady initially pleaded not guilty to federal
26. Guidorizzi, supra note 22, at 761-62 (footnotes omitted).
27. See United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1298 (10th Cir. 1999) (en bane).
28. Concerned that "[n]o practice is more ingrained in our criminal justice system
than the practice of the government calling a witness who is an accessory to the crime
for which the defendant is charged and having that witness testify under a plea
bargain that promises him a reduced sentence." id. at 1301 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted), the en bane majority refused even to consider whether
offering leniency to a co-defendant in exchange for his testimony constituted witness
tampering on the grounds that the U.S. Attorney was exempt from prosecution due to
sovereign immunity. See id. at 1300-01. Judge Henry concurred on the grounds that
he simply could not believe that Congress could have intended "to criminalize the
widespread and common practice of government lawyers." Id. at 1303 (Henry, J.,
concurring). Judge Lucero, joined by Judge Henry, also concurred on the narrow
grounds that while the prosecutor was not exempt from the witness tampering statute,
offering a lenient plea bargain did not constitute an offense under that statute. See id.
(Lucero, J., concurring). Judge Kelly, joined by Chief Judge Seymour and Judge
Ebel, dissented, suggesting that while, in response to the merits panel decision,
prosecutors from coast to coast have sounded "the death knell for the criminal justice
system as we know it," id. at 1308, the straightforward interpretation of the statute,
"which encompasses a prohibition against buying witness testimony with leniency,
actually aids the search for truth." Id. at 1309 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
29. 397 U.S. 742 (1970). Not to be confused with the other "Brady" case discussed
in this Article, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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charges of kidnapping, but, upon learning that his co-defendant had
confessed and would be testifying against him, changed his plea to
guilty to avoid the risk of receiving the death penalty, a punishment
that was statutorily inapplicable to a defendant who pleaded guilty."
In his petition for post-conviction relief, Brady argued that his guilty
plea was entered solely to avoid the possibility of the death penalty
and thus was not voluntary on account of the coercive effects of the
sentencing scheme.3'
The Supreme Court in Brady began with the premise, drawn from
familiar concepts of criminal waiver, that "guilty pleas are valid if both
'voluntary' and 'intelligent."'32 Voluntariness in pleading guilty, the
Court explained, would be presumed in the absence of coercion."
Although the Court recognized that the sentencing provision of the
federal kidnapping statute was the "but for" cause of Brady's change
of plea, it held that this did "not necessarily prove that the plea was
coerced and invalid as an involuntary act."'  Instead, the Court
suggested that, unlike pleading guilty in response to threats, pleading
guilty in response to promises of more lenient treatment is voluntary.35
This supposed distinction between promises and threats in
determining the voluntariness of a guilty plea suggested by the
Supreme Court in the Brady Trilogy would seem to be precluded by
Bram v. United States, 6 a nineteenth century precedent holding that,
"to be admissible, [a confession] must be free and voluntary: that is, it
must not be extracted by any... threats or violence, nor obtained by
any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of
any improper influence. '37 However, the Brady Court distinguished
Brain on the grounds that, unlike Brady, Bram had been
30. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 743.
31. See id. at 744.
32. Id. at 747 (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,242 (1969)).
33. See id. at 749-50.
34. Id. at 750.
35. Compare id. ("Of course, the agents of the State may not produce a plea by
actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the
defendant."), with id. at 751 ("We decline to hold, however, that a guilty plea is
compelled and invalid under the Fifth Amendment whenever motivated by the
defendant's desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty .... ").
The Court further finessed this distinction between threats and promises as to
voluntariness in the Brady Trilogy companion case, Parker v. North Carolina, in
which the defendant pleaded guilty to first degree burglary, then a capital offense, in
order to avoid the possibility of the death penalty, by stating that "an otherwise valid
plea is not involuntary because induced by the defendant's desire to limit the possible
maximum penalty to less than that authorized if there is a jury trial." 397 U.S. 790, 795
(1970). However, the Court failed to acknowledge in either case that such a
distinction depends arbitrarily upon whether the sentencing provision of the statute is
viewed as a promise of more lenient treatment if the defendant pleaded guilty or a
threat of greater punishment if the defendant exercised his right to a jury trial.
36. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
37. Id. at 542-53.
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unrepresented by counsel.3s The Court explained that "the possibly
coercive impact of a promise of leniency" was presumptively
"dissipated by the presence and advice of counsel."39 Because Brady
"had competent counsel and full opportunity to assess the advantages
and disadvantages of a trial as compared with those attending a plea
of guilty,"'  his decision to plead, "unlike Bram's confession, was
voluntary."41 Thus, in an end-run around Bran, the Court treated the
assistance of counsel as a proxy for voluntariness in pleading,
effectively establishing that a counseled plea is presumptively valid.
The second requirement for a valid guilty plea pursuant to the
Brady Trilogy is that it be intelligently made with "sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.""
During the previous year, the Court had held that, for a guilty plea to
be acceptable, the defendant must possess "an understanding of the
law in relation to the facts."4 The Court had also held in Boykin v.
Alabama'4 that in order for a trial judge to accept a guilty plea, the
record must reflect "an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and
voluntary."'  The reasoning behind this requirement was that
"[i]gnorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements, subtle
or blatant threats might be a perfect cover-up of
unconstitutionality."'
The Brady Court invoked these precedents 7 but then summarily
drained them of much of their force, stating that "[t]he rule that a plea
must be intelligently made to be valid does not require that a plea be
vulnerable to later attack if the defendant did not correctly assess
every relevant factor entering into his decision. '  Instead, as with the
voluntariness of the plea, the Court held that even a flawed
understanding of the facts and circumstances of the case is sufficient
38. Brady, 397 U.S. at 754.
39. Id This explanation is closely analogous to that offered in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
40. Brady, 397 U.S. at 754.
41. Id. at 755.
42. See id at 748.
43. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459,466 (1969).
44. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
45. Id at 242.
46. Id. at 242-43.
47. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 747 (citing Boykin); id. at 748 n.6 (citing McCarthy and
Boykin).
48. Id. at 757. The Court clarified just how little intelligence is needed to support
a valid plea in the third case of the Brady Trilogy, McMann r. Richardson, in which
the Court considered the extent to which a guilty plea may be collaterally attacked on
the grounds that it was motivated by a coerced confession: "[Tihe decision to plead
guilty before the evidence is in frequently involves the making of difficult judgments.
All the pertinent facts normally cannot be known unless witnesses are examined and
cross-examined in court. Even then the truth will often be in dispute." 397 U.S. 759,
769 (1970).
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as long as the decision to plead is "based on reasonably competent
advice" of counsel.49
The Brady Trilogy marked the decisive moment in the Court's
treatment of plea bargains. Although reiterating the form of the
voluntariness and intelligence requirements for waiver, the Court
substantially undercut any argument that systemic problems such as
coercive sentencing schemes or peremptory bargaining tactics were
rendering large numbers of guilty pleas invalid. The underlying
rationale for the Court's approach in Brady was starkly revealed by its
recognition that "about 90%, and perhaps 95%," of all criminal cases
are resolved by guilty pleas." The Court interpreted these statistics as
resulting from plea bargaining's "mutuality of advantage," in which
defendants are "no doubt motivated at least in part by the hope or
assurance of a lesser penalty than might be imposed if there were a
guilty verdict after a trial to judge or jury."51
The Court conceded that the prevalence of plea bargains could just
as easily be attributed to pervasively coercive effects of the threats
and inducements inherent in the plea bargaining process, 2 but simply
stated that it
cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State to extend a
benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to
the State and who demonstrates by his plea that he is ready and
willing to admit his crime and to enter the correctional system in a
frame of mind that affords hope for success in rehabilitation over a
shorter period of time than might otherwise be necessary.5 3
Not having squarely addressed the validity of plea bargaining until
after it had become embedded in the criminal justice systemF4 the
Court apparently saw no choice in the Brady Trilogy but to embrace
it.5  Under the twin banners of "mutuality of advantage" and
"rehabilitation," the Court definitively proclaimed the
constitutionality of bargained-for guilty pleas.
Subsequent Supreme Court cases dealing with plea bargains,
however, have been erratic in their application of the principles
articulated in the Brady Trilogy. 6 For example, the "rehabilitation"
rationale for validating guilty pleas based upon solemn admissions of
guilt was abandoned six months later as the Court upheld the plea of a
49. McMann, 397 U.S. at 770.
50. Brady, 397 U.S. at 752 n.10.
51. Id. at 752.
52. See id. at 752-53 ("Of course, that the prevalence of guilty pleas is explainable
does not necessarily validate those pleas or the system which produces them.").
53. Id. at 753.
54. See Guidorizzi, supra note 22, at 762.
55. See Tigar, supra note 3, at 4.
56. See Becker, supra note 6, at 760 (comparing the irregularity of the Supreme
Court's subsequent cases to "drunks scattering from a bar").
[Vol. 682020
PLEA BARGAINING WAIVERS
defendant who adamantly denied his factual guilt.' This rationale
nevertheless "continues to bob up in later opinions,"5- in the
suggestion, for example, that defendants who plead guilty do so
because they really are guilty, and are unlikely to have been led to
"false self-condemnation." 59 The Court's mercurial attitude toward its
justifications for the constitutionality of plea bargains makes distilling
enduring principles a difficult exercise. Nevertheless, a few recurrent
themes can be found among the Supreme Court's post-Brady Trilogy
plea bargaining cases.
First, the Court has paid relentless homage to the requirements that
a valid guilty plea be entered voluntarily and intelligently.' Like a
talisman, all plea bargain cases since the Brady Trilogy have invoked
those prerequisites. Mainly, those terms are treated as legitimating
vessels, filled in each instance with whatever significance the writing
Justice chooses. However, they are occasionally applied with vigor.
In one example, the Court vacated a second-degree murder
conviction based upon a guilty plea, despite "overwhelming evidence
of guilt," on the grounds that the record did not demonstrate that the
defendant had been informed that intent to cause the death of his
victim was an element of the offense."' Giving rare force to the
voluntariness requirement, the Court held that a plea "could not be
voluntary in the sense that it constituted an intelligent admission that
he committed the offense unless the defendant received 'real notice of
the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most
universally recognized requirement of due process."'",
A second prominent theme in the plea bargain cases since the
Brady Trilogy is the requirement that a guilty plea be counseled. In
many decisions, this requirement appears to be independent of the
voluntariness and intelligence aspects of the plea.' - Other cases,
57. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25.39 (1970).
58. Becker, supra note 6, at 822.
59. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570 (1989) ("By entering a plea of guilty,
the accused is not simply stating that he did the discrete acts described in the
indictment; he is admitting guilt of a substantive crime."); Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (discussing the mutuality of advantage in plea bargaining);
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 648 (1976) (White, J., concurring) (reiterating
that the Court "said in Brady v. United States that 'central to the plea and the
foundation for entering judgment against the defendant is the defendant's admission
in open court that he committed the acts charged in the indictment'- (citation
omitted)).
60. See, e.g., Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998) (echoing Brady's
mandate that a guilty plea is valid only if voluntary and intelligent); Alabama v.
Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 801 (1989) (same); Hill v. Lockhart. 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985)
(same); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257. 261-62 (1971) (-The plea must, of
course, be voluntary and knowing and if it was induced by promises, the essence of
those promises must in some way be made known.")
61. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644, 646 (1976).
62- Id. at 645 (citing Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329,334 (1941)).
63. See, e.g., Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504. 508 (1984) ("It is well settled that a
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however, have expanded on the suggestion in the Brady Trilogy that
the mere presence of counsel creates a presumption that the
defendant's choices are made knowingly and are free from coercion. 64
Along these lines, the Court has stated that defendants are
presumptively capable of making an intelligent choice if advised by
competent counsel.6
Finally, the decisions since the Brady Trilogy have continued to be
animated by the Court's view of plea bargaining as a practical
necessity. For example, the Court suggested in Santobello v. New
York, as it did in Brady, that plea bargaining "is an essential
component of the administration of justice," and "is to be
encouraged" since, "[i]f every criminal charge were subjected to a full-
scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to
multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities."'
Moreover, the Court explained, plea bargaining "is not only an
essential part of the process, but a highly desirable part for many
reasons," 67 primarily because of its speed and cheapness in disposing
of criminal cases.'
The Court has further emphasized that, "[w]hatever might be the
situation in an ideal world, the fact is that the guilty plea and the often
concomitant plea bargain are important components of this country's
voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has been
advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked."); Menna v. New
York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) ("[A] counseled plea of guilty is an admission of
factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes
the issue of factual guilt from the case." (emphasis in original)); Santobello, 404 U.S.
at 261 ("It is now clear, for example, that the accused pleading guilty must be
counseled, absent a waiver.").
64. See, e.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (stating that a
defendant "may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea
by showing that the advice he received from counsel was not within the standards" of
competence).
65. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978). In keeping with this
focus on the role of counsel in the defendant's decision whether to plead, the Court in
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-60 (1985), applied the standard for ineffective
assistance of counsel set in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-91 (1984), in
holding that a defendant may collaterally attack his otherwise valid guilty plea by
demonstrating that his counsel's advice fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and that he was prejudiced by his counsel's incompetence. See Hill,
474 U.S. at 57. To satisfy the prejudice prong, "the defendant must show that there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Id. at 59.
For example, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate or
discover potentially exculpatory evidence, the determination whether the
error 'prejudiced' the defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather than
go to trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would
have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea.
Id.
66. 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
67. Id. at 261.
68. See id.
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criminal justice system. '69 In fact, the Court has even ventured so far
as to validate the practice of overcharging defendants in order to
persuade them not to exercise their rights to a jury trial, suggesting
that without it "the institution of plea negotiation could not survive."7"
Gone, clearly, is any attempt to distinguish the prosecution's promises
from its threats in convincing a defendant to plead guilty.
Despite these broad recurrent themes of the voluntariness and
intelligence talismans, the importance of assistance of counsel, and the
overall necessity of plea bargaining to the functioning of the criminal
justice system, the Court's unsettled plea bargaining cases since the
Brady Trilogy still "circle like planets around a dim and fuzzy sun."'
The area of greatest disagreement and least adherence to principle
has been the loss of otherwise valid claims through pleading guilty.-
Part B considers both the automatic loss of antecedent claims upon
the act of pleading guilty and the waiver of surviving claims as part of
the plea agreement.
B. Plea Bargain Waivers
A guilty plea necessarily disclaims the defendant's rights to a trial
by jury with the assistance of counsel and to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses, as well as the privilege against self-
incrimination.7 3 The act of pleading guilty also extinguishes most
other non-jurisdictional claims that might have been asserted had the
defendant gone to trial. These "antecedent claims" are automatically
lost upon the entry of the guilty plea. Moreover, the prosecution may
69. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 361-62 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 378 (1982) (-The outcome
in Bordenkircher was mandated by this Court's acceptance of plea negotiation as a
legitimate process.").
70. Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 379 n.10. Some Justices have nevertheless recognized
limits on the practice of plea bargaining: "No court would knowingly permit a
prosecutor to agree to accept a defendant's plea to a lesser charge in exchange for the
defendant's cash payment to the police officers who arrested him. Rather, the
prosecutor is permitted to consider only legitimate criminal justice concerns in
striking his bargain-concerns such as rehabilitation, allocation of criminal justice
resources, the strength of the evidence against the defendant, and the extent of his
cooperation with the authorities." Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 401
(1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
71. Becker, supra note 6, at 775.
72- See, e.g., McMunigal, supra note 6, at 1020 (noting that one of the "most
conspicuous features" of existing "Supreme Court precedent on the issue of loss of
constitutional rights inherent in the guilty plea" process is "confusion regarding the
principles upon which they are based"); Saltzburg, supra note 6. at 1280 ("The state of
the law respecting the rights foregone after pleading guilty is obviously unsatisfactory.
Nothing in the language of any of the Supreme Court's cases articulates a rule that
helps even slightly in addressing new cases or evaluating the merits of those already
decided.").
73. See, e.g., Fed. R. of Crim. Proc. 11(c)(3) (enumerating the rights that the court
must address with a defendant in open court before accepting a guilty plea).
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bargain for additional waivers of those few remaining rights that are
not automatically lost by pleading guilty. The Supreme Court's lack
of doctrinal coherence regarding plea bargain waivers in each of these
forms has led to ongoing confusion as to what rights are forfeited by
the act of pleading guilty, what surviving rights may be waived as part
of the plea agreement, and what rights may never be waived.
1. Automatic Loss of Claims
The Supreme Court introduced the concept of the automatic loss of
antecedent claims in Tollett v. Henderson,74 holding that entry of a
guilty plea forfeits an accused's right to raise claims of constitutional
deprivation that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.1 Then-
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that, unlike the Brady Trilogy cases,
the facts giving rise to Henderson's otherwise valid claim, of
systematic racial discrimination in the composition of the grand jury
that indicted him, were unknown to him or his attorney at the time he
entered his plea.76 Thus, Justice Rehnquist conceded, "[i]f the issue
were to be cast solely in terms of 'waiver,' the Court of Appeals was
undoubtedly correct in concluding that there had been no such waiver
here."77 Nevertheless, the Court held that Henderson's guilty plea
"foreclose[d] independent inquiry into the claim of discrimination in
the selection of the grand jury."7
The Tollett Court reiterated the rule under the Brady Trilogy that,
to be valid, a guilty plea must be counseled, and voluntarily and
intelligently entered.7 9 However, the Court then recast the Trilogy as
holding that "a guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events
which has preceded it in the criminal process."'  As a result, once "a
criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in
fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not
thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of
74. 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
75. Id. at 267. The Court in Tollett considered the case of a habeas corpus
petitioner, convicted of murder and sentenced to 99 years imprisonment based upon
his guilty plea, who sought to have his sentence vacated and his plea withdrawn on the
grounds that African-Americans had been excluded from the grand jury that indicted
him. See id. at 259. The district court found "systematic exclusion" of African-
Americans from grand jury service, and the Sixth Circuit held that Henderson could
bring his claim because the record did not demonstrate a waiver of his constitutional
right not to be indicted by such a grand jury. See id. at 259-60. The Court granted
certiorari to determine "whether a state prisoner, pleading guilty with the advice of
counsel, may later obtain release through federal habeas corpus by proving only that
the indictment to which he pleaded was returned by an unconstitutionally selected
grand jury." Id. at 260-61.
76. See id. at 265-66.
77. Id. at 266.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 266-67.
80. Id. at 267.
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constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty
plea."'" Instead, he may only challenge the voluntary and intelligent
nature of the plea and the competence of his counsel in advising him
to plead.'
The Court held that a plea could be sufficiently intelligent even if
the defendant was not advised of every potential constitutional claim
or defense, concluding instead that as long as counsel's advice to plead
guilty was not the result of incompetent counsel, the plea may not be
collaterally attacked." The Tollett Court thus entirely removed such
antecedent claims as racial discrimination in grand jury composition
from the ambit of waiver in the sense of the intentional
relinquishment of known rights.'
After Tollett, the Court initially retreated from the proposition that
all antecedent constitutional violations are inevitably waived by the
entry of a counseled guilty plea. For example, in Blackledge v. Perr)y5
the Court upheld a collateral attack on an otherwise valid guilty plea
entered by a defendant who was reindicted on felony charges
following his appeal of a misdemeanor conviction, on the grounds that
the very initiation of proceedings against him was presumptively the
product of prosecutorial vindictiveness and operated to deny him due
process of law.86 The Court similarly held in Menna v. New York'
that by entering a counseled guilty plea a defendant does not waive
his right to raise a double jeopardy claim, reasoning that a conviction
must be set aside in cases "[w]here the State is precluded by the
United States Constitution from haling a defendant into court on a
charge."' While the Court acknowledged that a double jeopardy
81. Id
82. See id.
83. See id. at 268-69. The Court reached this holding despite the mandate from
Brady that guilty pleas "must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742,748 (1970) (emphasis added).
84. See Peter Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of
Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 Mich. L Rev. 1214, 1218-19 (1977)
(observing that under the Tollett rule a guilty plea operates as a forfeiture of all
constitutional claims except ineffective counsel and defenses in the actual
proceeding); see also Rubin, supra note 4, at 500 ("The Court seemed to be moving
toward the position that a valid guilty plea waives the right to appeal on the basis of
any constitutional infirmities in the procedure leading to the plea.").
85. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
86. Id. at 28. In reaching this conclusion, the Court did not require evidence that
the prosecutor had acted "maliciously" or "in bad faith" in seeking a felony
indictment. See id.
87. 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam).
88. Id. at 62 (citing Blackledge v. Perry. 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974)). Menna, after
serving a 30-day contempt sentence for refusing to testify before the grand jury, was
reindicted for having refused to testify in connection with the same investigation on a
different day. See id. at 61. After arguing unsuccessfully that the second indictment
should be dismissed under the Double Jeopardy Clause, Menna pleaded guilty and
was again sentenced. See id.
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claim may be waived, it refused to accept the argument that the claim
is automatically forfeited by a valid guilty plea.89
But by the time the Court had decided Bordenkircher v. Hayes,"
only five years after Tollett, the pendulum had swung out and back
regarding the automatic forfeiture of antecedent claims without any
explanatory principle revealed or any case overruled. In
Bordenkircher, a state prosecutor carried out a threat made during
plea negotiations to reindict Hayes on more serious charges if he did
not plead guilty to the offense with which he was originally charged.9'
The Sixth Circuit agreed with Hayes that because the prosecutor
acted vindictively, the defendant could challenge the plea pursuant to
Blackledge v. Perry.' In reversing, the Supreme Court focused on the
accused's choice to accept or reject the plea agreement and reasoned
that competent counsel and procedural safeguards sufficiently
protected defendants from prosecutorial "persuasion."'93 Despite its
acknowledgment that punishing a person for relying on his legal rights
would be "patently unconstitutional," the Court characterized the
prosecutor's conduct as "no more than openly present[ing] the
defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing
charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution." 94
Twenty years after Bordenkircher, it still remains unclear whether
the Court has completely closed the door on collateral challenges to
guilty pleas, apart from attacking their voluntariness or intelligence, or
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in deciding to plea. Some
cases seem to suggest so, 95 but others make clear that Blackledge v.
Perry is still good law. 96 The ongoing confusion in this area is typified
89. See id. at 63 n.2. The Court observed that "waiver was not the basic
ingredient" of the Brady Trilogy; rather, the point of the plea bargaining cases is that
a counseled guilty plea, if voluntary and intelligent, is such a reliable admission as to
remove the issue of factual guilt from the case. Id. at 62 n.2. Because the right not to
be placed in double jeopardy prohibits a second prosecution regardless of the validity
of factual guilt, a plea does not bar the claim. See id.
90. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
91. See id. at 358.
92. See id. at 360.
93. See id. at 363. Though the Court recognized that the risk associated with trial
may have a discouraging effect on the defendant's decision to preserve his rights, it
concluded that this is an inevitable and permissible by-product of a criminal justice
system that allows for the plea bargaining process. See id. at 364.
94. Id. at 365.
95. See, e.g., Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984) ("It is well settled that a
voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has been
advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked.").
96. For example, in Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27 (1984), the prosecution
responded to the defendant's exercise of his right to appeal for a trial de novo after
his misdemeanor convictions for a fatal traffic accident, by obtaining a felony
indictment for manslaughter covering the same conduct. See id. at 28-29. The
Supreme Court affirmed the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that
the "case is plainly controlled by Blackledge v. Perry." Id. at 30. Thus, Roberts
suggests that a reindictment covering the same conduct but charging more serious
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by the Court's treatment of double jeopardy claims following a guilty
plea.
After Menna, the Court revisited the issue of guilty pleas and
double jeopardy claims in Ricketts v. Adamson.W In that case, the
Court upheld the waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
double jeopardy even though the plea agreement did not contain the
words "double jeopardy," determining that the agreement adequately
specified the waiver that would result from a breach of the
agreement.98  Without citing Menna, the Court in Adamson
nevertheless followed its prescription that while the Fifth Amendment
protection against double jeopardy is not automatically forfeited by
the plea itself, it may be waived as part of a plea bargain, if both the
waiver and the plea are counseled, voluntary and intelligent.
The Court again returned to the issue of post-plea double jeopardy
claims in United States v. Broce,99 in which the two defendants each
moved to vacate one of their two conspiracy convictions after the
district court found in a subsequent related case that only a single
conspiracy had existed."° The Tenth Circuit ultimately affirmed the
district court's decision vacating the judgments and sentences on the
second conspiracy count, holding that while Adamson had "made
clear that the protection against double jeopardy is subject to
waiver.... [T]he guilty pleas in this case did not themselves constitute
such waivers.""1 1
In a complete about-face from Adamson, Justice Kennedy for the
Supreme Court reversed:
[W]hen the judgment of conviction upon a guilty plea has become
final and the offender seeks to reopen the proceeding, the inquiry is
ordinarily confined to whether the underlying plea was both
counseled and voluntary. If the answer is in the affirmative then the
conviction and the plea, as a general rule, foreclose the collateral
attack.'°2
offenses in response to the appeal of a conviction remains presumptively vindictive
and, notwithstanding Tollett and Bordenkircher, constitutes valid grounds for
challenging a conviction. See id at 30-31; see also Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 320
(1983) ("Our decisions subsequent to Tollett make clear that a plea of guilty does not
bar the review in habeas corpus proceedings of all claims involving constitutional
violations antecedent to a plea of guilty.").
97. 483 U.S. 1 (1987).
98. See id at 9-10.
99. 488 U.S. 563 (1989).
100. See id. at 566-67.
101. Id. at 568-69.
102. Id at 569. It did not matter that the Broce defendants' counsel did not advise
them on double jeopardy issues prior to their pleas. See id. at 572-73 ("Our decisions
have not suggested that conscious waiver is necessary with respect to each potential
defense relinquished by a plea of guilty. Waiver in that sense is not required.") Their
opportunity to challenge the theory of the indictments and to attempt to show the
existence of only one conspiracy in a trial-type proceeding, the Court explained, was
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Endeavoring to cabin the decisions in Blackledge and Menna without
overruling them, the Court in Broce recognized a limited jurisdictional
exception to the general rule against collateral challenges "where on
the face of the record the court had no power to enter the conviction
or impose the sentence," but found it inapplicable to claims of double
jeopardy."°3 Because the defendants were not otherwise challenging
the voluntary and intelligent character of their pleas, the Court held
that they were foreclosed from collateral relief.I°
Thus, the rule in the area of antecedent claims remains obscure. It
appears that most, but not all, non-jurisdictional antecedent claims are
automatically forfeited by the defendant's act of pleading guilty.
Survival of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in deciding to
plead suggests that non-jurisdictional antecedent claims are not
forfeited if they are critical to ensuring the validity of the plea itself.
Unfortunately, the Court has articulated little in the way of consistent
principles for predicting which claims are forfeited and which survive,
and the controversy surrounding claims challenging the validity of
guilty pleas and their attendant waivers continues unabated. 0
prior to pleading guilty. See id. at 571. The relinquishment of the right to bring a
double jeopardy claim derived "not from any inquiry into a defendant's subjective
understanding of the range of potential defenses, but from the admissions necessarily
made upon entry of a voluntary plea of guilty." Id. at 573-74. Thus, the Court held
that while a failure by counsel to provide advice may form the basis of a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, it cannot serve, in the absence of such a claim, "as
the predicate for setting aside a valid plea." Id. at 574.
103. Id. at 569. The Broce Court conceded that it had held in Blackledge that "the
potential for prosecutorial vindictiveness against those who seek to exercise their
right to appeal raised sufficiently serious due process concerns to require a rule
forbidding the State to bring more serious charges against defendants in that
position." Id. at 574. However, the Court reinterpreted Menna as having enunciated
an "important qualification" upon Blackledge by stating that "'a plea of guilty to a
charge does not waive a claim that-judged on its face-the charge is one which the
State may not constitutionally prosecute."' Id. at 575 (emphasis added) (quoting
Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975)). Having confined them to their facts,
the Court then attempted to distinguish Menna and Blackledge on the grounds that, in
those cases, the defendants did not "seek further proceedings at which to expand the
record with new evidence." Broce, 488 U.S. at 575. The Broce defendants, by
contrast, could not "prove their claim by relying on those indictments and the existing
record." Id. at 576. Thus, for want of a fully developed factual record, the Court
precluded the Broce defendants from bringing what would otherwise have been a
successful double jeopardy motion. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan and
Justice Marshall, dissented vigorously on this point. Noting that the critical language
in Menna was dicta, Justice Blackmun railed that "nothing in Blackledge or Menna
indicates that the general constitutional rule announced in those cases was dependent
on the fortuity that the defendants' double jeopardy claims were apparent from the
records below without resort to an evidentiary hearing." Id. at 582 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
104. Id. at 574.
105. Compare Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998) (holding for the
first time, and without explanation or citation to authority, that "even the
voluntariness and intelligence of a guilty plea can be attacked on collateral review
only if first challenged on direct review"), with id. at 629 (Stevens, J., concurring in
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2. Bargained-For Waivers
In addition to the rights necessarily lost upon pleading guilty, such
as the right to a jury trial and to confrontation, as well as the privilege
against self-incrimination, most otherwise valid antecedent claims are
automatically forfeited by the act of pleading. Of the few claims that
survive the plea, courts have generally permitted their knowing and
voluntary waiver as part of a plea or dismissal agreement. For
example, though entry of a guilty plea does not bar a subsequent civil
action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress an alleged
constitutional violation," 6 the Court has found enforceable a
defendant's agreement with prosecutors to relinquish a valid § 1983
claim upon dismissal of charges."
On the other hand, courts have consistently held that there are
some claims that a defendant cannot waive as part of a plea bargain,
such as the requirement that the plea be knowing and voluntary, or
the right not to be convicted upon a charge that does not state a valid
offense." One particularly widespread and-as it still has not yet
been addressed by the Supreme Court-controversial plea bargain
waiver is that of the right to appeal."
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Constitution does
not mandate an appeal in criminal cases."' Nevertheless, the
statutory right to appeal has approached the status of a fundamental
right.' Since the Brady Trilogy, every court of appeals that has
considered this issue has determined that such waivers are generally
part and dissenting in part) ("The Court has never held that the constitutionality of a
guilty plea cannot be attacked collaterally unless it is first challenged on direct
review.").
106. See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306,323 (1983).
107. See Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386,392-98 (1987). Justice Stevens disagreed
that the deliberate and rational character of the agreement was a sufficient basis for
finding the agreement enforceable, and analogized it to overt acts of bribery, such as
an offer to pay a trooper for not issuing a traffic ticket or contributing to the police
department's retirement fund for dismissal of felony charges. Id. at 408 (Stevens, J..
dissenting). Notwithstanding Justice Stevens's concerns, and the majority's
recognition that "in some cases these agreements may infringe important interests of
the criminal defendant and of society as a whole," the Court upheld the waiver in that
instance. d at 392.
108. See Rubin, supra note 4, at 493-94.
109. See, eg., Howard Mintz, Northern District May Face a Plea Bargain
Showdown, The Recorder (San Francisco), Mar. 4, 1993, at 1 (describing controversy
over proposed waiver of the right to appeal); see also Robert K. Calhoun. Waiver of
the Right to Appeal, 23 Hastings Const. L.Q. 127, 130 (1995) ("Recently, the policy of
the United States Attorney for the Northern District of California of insisting upon
appeal waivers in most plea dispositions resulted in a short-lived, but highly
publicized, boycott of indigent appointments by the local defense bar.").
110. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745,751 (1983).
111. See, e.g., Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less)
Seriously, 95 Yale Li. 62, 62 (1985) ("Although its origins are neither constitutional
nor ancient, the right has become, in a word, sacrosanct.").
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enforceable. 12 However, the courts have offered little to buttress that
result. Recently, some courts have acknowledged limits on waiving
the right to appeal."' But for the most part, the courts have struggled
to explain the precise contours of those limits and their theoretical
basis.
The first decisions on the issue recognized no limitations on plea
bargain waivers of the right to appeal, asserting merely that if
defendants can waive fundamental constitutional rights as part of a
plea bargain, "surely they are not precluded from waiving procedural
rights granted by statute.""' 4 Along these lines, a divided panel of the
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Melancon explained: "The Supreme
Court has repeatedly recognized that a defendant may waive
constitutional rights as part of a plea bargaining agreement. It follows
that a defendant may also waive statutory rights, including the right to
appeal.""' 5 The only policy justification offered by the courts in
upholding such waivers was to "preserve the finality of judgments and
sentences imposed pursuant to valid pleas of guilty.""' 6
112. Prior to the Brady Trilogy, the First Circuit suggested in Worcester v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 370 F.2d 713 (1st Cir. 1966), that such a waiver
would not be enforceable. Id. at 718. In that case, the Court considered whether to
enforce a taxpayer's waiver of the right to appeal from his conviction for filing false
returns in exchange for the district court's offer of probation conditioned on that
waiver. See id. The First Circuit refused to enforce the waiver on the grounds that the
district court "was without right to bargain thus with the defendant, or to put a price
on an appeal." Id. Although the facts in that case distinguish it from a plea bargain,
the First Circuit broadly reasoned:
A defendant's exercise of a right of appeal must be free and unfettered. Just
as it is unfair to ... use the great power given to the court to determine
sentence to place a defendant in the dilemma of making an unfree
choice.... It is no answer to say that the defendant need not accept the
court's 'offer.' The vice is that vis-A-vis the court he is in an unequal
position.
Id.
113. See infra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
114. United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990); see also United States
v. Ashe, 47 F.3d 770, 775-76 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that even a constitutional right
may be surrendered in an agreement by a knowingly and voluntarily made waiver);
United States v. Rutan, 956 F.2d 827, 828 (8th Cir. 1992) (upholding a defendant's
waiver of the right to appeal).
115. 972 F.2d 566, 567 (5th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). But see id. at 571 (Parker,
J., concurring) (opining that a defendant can never knowingly and intelligently waive
the right to appeal a sentence not yet imposed because "such a 'waiver' is inherently
uninformed and unintelligent").
116. Rutan, 956 F.2d at 829. The Ninth Circuit reached a similar result in United
States v. Navarro-Botello after considering whether "there should be a per se rule
invalidating any guilty plea requiring defendants to waive the right to appeal because
such a waiver violates both due process and public policy." 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir.
1990). On the due process claim, the Ninth Circuit ruled that a waiver of the statutory
right to appeal in an otherwise valid plea bargain is generally enforceable, but noted
that "a waiver of the right to appeal would not prevent an appeal where the sentence
imposed is not in accordance with the negotiated agreement." Id. The Ninth Circuit
also found that public policy interests in "finality" and "savfing] the state time and
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Many commentators criticized the decisions uniformly upholding
plea bargain waivers of the right to appeal, particularly in light of the
Supreme Court's suggestion in United States v. Mezzanatto that the
same analysis of the enforceability of criminal waivers applies to
statutory as well as constitutional rights and the Court's recognition
that there are indeed some limits on such waivers.' "  In response,
most Courts of Appeals have begun to scrutinize plea bargain waivers
of the right to appeal more carefully. For example, in addition to
requiring that a waiver of the right to appeal be knowing, voluntary,
and on the record, courts have explicitly stated that a breach of the
plea agreement by the government, sentencing based on an
impermissible factor such as race, or sentencing above the statutory
maximum, may give rise to a claim on appeal notwithstanding an
otherwise valid waiver of the right to appeal as part of the plea
agreement.118
The Second Circuit has given particularly close scrutiny to appeal
waivers, invalidating some as unknowing or involuntary on their
facts." 9 Moreover, while the First and D.C. Circuits have not yet
money" supported the enforcement of waivers of the right to appeal. i. at 322. In
subsequent cases, however, the Ninth Circuit began suggesting that an otherwise valid
waiver of the right to appeal might not bar claims such as ineffective assistance of
counsel in deciding to plead. See United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir.
1994); United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993).
117. See, e.g., Calhoun, supra note 109, at 201 (stating that waiver of the right to
appeal is in direct conflict with the goals of criminal justice administration); see also
Gregory M. Dyer & Brendan Judge, Note, Criminal Defendants' Waiver of the Right
to Appeal-An Unacceptable Condition of a Negotiated Sentence or Plea Bargain, 65
Notre Dame L. Rev. 649, 655 (1990) (attacking waiver of the right to appeal as
offensive to due process, public policy and judicial integrity).
118. See United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840,843 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Further, we
have recognized that the waiver of a right to appeal may be subject to certain
exceptions such as claims involving breach of the plea agreement, racial disparity in
sentencing among codefendants or an illegal sentence imposed in excess of a
maximum statutory penalty."); United States v. Schmidt, 47 F.3d 188, 190 (7th Cir.
1995) ("[D]espite a valid waiver of the right to appeal, a defendant could appeal his
sentence if the trial court relied on a constitutionally impermissible factor such as race
or if the court sentenced the defendant above the statutory maximum."). Most
circuits have also held that waiver of the right to appeal does not foreclose a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel in deciding to plead. See United States v. Woolley,
123 F.3d 627, 634-37 (7th Cir. 1997) (considering merits of ineffective assistance of
counsel claim); Baramdyka, 95 F.3d at 844 ("[S]uch a waiver does not include claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel."); United States v. Henderson, 72 F.3d 463, 465
(5th Cir. 1995) ("[W]e have previously noted, without deciding the issue, that waivers
of rights to appeal may not apply to ineffective assistance of counsel claims."); see also
Watson v. United States, 165 F.3d 486, 488-89 (6th Cir. 1999) (following the Ninth
Circuit's approach). In addition, the Sixth Circuit determined that the government
can forfeit its argument that a defendant has waived his appeal by failing to raise the
argument in a timely manner. See Hunter v. United States, 160 F3d 1109, 1113 (6th
Cir. 1998).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Goodman, 165 F.3d 169, 174-75 (2d Cir. 1999)
(refusing to enforce a waiver of the right to appeal by a defendant sentenced for a
period nearly twice as long as that recommended in the guidelines), United States v.
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addressed the issue, district courts in those circuits have held that plea
bargain waivers of the right to appeal are unenforceable as a matter of
law on the grounds that they can never be knowing and intelligent. 20
However, in the absence of clear guidance from the Supreme Court as
to whether and under what circumstances rights such as the right to
appeal may be waived as part of a plea bargain, most courts have
remained in limbo between either fully validating the waivers, and
reaping their supposed benefits in terms of cheapness and finality, or
absolutely precluding them as unfair to the defendants and
detrimental to the public interest.
In sum, there has been no definitive articulation of why some rights
may be waived as part of a plea bargain but others may not, and how
to distinguish between the two. The act of pleading guilty necessarily
disclaims many fundamental rights and automatically forfeits most
antecedent claims. Of the surviving claims, it appears that most but
not all may be waived as part of the plea agreement. As a result, the
courts are without guidance as to how to respond to innovations in the
plea bargaining process, such as the requirement that the defendant
waive the right to the prosecutor's disclosure of favorable material
evidence.
II. THE DUTY To DISCLOSE EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE
ACCUSED
The question considered in this Article is whether a defendant may
with a plea agreement waive the right to mandatory disclosure by the
prosecution of favorable evidence. Analyzing whether that right to
disclosure is among the few unwaivable protections requires an
understanding, not only of the scope of the right, but also of its
application to the plea bargaining context, which has generated strong
reactions by prosecutors and defense counsel alike.
A. Scope of the Duty to Disclose
A constitutional duty upon prosecutors to disclose evidence
favorable to defendants was first articulated by the Supreme Court
under the Due Process Clause in Brady v. Maryland.2 1 The cases
Martinez-Rios, 143 F.3d 662, 667-69 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that a waiver should be
enforced only if the record clearly demonstrates that it was knowingly and voluntarily
made).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 46 F. Supp. 2d 59, 60 (D. Mass. 1999); United
States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 44 (D.D.C. 1997).
121. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Court had previously held in Jencks v. United States,
353 U.S. 657 (1957), that a "criminal action must be dismissed when the Government,
on the grounds of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce, for the
accused's inspection and for admission in evidence, relevant statements or reports in
its possession of government witnesses touching the subject matter of their testimony
at the trial." Id. at 672. However, the decision in Jencks was grounded not in the Due
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following Brady have reflected a tension between ensuring fairness in
criminal prosecutions and maintaining their adversarial nature.' " This
part traces the development and the scope of the duty to disclose
favorable evidence, and the recent responses to its application to the
plea bargaining stage of criminal adjudications.
Brady v. Maryland established the rule that a prosecutor's pretrial
suppression of evidence "favorable to an accused" violates due
process. 123 Brady and a co-defendant, Boblit, were both found guilty
of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. 24 Brady had taken the
stand at trial and admitted his participation in the crime, but claimed
that Boblit did the actual killing.' -5 In his summation before the jury,
Brady's lawyer conceded that Brady was guilty of murder, asking only
that the jury not sentence him to death. 26
Prior to trial, Brady's lawyer had requested that the prosecution
allow him to examine any extrajudicial statements made by Boblit.21
In response, several statements were shown to him, but one in which
Boblit admitted the homicide was withheld by the prosecution, and
did not come to light until after Brady had been convicted and
sentenced. 128
The Brady Court overturned Brady's death sentence and
announced the rule that "the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."'" The
Supreme Court reasoned that the issue in Brady's case was "not
punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of
an unfair trial to the accused."'' The Court further explained:
Process Clause, but in the limits of the government's evidentiary privilege and,
implicitly, in the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine the witnesses
against him. See iL at 666-67. In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Jencks,
Congress enacted the Jencks Act, see 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1982), "which codifies and, in
some respects, regulates, the Supreme Court's decision." United States v. Roseboro,
87 F.3d 642, 645 (4th Cir. 1996). Because the duty to disclose under Jencks and the
Jencks Act is predominantly a trial right, its role in the plea bargaining process is
limited. Beyond the scope of this Article is the current split among the circuits
regarding how to treat evidence that falls under both Brady and Jencks. See, e.g.,
United States v. Beckford, 962 F. Supp. 780, 791 (E.D. Va. 1997) (discussing the split).
122. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) ("The Brady rule is
based on the requirement of due process. Its purpose is not to displace the adversary
system as the primary means by which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a
miscarriage of justice does not occur.").
123. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
124. See id at 84.
125. See id
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id
129. Id at 87.
130. Id The Court drew support from the rule that permitting unsolicited perjured
testimony to go uncorrected by the prosecutor is as much a denial of due process as
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A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused
which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the
penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant. That
casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that
does not comport with standards of justice, even though, as in the
present case, his action is not the result of guile.'31
The Brady Court held that material favorable evidence must be
disclosed but did not define the standard for determining what
evidence is "material." Although Justice Fortas later suggested that
the scope of that term might be extremely broad,'132 the tension
between promoting fairness while minimizing the potential for making
"the trial less of an adversary contest in the traditional sense"'133 led
the Court to limit its scope as it refined the contours of its holding in
Brady.
First, in Giglio v. United States,"3 the Court unanimously held that
the due process right described in Brady was violated by a
prosecutor's failure to disclose a promise made by a different
prosecutor to the government's key witness that he would not be
prosecuted if he testified. 35  The decision in Giglio expanded on
Brady in two important ways: the information at issue did not relate
directly to the defendant's guilt or punishment, but was merely
evidence that could have been used to impeach the government's
witness when he testified that no such promise had been made; and
the trial prosecutor did not have actual knowledge of the promise
made to the witness by the other prosecutor. 36
The Giglio Court also limited the scope of the term "material" as
used in Brady. Rather than define the materiality of the evidence to
deliberately presenting the perjured testimony. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264,
269-70 (1959) (permitting unsolicited perjured testimony to go uncorrected); Pyle v.
Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215-16 (1942) (deliberate presentation of perjured testimony);
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (same).
131. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
132. See, e.g., Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 101-02 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)
(stating that the government has a constitutional duty "to disclose material in its
exclusive possession which is exonerative or helpful to the defense" (emphasis
added)).
133. Barbara Allen Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and
Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1133, 1145 (1982); see also Giles, 386
U.S. at 116-19 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that an interpretation of Brady to
create a broad, constitutionally required right of discovery "would entirely alter the
character and balance of our present systems of criminal justice").
134. 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (Powell, J. and Rehnquist, J., took no part in the
consideration or decision).
135. See id. at 150-51.
136. See id. at 154 ("[W]hether the nondisclosure was a result of negligence or
design, it is the responsibility of the prosecutor. The prosecutor's office is an entity
and as such it is the spokesman for the Government. A promise made by one
attorney must be attributed, for these purposes, to the Government.").
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be disclosed in terms of relevance, as implied in Brady, the Court in
Giglio without discussion adopted a more rigorous, results-oriented
standard, stating that the undisclosed information was material, and a
new trial required, only if it "could in any reasonable likelihood have
affected the judgment of the jury." '
The Supreme Court revisited the materiality standard for the
prosecution's duty to disclose favorable evidence in United States v.
Agurs.138 Building on the one-stage "reasonable likelihood" definition
of materiality set in Giglio, the Agurs Court erected a multi-tiered
standard that shifted depending upon whether the defendant had
specifically requested the undisclosed information.""
This awkward edifice teetered for nearly a decade until the
Supreme Court finally nailed down the materiality standard in United
States v. Bagley." Bagley, who was convicted of violating federal
narcotics and firearms statutes, learned after trial that the
prosecution's principal witnesses, two state law enforcement officers,
had each signed undisclosed contracts with the Federal Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms stating that he would "provide
information" against Bagley and otherwise assist the ATF in exchange
for three hundred dollars.1 41 The Supreme Court held that because
137. Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Although at least one
legal scholar has suggested that the reference to "material" evidence in Brady had
itself implicitly encompassed a "certain quantum of likelihood that the undisclosed
evidence would have affected the verdict," Giglio explicitly applied this new standard
of materiality. Babcock, supra note 133, at 1146 n.46.
138. 427 U.S. 97 (1976). Convicted of the second degree murder of a man with
whom she struggled over a knife in her motel room, Agurs argued that the
prosecution's failure to provide her with information about the man's criminal
record-which included convictions for assault and carrying a knife, and would have
supported her claim of self-defense-deprived her of a fair trial under the rule of
Brady v. Maryland. See id. at 100.
139. The Court in Agurs held that, in cases where a defendant fails to make a
specific request, nondisclosed evidence is material only if, evaluated in the context of
the entire record, it "creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist." Id. at
112. The Court reasoned that "the defendant should not have to satisfy the severe
burden of demonstrating that newly discovered evidence probably would have
resulted in acquittal," id. at 111, but that, "[ulnless every nondisclosure is regarded as
automatic error, the constitutional standard of materiality must impose a higher
burden on the defendant" than "the customary harmless-error standard." Id. at 112.
At the other extreme, where the undisclosed evidence demonstrates that the
prosecution's case includes perjured testimony and that the prosecution knew, or
should have known of the perjury, the Agurs Court set the standard as the Giglio
materiality of "any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected
the judgment of the jury," id. at 103 (citing Giglio, 450 U.S. at 154), since such cases
involve not only "prosecutorial misconduct" but "a corruption of the truth-seeking
function of the trial process." Id. at 104. The Agurs Court did not attempt to define
the standard of materiality applicable in a case where the defendant does make a
specific request, but suggested that it might be more lenient to the defense than in the
situation where the defendant makes no request. Id. at 106; see also United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 681 (1985) (discussing the materiality standard in Agurs).
140. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
141. Id at 670-71.
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the information could have been used to impeach Government
witnesses, the prosecutor's failure to disclose this evidence violated
the right announced in Brady.
14 2
The Bagley Court streamlined the definition of materiality, stating
that evidence is material if there is a reasonable doubt that its
disclosure to the defense would have led to a different result in the
proceeding.143  This formulation, the Court held, would be
"sufficiently flexible to cover the 'no request,' 'general request,' and
'specific request' cases of prosecutorial failure to disclose evidence
favorable to the accused.""
The Supreme Court recently tweaked this balance between fairness
and agonism by further illuminating responsibility of prosecutors "to
learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the
government's behalf in the case, including the police.' ' 45 In Kyles v.
Whitley, Justice Souter for the Court explicitly held that the
prosecutor's affirmative duty to disclose evidence favorable to a
defendant applies even when the police fail to inform the prosecutors
of all they know: "[A]ny argument for excusing a prosecutor from
disclosing what he does not happen to know about boils down to a
plea to substitute the police for the prosecutor, and even for the courts
themselves, as the final arbiters of the government's obligation to
ensure fair trials.' ' 4
6
Thus, since the right was first announced in Brady v. Maryland, the
Supreme Court has gone on to emphasize that defendants have the
right to all favorable evidence that is "material," whether exculpatory
142. See id. at 683. As a preliminary matter, the Bagley Court vigorously
reaffirmed that impeachment evidence, no less than exculpatory evidence, "falls
within the Brady rule," emphasizing that it "has rejected any such distinction between
impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence." Id. at 676.
143. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. This materiality standard, which tracks the standard
for ineffective assistance of counsel set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984), "does not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the
suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant's acquittal," or
"that after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence,
there would not have been enough left to convict." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,
434-35 (1995) (discussing the Bagley materiality standard). Nor is there a need for
further harmless-error review once a reviewing court has applied the materiality
standard. See id. at 435. Finally, all of the suppressed evidence is to be "considered
collectively, not item by item." Id. at 436.
144. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
145. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. The Court had previously suggested that each
prosecutor is constructively aware of the evidence known to other prosecutors who
have worked on the case. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
Subsequently, in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), the Court "implicitly
recognized that Brady may require the prosecutor to examine files held by other
government agencies to determine whether they contain any material evidence
favorable to the defense." Robert Hochman, Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the
Search for Truth in Criminal Trials, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1673, 1678 (1996) (citing
Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57-60).
146. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438.
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or impeachment, whether requested or not, and whether the
prosecutor was actually aware or reasonably should have been aware
of the favorable evidence. It is all "Brady evidence," and it is
constitutionally indistinguishable, as long as it meets the materiality
standard.
The balance struck by the Supreme Court in refining the
"materiality" requirement of the evidence that must be turned over
ensures that the duty to disclose, while perhaps unpopular with some
prosecutors,147 will not unduly compromise the adversary nature of
criminal trials."4 Although constructed as a rule of fairness and truth-
seeking, an unbounded requirement that the prosecution assist the
defense would violate the criminal trial's "central tenet of antagonistic
play: In putting forth its best efforts, a team must be assured of
helping itself more than its opponent. ' 4 9  That the Court felt it
necessary to encroach upon the adversarial process demonstrates the
importance of the disclosure in ensuring fairness in criminal
adjudications.
B. Duty to Disclose at Plea Bargaining
While nearly all criminal cases are resolved by guilty plea, the
convictions reviewed by the Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland and
its progeny each resulted from trials, arguably leaving open the
question of whether the prosecutor's duty to disclose material
evidence favorable to the defense applies to plea dispositions.
However, commentators have long argued that prosecutors should be
required to disclose evidence favorable to the defense at the plea
bargain stage. 5 ' The earliest commentary focused on the necessity of
pretrial discovery in ensuring that the defendant's guilty plea is
voluntary and intelligent."' It is this rationale that has primarily
147. The Kyles Court advised "anxious" prosecutors to resolve uncertainty to the
defendant's benefit. Id at 438-39. "This is as it should be. Such disclosure will serve
to justify trust in the prosecutor as the representative of a sovereignty whose interest
in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."
Id. (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (alteration and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
148. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439.
Unless, indeed, the adversary system of prosecution is to descend to a
gladiatorial level unmitigated by any prosecutorial obligation for the sake of
truth, the government simply cannot avoid responsibility for knowing when
the suppression of evidence has come to portend such an effect on a trial's
outcome as to destroy confidence in its result.
See also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 n.6 (suggesting that the Brady rule departs from a
purely adversarial system of justice).
149. Babcock, supra note 133, at 1145.
150. See, eg., Robert L. Fletcher, Pretrial Discoverv in State Criminal Cases, 12
Stan. L. Rev. 293,316-19 (1960).
151. See Tigar, supra note 3, at 23 (arguing that the prosecution could ensure an
uncoerced guilty plea by asking the defendant whether he has been shown any
prosecution evidence indicating the strength of the case against him); see also
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motivated the courts to hold that the duty to disclose is pertinent not
only to trial preparation but also to an accused's decision of whether
to plead guilty.
For example, in Fambo v. Smith, the first published decision
addressing the issue, the trial court recognized a duty of prosecutors
to disclose clearly exculpatory evidence to the defendant in the course
of plea bargaining. 52 Without such evidence, the court reasoned that
it could not satisfy itself that the guilty plea was intelligent and
voluntary, and with the competent advice of counsel. 153 Accordingly,
the district court held that Fambo was not precluded from raising a
post-plea Brady claim, but nevertheless upheld Fambo's conviction,
finding the constitutional error harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.5 4
Although the Supreme Court has not yet spoken on the
government's duty to disclose Brady material in plea bargains, each of
the courts of appeals that has addressed the issue has followed
substantially the same rationale as in Fambo. The Sixth Circuit,
considering in Campbell v. Marshall whether the withholding of Brady
information "so taint[ed] the plea-taking as to render the guilty plea
involuntary or unintelligent,"'55 acknowledged that, "in Tollett and the
Saltzburg, supra note 6, at 1304 (opining that, in light of the constitutional safeguards
developed to protect defendants, the prosecution must offer a criminal defendant "an
informed choice"); Lee Sheppard, Comment, Disclosure to the Guilty Pleading
Defendant: Brady v. Maryland and the Brady Trilogy, 72 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
165, 179 (1981) ("Disclosure of such evidence must precede the defendant's act of
self-conviction if his guilty plea is to be the product of an informed choice between
self-conviction and trial."); Rand N. White & Tom E. Wilson, Note, The Preliminary
Hearing in California: Adaptive Procedures in a Plea Bargain System of Criminal
Justice, 28 Stan L. Rev. 1207, 1216-17 (1976) (comparing criminal pleas to civil
settlement and observing that pretrial discovery would ensure that the guilty plea is
truly a knowing waiver of rights); Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of the
Criminal Process, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 564, 579 (1977) (observing that, coupled with the
fear of a heavier sentence after trial and deference to advice of counsel, lack of full
pretrial discovery impairs a defendant's ability to make an intelligent choice). At
least one early commentator also suggested that the selective and informal discovery
that existed in lieu of broad discovery to criminal defendants as a matter of right
resulted in impermissibly unequal treatment of defendants depending upon how
connected their counsel was to the prosecutor's office. See Albert W. Alschuler, The
Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 Yale L.J. 1179, 1228-29 (1975).
152. See Fambo v. Smith, 433 F. Supp. 590, 598 (W.D.N.Y. 1977), affd, 565 F.2d
233 (2d Cir. 1977). Fambo, who was convicted of possessing an explosive device, later
learned that the tube of dynamite in question had been made harmless by a sheriff's
deputy who had removed the tube's explosive contents and repacked it with sawdust
before Fambo possessed it. Id. at 592. Fambo had petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus, claiming that his state court conviction was unconstitutional because the
prosecution had not disclosed exculpatory facts before the court accepted his guilty
plea. See id. at 591-92.
153. See id. at 599.
154. See id. ("[I]t is well established that even where a defendant may not be
convicted for the substantive offense because of factual impossibility, a defendant
could still be convicted of attempting that substantive offense.").
155. 769 F.2d 314, 315 (6th Cir. 1985).
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Brady Trilogy, the Supreme Court did not intend to insulate all
misconduct of constitutional proportions from judicial scrutiny solely
because that misconduct was followed by a plea which otherwise
passes constitutional muster as knowing and intelligent."' '
Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit held on the facts of the case that
Campbell, like Fambo, had not been prejudiced by the misconduct, 7
The Eighth Circuit in White v. United States adopted the Sixth
Circuit's interpretation that "the Tollett line of cases does not
preclude a collateral attack upon a guilty plea based on a claimed
Brady violation," ' and similarly denied habeas relief on the grounds
that White's knowledge of the undisclosed material would not have
"affected his decision to forego trial."'59
The Second Circuit followed this same approach, holding that a
defendant may challenge an otherwise valid guilty plea on the grounds
that the prosecution withheld material evidence that would have
influenced the defendant's assessment of the case against him and his
decision to plead guilty.'16 The Tenth Circuit subsequently held that,
in light of the Supreme Court's decisions on plea bargains, "as well as
the importance to the integrity of our criminal justice system that
guilty pleas be knowing and intelligent.., the prosecution's violation
of Brady can render a defendant's plea involuntary."' " ' The Ninth
Circuit adopted a per se rule in Sanchez v. United States providing
that, while a valid guilty plea precludes a defendant from later raising
"independent claims of constitutional violations," the plea "cannot be
deemed intelligent and voluntary if entered without knowledge of
156. Id- at 321.
157. See id. at 322.
158. 858 F.2d 416, 422 (8th Cir. 1988).
159. Id. at 424: see also United States v. Wolczik, 480 F. Supp. 1205, 1211 (W.D. Pa.
1979).
[W]hile a defendant's guilty plea must, to be valid, be intelligently made, we
are reluctant to impose additional discovery burdens on the Government,
Le., disclosing all Brady material, as a prerequisite for entering into plea
negotiations. At the same time, we believe that the Government cannot be
permitted to intentionally misrepresent its case to the defendant to insure a
guilty plea. Obviously, then, only a case by case approach can be used, and
the facts in this case lead us to the conclusion that the guilty plea is valid.
Wolczik, 480 F. Supp. at 1211.
160. See Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1320 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756 (1970)). The Second Circuit granted habeas relief to
the petitioner, who claimed that he would not have pleaded not guilty by reason of
insanity had the prosecution not withheld Brady information prior to the entry of his
plea. See id. at 1313, 1318-19.
161. United States v. Wright, 43 F3d 491, 496 (10th Cir. 1994). Although both the
Eighth and Tenth Circuits suggested that, "even if a Brady violation is established,
'habeas relief would clearly be the exception,"' id. (quoting White, 858 F.2d at 422),
the Supreme Court has since clarified that, once a Brady violation is established,
"there is no need for further harmless-error review." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,
435 (1995).
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material information withheld by the prosecution."'' 62 Finally, in the
absence of a Fourth Circuit precedent, the district court for the
Eastern District of Virginia in Banks v. United States granted the
petition to vacate Banks' conviction on the grounds that his guilty plea
was not voluntary and intelligent without the material favorable
evidence withheld by the prosecution. 63
Thus, the courts have determined that a Brady claim is not among
those rights automatically forfeited by a guilty plea because, like the
right to counsel, the disclosure of material evidence favorable to the
defendant is necessary to ensure that the guilty plea itself is voluntary
and intelligent. Under these cases, the materiality standard for
disclosure of favorable evidence as applied to guilty pleas is "whether
there is a reasonable probability that but for the failure to disclose the
Brady material, the defendant would have refused to plead and would
have gone to trial."'" Moreover, the disclosure requirement at the
plea bargain stage like all forms of the Brady right applies to
impeachment as well as exculpatory evidence. 65
Beyond ensuring the voluntariness and intelligence of the guilty
plea, commentators have proposed additional rationales in support of
preplea disclosure of favorable evidence by the prosecution. Some
legal scholars, for example, have emphasized the role of preplea
disclosure in enhancing the accuracy of convictions and sentences
resulting from plea bargains.66 Disclosing the Brady material before
the defendant decides whether to plead equalizes the bargaining
power of the defendant in his negotiations with the prosecutor and
reduces the opportunities for unchecked prosecutorial bluffing.'67
Because the inducements to plead guilty are necessarily offered in the
most attractive terms when the prosecution's case is weakest,168
preplea disclosure of Brady material helps ensure that innocent
defendants do not plead guilty merely because they are unaware of
the exculpatory information held by the prosecutor. 6 9
162. 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
163. 920 F. Supp. 688, 691, 693 (E.D. Va. 1996).
164. Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1454 (citing Miller, White, and Campbell).
165. See, e.g., Banks, 920 F. Supp. at 691 (."Favorable' evidence includes not only
evidence that is exculpatory but also evidence that serves to impeach the credibility of
government witnesses.").
166. See McMunigal, supra note 6, at 959; see also Note, The Prosecutor's Duty to
Disclose to Defendants Pleading Guilty, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1004, 1018 (1986)
("Application of the Brady v. Maryland duty [to plea bargains] is necessary to combat
the threat of inaccurate pleas created by nondisclosure.").
167. See McCoy & Mirra, supra note 11, at 933; Eleanor J. Ostrow, Comment, The
Case for Preplea Disclosure, 90 Yale L.J. 1581, 1584 (1981).
168. See McMunigal, supra note 6, at 985-89; Schulhofer, supra note 11, at 1981.
169. See McCoy & Mirra, supra note 11, at 933 n.173; H. Richard Uviller, Pleading
Guilty: A Critique of Four Models, 41 Law & Contemp. Probs. 102, 114-15 (1977);
Steven L. Friedman, Note, Preplea Discovery: Guilty Pleas and the Likelihood of
Conviction at Trial, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 527, 531 (1971).
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Other commentators have applied contract analysis in arguing that
preplea disclosure is necessary, not just to promote factual accuracy,
but to ensure the fairness of the plea bargain as a consensual
transaction.1 70 Under such a contract-based approach, the "doctrines
of duress and mistake lend strong support to the case for preplea
disclosure.' 171  Finally, some commentators have underscored the
importance of preplea disclosure based strictly upon economic
efficiency, apart from considerations of either fairness or accuracy.
For example, Richard P. Adelstein, a pioneer in the application of
economics to legal analysis, has long advocated broad preplea
discovery on the grounds that without it some defendants would
refuse to bargain even when bargaining is to their advantage;
further, other defendants may concede when they ought not. The
result in either case may be that defendants are overcharged, which
simultaneously distorts the equation of an offense's punishment
price with its social costs and raises associated moral transaction
CoStS.
17 2
These transaction costs are independent of due process concerns, and
are incurred without regard to whether the defendant is factually
guilty. 1
73
Critical Legal Studies theorists Mark Tushnet and Jennifer Jaff
have characterized plea agreements by parties with asymmetrical
knowledge as suboptimal and inefficient, because defendants cannot
assess the strength of the prosecution's evidence the prosecutor has,
such as potential witnesses.174 Fred Zacharias echoed this concern in
noting that disclosure ensures parties' abilities to preserve their
respective interests; specifically, it enables the defense counsel to
perform its own investigation, and produce more information for the
prosecution to consider for evaluating the case. 175
170. See Ostrow, supra note 167, at 1608-09; Sheppard, supra note 151, at 201-02.
171. Ostrow, supra note 167, at 1609.
172. Adelstein, supra note 11, at 810 (footnotes omitted). The potential for
"market failure" in criminal procedure has also been recognized by Law and
Economics advocate, Judge Frank H. Easterbrook. Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal
Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. Legal Stud. 289, 290 (1983). Judge Easterbrook,
however, dismisses the potential for such market failure in the plea bargaining process
as "trivial," notwithstanding the information costs caused by suppression of Brady
material. See id. at 309.
173. See id
We are suggesting that mechanisms that increase the amount of information
available to the defendant-such as disclosure of prosecution evidence-can
be justified independently of considerations such as due process or other
constitutional rights. Such mechanisms are useful to the system as a whole,
on a purely pragmatic level, because they facilitate the bargaining that we
have chosen as our principal tool of adjudication.
Id
174. Mark Tushnet & Jennifer Jaff, Critical Legal Studies and Criminal Procedure,
35 Cath. U. L Rev. 361,371 (1986).
175. See Zacharias, supra note 11, at 1146.
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Thus, in addition to ensuring the voluntariness and intelligence of
the guilty plea itself, commentators have advocated such justifications
for applying the Brady requirement of disclosure of material favorable
evidence to the plea bargaining context as promoting factual accuracy,
encouraging fairness in the bargaining process, and minimizing the
societal costs of suboptimal pleas. While the courts initially focused
solely on ensuring the voluntariness and intelligence of the plea, some
of these additional rationales have been recognized in the most recent
decisions applying Brady to plea bargains. 176
C. Responses to the Application of the Duty to Disclose to Plea
Bargaining
In response to the application of the Brady requirements to plea
dispositions, federal prosecutors in California and elsewhere have
sought waivers from defendants of their right to Brady material as
part of their plea agreements.17 7  In some cases, prosecutors have
proposed quite broad waivers that supplanted disclosure of all
evidence including exculpatory evidence relating to factual guilt.
Other prosecutors have attempted to craft more targeted waivers. 17
For example, in United States v. Reynolds,'7 9 the prosecution insisted
176. See, e.g., United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998)
(explaining the preplea disclosure is necessary to discourage "impermissible conduct"
by law enforcement officials); Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir.
1995) ("[I]f a defendant may not raise a Brady claim after a guilty plea, prosecutors
may be tempted to deliberately withhold exculpatory information as part of an
attempt to elicit guilty pleas.")
177. See MacLean, supra note 13, at 1. Prosecutors outside California as well have
tried to undermine the requirements to disclose favorable evidence at the plea
bargain stage. See, e.g., Avellino, 136 F.3d at 262 (addressing the government's
argument that it was not obligated to comply with Brady or Giglio in plea bargaining).
178. See Erica G. Franklin, Note, Waiving Prosecutorial Disclosure in the Guilty
Plea Process: A Debate on the Merits of "Discovery" Waivers, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 567,
568-69 (1999). In the Northern District of California, the standard plea agreement
recognized no ongoing duty to provide any further discovery. See, e.g., David E.
Rovella, Federal Plea Bargains Draw Fire, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 17,2000, at Al. In the
Southern District of California, the standard plea agreement reaffirms the
prosecutor's ongoing duty to disclose "information establishing the factual innocence
of the defendant," but provides:
The defendant understands that if this case proceeds to trial, the government
would be required to provide impeachment information relating to any
informants or other witnesses. In addition, if the defendant raised an
affirmative defense (for example, entrapment or duress), the government
would be required to provide information in its possession that supports
such a defense. In return for the government's promises set forth in this
agreement, the defendant waives the right to this information, and agrees
not to attempt to withdraw the guilty plea or to file a collateral attack based
on the existence of this information.
See Sylvia Hsieh, New Plea Provision Worries Defense Lawyers, Law. Wkly. USA,
Mar. 6, 2000, at 1.
179. No. CR 97-0292 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 1998).
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on the following provision as part of the plea agreement of a
defendant charged with bank robbery:
The defendant understands that discovery may not have been
completed in this case, and that there may be additional discovery to
which he would have access if he elected to proceed to trial. The
defendant agrees to waive his right to receive this additional
discovery which may include, among other things, evidence tending
to impeach the credibility of potential witnesses." j
Against the advice of his counsel, Reynolds agreed to the plea
bargain with the waiver.1 81 Reynolds's counsel, however, refused to
sign the plea agreement, and at the plea hearing moved that the court
strike the waiver provision as unenforceable. "  Although federal
prosecutors in San Diego had been using a similar waiver provision
for several years without a challenge,' Reynolds's counsel argued
that Brady creates an unwaivable structural protection because,
pursuant to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Sanchez, a guilty plea could
not be deemed intelligent or voluntary with a waiver of Brady
rights.1 4
Reynolds's counsel claimed that the Supreme Court's recent
suggestion, in United States v. Mezzanatto,'i that some otherwise valid
waivers might not be enforceable if they impaired the truth-seeking
function of trials or the reliability of the factfinding process, or if they
resulted in less accurate verdicts, precluded a waiver of Brady rights.
He relied also on the Court's statement that a waiver might be
unenforceable if it discredited the federal courts, undermined civilized
procedure, or violated public policy. 6 All of these factors, Reynolds'
counsel argued, cut in favor of finding a waiver of Brady rights at the
plea bargain stage unenforceable. Moreover, counsel argued,
prosecutors are ethically bound to disclose Brady, material by the
California Rules of Professional Conduct, which provide that -[a]
member shall not suppress any evidence that the member or the
member's client has a legal obligation to reveal."'",
The government responded that the plea agreement context is
unique and that Reynolds's plea bargain waiver should be upheld as
180. See MacLean, supra note 13, at 1.
181. See id.
182. See Paul Elias, Defenders Say New Plea Is a Raw Deal, The Recorder (San
Francisco), Jan. 20, 1998, at 4.
183. See MacLean, supra note 13, at 1.
184. Interview with Larry Kupers, Assistant Federal Public Defender. in San
Francisco, California (May 17, 1999) (counsel for Reynolds) [hereinafter Interview
with Kupers].
185. 513 U.S. 196, 203-04 (1995).
186. See id. at 204, 207.
187. California Rules of Professional Conduct 5-220 (1998); see also United States
v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1459-61 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the California Rules of
Professional Conduct apply to federal prosecutors in California).
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narrowly tailored to permit nondisclosure only of impeachment
evidence, which they suggested was not relevant to a defendant's
decision of whether to plead guilty, notwithstanding the numerous
cases and commentaries to the contrary.' Claiming that their office
had never advocated "a broad-based Brady waiver," the federal
prosecutors nevertheless admitted that in response to the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Sanchez, applying Brady to plea dispositions, they
"started actively thinking about [a waiver]."'189 Moreover, the timing
of the policy to seek Brady waivers as part of plea bargains coincided
with "embarrassing disclosures that potential Brady material had not
been given to defendants" in at least two criminal cases in the
Northern District of California."'
The California Attorneys for Criminal Justice and the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers filed a joint amicus brief in
Reynolds stressing that in United States v. Bagley'9' the Supreme Court
had held that the Brady rule requires disclosure of impeachment
evidence as well as exculpatory evidence.Y2 Moreover, amici argued
that the text of the provision in Reynolds, which waives, "among other
things, evidence tending to impeach the credibility of potential
witnesses,"' 93 would likely be broad enough to encompass all
Brady material, including exculpatory evidence.
Notwithstanding these arguments, the district court accepted
Reynolds's plea, noting that no published decision in any court
addresses the issue of whether the right to Brady material may be
waived as part of a plea agreement. 94 However, the district court held
open the possibility that if Reynolds were to bring a claim alleging
that the prosecutors actually did withhold favorable evidence to which
he would have been entitled, the waiver might be found
unenforceable. 5 The court in Reynolds thus left unresolved the
188. See Franklin, supra note 178, at 575-76.
189. MacLean, supra note 13, at 1 (quoting George Hardy, Criminal Division
Chief, Office of the United States Attorney for the Northern District of California).
This was not the first time that the lawyers for the U.S. Attorney and the defense bar
in San Francisco had clashed over plea bargain waiver issues. See Howard Mintz,
Northern District May Face a Plea Bargain Showdown, The Recorder (San Francisco),
Mar. 4, 1993, at 1 (describing controversy over proposed waiver of the right to
appeal); see also Calhoun, supra note 109, at 130 (discussing the controversy in tile
Northern District of California over appeal waivers in plea bargain agreements).
190. See MacLean, supra note 13, at 1 (citing United States v. Siripreachapong, CR
91-0629 VRW, and United States v. Jimenez-Vargas, CR 96-0427 FMS).
191. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
192. See United States v. Reynolds, No. CR 97-0292, Application of Amici Curiae
to File Brief on Behalf of Christopher Reynolds in re the Enforcement of Plea
Agreement Waiver Provision and Related Brief on the Merits of California Attorneys
for Criminal Justice and the National Association of Criminal Defense lawyers, at 5
(N.D. Cal. May 13, 1998) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 677).
193. MacLean, supra note 13, at I (emphasis added).
194. See Interview with Kupers, supra note 184.
195. See id.
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question of whether a defendant may be precluded from waiving the
right to Brady material as part of a plea bargain.
Since Reynolds, an impasse has solidified between prosecutors and
defenders in Northern California over the waiver of Brady rights."'
Federal Public Defender Barry J. Portman decided that "as a matter
of policy, his office would refuse to sign any plea agreement that
included such a provision."'" United States Attorney Robert S.
Mueller, however, mandated that all plea agreements include this
waiver,198 explaining that they are required by other federal
prosecutors around the country.' The prosecutors in Northern
California recently dropped the original waiver language specifically
targeting Brady rights, but now insist on an appeal waiver broad
enough to incorporate all post-conviction Brady claims.2' Although
the issue has become increasingly publicized, the courts have
remained unwilling to descend into the doctrinal thicket of plea
bargain waivers of Brady rights and make a final determination as to
their enforceability.20' Meanwhile, in the absence of guiding principles
or a methodology for evaluating innovations in the plea bargaining
process, the waivers continue to mutate and metastasize.
III. LIMITS OF PLEA BARGAIN WAIVERS
With the courts generally in agreement that a Brady claim is not
forfeited by a guilty plea, the question remains whether the right to
disclosure of favorable material evidence may nevertheless be
expressly relinquished by the defendant as part of his plea bargain.
Answering this question requires a new approach toward
understanding the limits of plea bargain waivers.
The bulk of authority amply demonstrates that criminal defendants
may waive nearly every constitutional and statutory right that they
196. See MacLean, Waiver Creates Turmoil, supra note 15, at 1.
197. See Pamela A. MacLean, U.S. Wants Defendants in Plea Deals to Waive
Rights, Daily J. (San Francisco), Jan. 16, 1998, at 1 [hereinafter MacLean, U.S. Wants
Defendants]; see also Elias, supra note 182, at 4 ("Portman's law'ers are refusing to
sign any plea agreement that contains new provisions requiring defendants [to] give
up rights that could help uncover what they don't know about the government's
case.").
198. See MacLean, U.S. Wants Defendants, supra note 197,.at 1.
199. See Brady Waivers: Coming Soon to a Courthouse Near You?, 13 Crim. Prac.
Rep. (BNA) 143, 143 (Apr. 21, 1999).
200. See id.
201. See John T. Philipsborn, Prosecution and Defense Disagree on Brady Waivers,
25 CACJ Forum 15, 15 (1998) ("Unfortunately, Reynolds did not produce any
definitive decision on point, though it did at least provide a somewhat publicized
forum for debate on the issue."); see also MacLean, Judge Steps Into Fight, supra note
15 ("U.S. District Judge Susan Illston said Friday she would take under submission
the contested terms of the plea agreement in a bank robbery case and advise Chief
Judge Marilyn Hall Patel that this appears to be a new prosecution policy for plea
agreements in the Northern District [of California].").
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possess. However, that there are some limits on criminal waiver has
been long advocated by legal theorists, 2°2 and recently recognized by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Mezzanatto.0 3 Unfortunately,
neither commentators nor the courts have yet articulated a coherent
basis for distinguishing between those rights that may be waived and
those that may not. On the contrary, as demonstrated by the Court's
decision in Mezzanatto, confusion reigns as to the types of waiver that
occur in the criminal process and what theoretical approaches or
principles apply in determining whether a particular right may be
waived.
In Mezzanatto, the Court upheld a defendant's agreement with the
prosecution to waive Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6)
and Federal Rule of Evidence 410, which exclude from trial all
statements made during the plea bargaining process, and to permit the
prosecution to use any such statements for impeachment purposes if
the defendant were to go to trial and testify3°4 Nevertheless, the
Court acknowledged that, although these rules are statutory rather
than constitutional in origin, "[t]here may be some evidentiary
provisions that are so fundamental to the reliability of the factfinding
process that they may never be waived without irreparably
discrediting the federal courts."2 5 Unfortunately, the Court gave little
in the way of guidance as to how to determine which rights are
unwaivable. Two vague hints regarding structural protections and
public policy are all the majority in Mezzanatto provided.
The Court began its discussion of potentially unwaivable rights by
noting that a defendant may be precluded from waiving his right to
conflict-free counsel,2 6 and quoting a passage from a Seventh Circuit
case, in which Judge Posner hypothesized that "if the parties
stipulated to trial by twelve orangutans the defendant's conviction
would be invalid notwithstanding his consent, because some minimum
of civilized procedure is required by community feeling regardless of
what the defendant wants or is willing to accept."'2" With these
references, the Court suggested that rights that are critical to the
202. See, e.g., Tigar, supra note 3, at 8 ("[T]here may be some procedural incidents
of the criminal process which the accused cannot waive.").
203. 513 U.S. 196 (1995).
204. See id. at 210.
205. Id. at 204 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Peretz v.
United States, 501 U.S. 923, 937 (1991) (suggesting that a party may not be able to
waive "structural protections").
206. See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204 (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153,
162 (1988)).
207. Id. at 204 (quoting United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 588 (7th Cir. 1985)
(holding that a defendant may waive the rule providing that alternate juror not
replacing a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its
verdict)).
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structure of the criminal justice system would not be waivable by the
defendant.2'
The Court next considered the defendant's claim that waiver of
Rules 410 and 11(e)(6) would be "fundamentally inconsistent with the
Rules' goal of encouraging voluntary settlement."21 The Ninth
Circuit had reasoned along those lines that permitting waiver could
have a "chilling effect" on plea bargaining, and would undercut the
value of what the defendant has "to sell" as part of the bargaining
process.210  Nevertheless, while allowing that "substantial 'public
policy' interests" may "override the presumption of waivability" in
some cases, the Supreme Court determined that "there is no basis for
concluding that waiver will interfere with the Rules' goal of
encouraging plea bargaining. 21'
Additional rationales for precluding a waiver were proposed by
Justice Souter who, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented on the
grounds of legislative intent.212 Justice Souter agreed with the
majority that "[i]f the Rules are assumed to create only a personal
right of a defendant, the right arguably finds itself in the company of
other personal rights, including constitutional ones, that have been
208. Along these lines, the Mezzanatto Court noted Justice Kennedy's concurrence
in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 741 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring), urging
that a party may never waive Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c), which at that
time provided that an alternate juror who does not replace a regular juror "shall be
discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict." Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 205
(quoting Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 24(c)); see also United States v. Lamb, 529 F2d 1153,
1157 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that parties may not stipulate to a violation of Rule
24(c)). Oddly, the Supreme Court in Mezzanatto relied upon both Josefik, in which
the Seventh Circuit held that Rule 24(c) could be waived, and Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Olano, which reached precisely the opposite conclusion. See
Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204-05. Rule 24(c) has since been amended to place the
dismissal of the alternate in the discretion of the district judge. See Fed. R. Crim.
Proc. Rule 24(c) (Supp. 2000). The Court in Mezzanano asserted, without deciding,
that, even if "the requirements of Rule 24(c) are 'the product of a judgment that our
jury system should be given a stable and constant structure, one that cannot be varied
by a court with or without the consent of the parties,' the plea-statement Rules plainly
do not satisfy this standard." Id. at 205 (quoting Justice Kennedy's concurrence in
Olano, 507 U.S. at 742) (citation omitted).
209. Id. at 206.
210. Id. at 206 (quoting United States v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452, 1455 (9th Cir.
1993)).
211. Id. at 207. Justice Ginsburg in her single paragraph concurrence, joined by
Justice O'Connor and Justice Breyer, echoed the "public policy" justification for
potentially holding a waiver unenforceable, suggesting that a slightly different waiver
agreement permitting the use of plea negotiations statements in the prosecution's case
in chief, rather than merely as impeachment evidence, might be unenforceable. Id. at
211 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("It may be, however, that a waiver to use such
statements in the case in chief would more severely undermine a defendant's
incentive to negotiate, and thereby inhibit plea bargaining."). Underscoring the
majority opinion's second ground for unwaivability, Justice Ginsburg's terse
statement suggests, unfortunately without citation or explanation, that if the waiver
agreement did undermine the public policy behind the rule, it may not be enforceable.
212. See id. at 211 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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accepted time out of mind as being freely waivable. ' '213  However,
Justice Souter suggested that the provisions protecting a defendant
against use of statements made in his plea bargaining "create
something more than a personal right shielding an individual" and
instead "are meant to serve the interest of the federal judicial
system. '214 Thus, Justice Souter argued, Congress determined that the
rule is not the defendant's personal right to waive.215 Finally, noting
that "defendants are generally in no position to challenge demands for
these waivers, and the use of waiver provisions as contracts of
adhesion has become accepted practice, 2 6 Justice Souter concluded
by warning that "the majority's reasoning will provide no principled
limit" on the proliferation of waivers during the plea bargaining
process.
21 7
Thus, from the Court's most recent statement on the issue, it may
be tentatively inferred that rights constituting structural protections or
promoting public policy, and possibly those that transcend personal
ownership or that are stripped away as part of a contract of adhesion,
may not be waived by a criminal defendant. These hints, however,
have not been sufficient to equip the lower courts to address the
recent innovations in plea bargain waivers foreseen by Justice Souter,
such as the waiver of Brady rights. The sections below set out a two-
part approach aimed at providing the missing guidance regarding the
limits of plea bargain waivers. Section A proposes a taxonomy of
criminal waiver, and Section B explores and applies various
theoretical limitations on criminal waiver to the issue of Brady claims.
A. Taxonomy of Waiver
As a few astute commentators have noted, a significant part of the
current confusion regarding criminal waiver derives from sloppy
terminology.1 This problem remains evident even in the Supreme
Court's most recent decisions. For example, in upholding the
defendant's pre-trial waiver agreement in Mezzanatto, the Court
purported to apply a precedent-bound "presumption of
waivability."21 9 However, the term "waiver" refers to a broad range of
circumstances in which a party loses a right, and the type of waiver
considered in Mezzanatto differs fundamentally from the precedents
213. Id. at 212 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938), which held that a
defendant may waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
214. Id. at 214.
215. See id. at 215.
216. Id. at 216.
217. Id. at 217.
218. See, e.g., Dix, supra note 3, at 194 (stating that the malleability of the waiver
doctrine stems from its vagueness); see also Rubin, supra note 4, at 483-87 (proposing
a general theory of waiver); Westen, supra note 84, at 1214-15 (distinguishing criminal
waiver from forfeiture).
219. 513 U.S. at 202.
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the Court relied on in deriving that presumption. This confusion in
nomenclature has contributed substantially to the difficulties in
identifying the limits of criminal waiver.
Early in the majority opinion, the Mezzanatto Court cites three
cases in support of its statement that "[a] criminal defendant may
knowingly and voluntarily waive many of the most fundamental
protections afforded by the Constitution. "220 However, none of these
cases establish any "presumption of waivability." On the contrary, the
cited cases emphasize that "courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights,"'
' 2
that courts "do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental
rights," and that "[p]resuming waiver from a silent record is
impermissible."'
The Mezzanatto Court's only cited authority for its reference to a
"presumption of waivability" is Peretz v. United States,"4 in which the
Court indeed stated that "[t]he most basic rights of criminal
defendants are.., subject to waiver.'"s In Peretz, Justice Stevens for
the Court in a five-to-four decision affirmed the felony conviction of a
defendant who had consented to voir dire by a magistrate rather than
an Article III district judge." While the Court had previously held
that magistrates lacked explicit statutory authority under the Federal
Magistrates Act to conduct voir dire over the objection of a party, the
Peretz Court construed a clause in the Act referring to "additional
duties" to permit the magistrate to do so if neither party objected.!
Although the Court in Peretz labeled the defendant's failure to
object as a "waiver," none of the cases cited in support of its
conclusion that most rights are subject to waiver address the "knowing
and voluntary" relinquishment of a right at issue in Mezzanatto.
Instead, every cited precedent, even if using the term "waiver,"
220. Id at 201 (citing Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 10 (1987) (finding that a
double jeopardy defense was waivable by pretrial agreement); Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (holding that a knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, right to jury trial, and right to
confront one's accusers); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (finding that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be waived)).
221. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis
added).
222- ML at 464 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
223. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
224. 501 U.S. 923 (1991).
225. Id at 936. The Court in Mezzanatto also cites a nineteenth century civil case,
Shutte v. Thompson, 15 Wall. 151, 159 (1873), for the proposition that -[a] party may
waive any provision, either of a contract or of a statute, intended for his benefit."
United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196,201 (1995).
226. See 501 U.S. at 936.
227. See id. at 933-34. Significantly, the Court seemed to be driven, as in the plea
bargaining context, by practical concerns of judicial efficiency. See id. at 929 (noting
that magistrates play an important role in achieving judicial efficiency at the federal
level).
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actually refers to a right forfeited through mere inadvertence or
failure to act: failure to object waives the right to be present at all
stages of criminal trial;2 failure to object to closing the courtroom
waives the right to public trial;2 9 failure to assert the Fourth
Amendment waives the right to be free from unlawful searches and
seizure;230 failure to object forfeits a claim of unlawful postarrest
delay;231 failure to object or raise the defense forfeits Fifth
Amendment protections.
Thus, the type of "presumptive" loss of rights through failure to act
considered in Peretz differs markedly from the type of knowing and
voluntary relinquishment of rights addressed in Mezzanatto. Yet,
both have interchangeably been called "waiver." In fact, the term
'"waiver" is routinely used in at least four distinguishable instances:
intentional relinquishment of a known right; forfeiture of a right
through failure to take timely steps to assert it; election of one right
over another; and alienation of a right by bargaining it away in
exchange for some consideration. The first step in deciding whether a
particular right may be "waived" is to determine what sort of waiver is
at issue." Accordingly, each of the four types of waiver is considered
in turn below.
1. Intentional Relinquishment
The type of waiver considered in both Mezzanatto and the Brady
Trilogy is "intentional relinquishment." Such waivers involve the
explicit, premeditated and theoretically unilateral decision to forego
the benefits of a personal right. As the Court noted in Brady v.
United States.'3 waivers of this sort "not only must be voluntary but
must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences."235
This formulation for "waiver" tracks the oft-quoted definition from
the seminal case Johnson v. Zerbst236  of "an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." '237 In
that case, Johnson, convicted along with a co-defendant of
counterfeiting, brought a habeas corpus petition claiming that he was
228. See United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 528 (1985) (per curiam).
229. See Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610,619 (1960).
230. See Segurola v. United States, 275 U.S. 106, 111 (1927).
231. See United States v. Figueroa, 818 F.2d 1020, 1025 (1st Cir. 1987).
232. See United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335, 1365 (11th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Coleman, 707 F.2d 374,376 (9th Cir. 1983).
233. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (stating that the
requirements of waiver hinge on the particular right involved).
234. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
235. Id. at 748 (citing, inter alia, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
236. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
237. Id. at 464 (1938).
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denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. - Upon arraignment,
the defendants had pleaded not guilty, and informed the court that
they had no lawyer, but responded when asked that they were ready
for trial.? 9 They conducted their defenses as best they could, but
nevertheless were convicted.2" Following trial, the jailer denied the
prisoners' requests to contact a lavyer.241  After the lower courts
denied Johnson's petitions for habeas corpus, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to consider under what circumstances a defendant
may waive his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel .-2
Emphasizing the importance of the right to counsel, -243 the Johnson
Court conceded that the right may be waived, but concluded that the
district court had not made the necessary finding to support such a
waiver.2' The "protecting duty" of the trial court with respect to an
unrepresented defendant, the Court explained, "imposes the serious
and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining
whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused"
of his right to counsel.245 Thus, the Supreme Court held that, while
the accused may waive the right to counsel, the trial court must
determine whether the record evidences a proper waiver.-'
In Johnson's case, the district court made no such determination
and in denying his petition for habeas corpus stated merely that it is
"unfortunate" if Johnson lost his "right to a new trial through
ignorance or negligence, but such misfortune cannot give this Court
jurisdiction in a habeas corpus case to review and correct the errors
complained of."247  The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning,
holding instead that "[t]he purpose of the constitutional guaranty of a
right to counsel is to protect an accused from conviction resulting
from his own ignorance of his legal and constitutional rights, and the
guaranty would be nullified by a determination that an accused's
ignorant failure to claim his rights removes the protection of the
Constitution."24s  The Court remanded for the district court to
determine whether Johnson competently and intelligently waived his
right to counsel.249
There are very few rights that may not be intentionally
238. See id. at 459-60.
239. See id. at 460.
240. See id. at 460-61.
241. See id. at 461.
242. See id. at 459.
243. See id. at 462-63 (explaining that without Sixth Amendment protection, which
embraces the right to be heard by counsel, the typical defendant lacks the skill to
defend himself against a seasoned prosecutor).
244. See id. at 464.
245. Id at 465.
246. Id
247. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
248. IM.
249. Id at 469.
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relinquished. Some exceptional rights, such as the Thirteenth
Amendment freedom from slavery and the right not to be convicted
by a court lacking jurisdiction to hear the charges, may not be waived
in any context, even by explicit agreement." Along these lines, the
Supreme Court in Mezzanatto noted the suggestion that even if a
defendant stipulated to trial by twelve orangutans, his conviction
would be invalid notwithstanding his consent.2s' Other unwaivable
rights identified by the Supreme Court include the right to conflict-
free representation where there is an actual conflict of interest z2 and
the right to a unanimous jury verdict in a criminal case.253
In the plea bargaining context, courts have consistently held that a
defendant may not waive the requirement that a guilty plea be
voluntary and intelligent,' and that it be entered upon the effective
assistance of counsel.15 In addition, the Ninth Circuit in United States
v. Ruelas 2 6 recently held that, although the defendant effectively
waived the right to appeal as part of his plea bargain, he could not
waive the right to bring the jurisdictional claim on appeal that the
indictment upon which he was convicted failed to allege a valid
offense.2z 7
The requirements for intentional relinquishment of a known right
set out in Johnson v. Zerbst, still a touchstone for most fundamental
rights,158 were applied to the plea bargaining context in the Brady
250. See Rubin, supra note 4, at 493-94.
251. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 204 (1995) (quoting United
States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 588 (7th Cir. 1985)).
252. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 162-63 (1988).
253. See, e.g., United States v. Ullah, 976 F.2d 509, 512 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[Tjhe
requirement of a unanimous verdict is firmly established in our federal system."
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Scalzitti, 578 F.2d
507, 511 (3d Cir. 1978) (noting "the long and unbroken line of federal cases viewing
the requirement of unanimity as an essential element of the criminal jury trial as
established in the federal system"). Additional rights that may not be waived include
the right not to be imprisoned unless charged with and convicted of a crime; the right
to have guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt; the right to have adverse witnesses
testify under oath; the right not to be tried unless competent; and the right to be
present in the courtroom in capital cases. See Rubin, supra note 4, at 493-94.
254. See, e.g., United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 1996).
255. See id. at 844.
256. 106 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1996).
257. See id. at 1418 (stating that the defendant's waiver of his right to appeal in the
plea agreement did not create jurisdiction for the district court to receive the plea).
258. For example, in addition to the right to counsel, the Johnson requirements for
intentional relinquishment have been applied to waivers of the right to a jury trial, see
Adams v. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 278 (1942); to confrontation, see Brookhart v. Janis,
384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966); to a speedy trial, see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525-26
(1972); to double jeopardy, see Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1957); to
trial-type situations, see Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 149-50 (1949)
(compulsory self-incrimination before an administrative agency); Emspak v. United
States 349 U.S. 190, 194-98 (1955) (compulsory self-incrimination before a
congressional committee); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34 (1967) (waiver of counsel in ajuvenile proceeding); and to certain pretrial situations where deemed essential to
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Trilogy, and ultimately in Mezzanatto, as "knowing and voluntary"
waiverP 9 Johnson v. Zerbst makes clear that such an intentional
relinquishment of a right cannot be presumed. It must also be
counseled and frequently must be on the record, or at least in writing.
However, numerous other situations not requiring a "knowing and
voluntary" relinquishment of the right have also been misleadingly
called "waiver."
2. Forfeiture
The Supreme Court has in its more lucid moments acknowledged
the difference between intentional relinquishment and forfeiture, the
"failure to make the timely assertion of a right. ' 2W However, grave
misunderstanding over this type of waiver nevertheless persists. As
discussed above, when the Court in Peretz stated that "[tjhe most
basic rights of criminal defendants are.., subject to waiver,'-' it was
really referring to forfeiture. Nevertheless, the Court in Mezzanatto
mischaracterized the decision in Peretz as articulating a presumption
with respect to the intentional relinquishment of a right. - "
Unlike the Johnson v. Zerbst type of waiver, forfeiture need not be
intentional or conscious, competent or intelligent, counseled or on the
record. For example, in Schneckloth v. Bustanonte,"- ' the Supreme
Court rejected the requirements for intentional relinquishment of a
known right in determining whether a defendant effectively waived
his Fourth Amendment rights by consenting to a warrantless search of
his automobile.264 Although purporting to analyze the "voluntariness"
of Bustamonte's consent, the Court stated that voluntariness in that
context "cannot be taken literally to mean a 'knowing' choice." '
Instead, the Court analogized to principles governing coerced
confessions in explaining that the determination of consent "reflect[s]
an accommodation of the complex of values implicated in police
questioning of a suspect," including "the need for police
questioning."266
For a valid Fourth Amendment "waiver," the Bustanionte Court
protect fairness at trial, see Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967) (waiver of
counsel at post-indictment pretrial lineup); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466-67
(1966) (waiver of right to silence and to counsel in pretrial custody).
259. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 201 (1995); Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742,747 (1970).
260. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993); see also Dix. supra note 3, at
209 (distinguishing waiver from the "failure to pursue required procedures for
implementing the right at issue or for securing a specific remedy for its violation").
261. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991).
262. See supra notes 220-40 and accompanying text.
263. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
264. See id at 219.
265. Id. at 224.
266. Id. at 224-25.
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held, the prosecution need not necessarily prove "that the defendant
knew he had a right to refuse to answer the questions that were
put. 267 Rather, as applied to consent searches, the trial court should
look to "the totality of all the surrounding circumstances"268 to
determine "whether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or
was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied.. ,26I The
courts must perform this inquiry by balancing "two competing
concerns.., the legitimate need for such searches and the equally
important requirement of assuring the absence of coercion. "270 Under
this framework, the Court held that Bustamonte need not have been
aware of or understood the nature of his right to refuse consent to
have lost the protections of the Fourth Amendment.7 '
Numerous commentators have criticized the Court's suggestion in
Bustamonte that the perceived need for warrantless searches has
anything to do with the defendant's subjective "voluntariness" in
waiving his Fourth Amendment rights. Such policy justifications for
limiting the right to be free from unreasonable searches are
completely unrelated "to any conscious choice the defendant or his
attorney may have made." 73 Justice Marshall dissented along these
lines,2 74  questioning how "one can choose to relinquish a
constitutional right-the right to be free of unreasonable searches-
without knowing that he has the alternative of refusing to accede to a
police request to search. '275  Ultimately, the Court's decision in
Bustamonte cannot be understood in terms of waiver as intentional
relinquishment of known right,276 and instead must be recognized as
267. Id. at 227.
268. Id. at 226.
269. Id. at 227.
270. Id.
271. See id. at 232-33. The decision in Bustamonte still has force in the Fourth
Amendment context. See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (applying
Bustamonte to hold that the Fourth Amendment does not require that a lawfully
seized defendant be advised that he is "free to go" before his consent to search will be
recognized as voluntary).
272. See, e.g., Dix, supra note 3, at 196 (criticizing Bustamonte). Dix suggests that
"[ajlthough the Court ultimately articulated its decision in term of waiver, the
considerations it regarded as controlling reveal that the real issue was either the scope
of the right to be free from unreasonable searches or the procedure for implementing
that right." Id. at 197.
273. Id. at 209.
274. See Bustarnonte, 412 U.S. at 284-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Separate
dissents were filed by Justice Douglas, id. at 275, and Justice Brennan, id. at 276.
Justice Blackmun also concurred separately, id. at 249, as did Justice Powell, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, who focused on the availability of habeas
corpus relief, id. at 250.
275. Id. at 277 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
276. The only principled explanation for the result in Bustamonte is that the Court
determined that the intentional relinquishment cases like Johnson v. Zerbst were
simply inapposite in the Fourth Amendment context, deciding instead that "lo]ur
cases do not reflect an uncritical demand for a knowing and intelligent waiver in every
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"forfeiture" of the right by failing to assert it in a timely manner,
which "occurs by operation of law without regard to the defendant's
state of mind."2'
In the plea bargaining context, commentators have suggested that,
as in Bustamonte, the best way to explain the Court's decision in
Tollett regarding the automatic loss upon pleading guilty of non-
jurisdictional antecedent claims is with the concept of forfeiture. In
such instances where antecedent claims are automatically lost, "the
forfeiture of constitutional defenses is justified not by the deliberate
and voluntary consent of the defendant (as is said to be true of
waiver), but by the overriding interests of the state."27- Naturally,
rights that are automatically forfeited by the act of pleading guilty are
not available to the defendant for relinquishment as part of his plea
agreement.27 9
situation where a person has failed to invoke a constitutional protection." Id. at 235.
The Court implied as much by noting that "[waiver is a vague term used for a great
variety of purposes, good and bad, in the law." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Citing Johnson, the Court further suggested that, "[a]lmost without exception, the
requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been applied only to those rights
which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair
trial." Id. at 237. Asserting that "[t]here is a vast difference between those rights that
protect a fair criminal trial and the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment,"
id. at 241, the Court held that "[n]othing, either in the purposes behind requiring a
'knowing' and 'intelligent' waiver of trial rights, or in the practical application of such
a requirement suggests that it ought to be extended to the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures." Id.. see also United States v. Gagnon,
470 U.S. 522, 527 (1985) (per curiam) (holding that the right of the defendant to be
present in courtroom when the judge conferred with a juror 'as lost by the
defendant's failure to object despite the lack of an explicit waiver on the record). The
Court's underlying justifications for this distinction were that the protections of the
Fourth Amendment were not designed to promote "the fairness of the trial" or "the
very integrity of the fact-finding process," Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 242 (internal
quotation marks omitted), and that it would be "unrealistic" to expect police officers
to inform suspects of their right to refuse consent before requesting it. Id. at 245.
277. Westen, supra note 84, at 1214. Unlike "waiver," which is based on the
concept of free choice, "forfeiture rests on a balance between the defendant's interest
in asserting defenses and the state's interest in cutting them off." Id. at 1255; see also
Dix, supra note 3, at 209 (noting that a defendant's conscious choice to forgo invoking
a procedural opportunity may provide a stronger basis for precluding his subsequent
enforcement of the right).
278. Westen, supra note 84, at 1238.
279. Moreover, rights that may not be intentionally relinquished may nevertheless
be forfeited by a failure to assert them. For example, the Eighth Amendment right to
be free from cruel and unusual punishment may not be waived in the sense that such a
claim once ripe may be brought at any time. C Stewart v. LaGrand, 526 U.S. 115, 121
(1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (expressing doubt as to whether a defendant may
consent to execution by "an unacceptably tortuous method"). Yet, if a prisoner fails
ever to bring the claim in the proper forum following required procedures, he has
effectively forfeited the right. Independent societal interests in the fairness of trials
and the maintenance of some civilized standards of criminal justice help ensure that
such rights are not forever lost. Nevertheless, one may theoretically choose to be
tortured or to live out one's life as a slave and the claims will as a practical matter be
"waived."
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As discussed at length in Part II.B. above, the courts that have
considered the issue have agreed that the right to disclosure of
material favorable evidence is one that is not automatically forfeited
by a guilty plea. As a result, the "presumption of waivability" at work
in the forfeiture context is inapplicable to plea bargain waivers of
Brady rights.
3. Election
Another form of waiver, distinct from either intentional
relinquishment or forfeiture, is "election." In the context of contract
remedies, "election" occurs when a party "having two coexistent but
inconsistent remedies chooses to exercise one, in which event he loses
the right thereafter to exercise the other."2 ' For example, in a
contract dispute, affirmance of the contract and a demand for
damages is an election that precludes disaffirmance of the contract
and a prayer for rescission." In this sense, the option of disaffirming
the contract is "waived" by choosing to affirm it.
In the context of criminal procedure, the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination also involves an "election." The
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, pursuant to the Fifth
Amendment, "[e]very criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his
own defense, or to refuse to do so."" However, in any given
prosecution, the same defendant cannot exercise both of those
alternative aspects of the Fifth Amendment simultaneously. Like any
witness, a defendant who testifies relinquishes the privilege against
self-incrimination.283 By the same token, a defendant who exercises
the privilege against self-incrimination as a factual matter has
relinquished the opportunity to testify on his or her own behalf. Yet
no formal "waiver" of the right to testify is required in order for the
defendant to elect to remain silent.
Another example of "election" occurs with the right of self-
representation. The Supreme Court in Faretta v. California2" held
that a defendant has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel
when he "elects" to do so.'s  As noted by the Court in Faretta,
280. Black's Law Dictionary 518 (6th ed. 1990).
281. See, e.g., Melby v. Hawkins Pontiac, Inc., 537 P.2d 807, 810 (Wash. Ct. App.
1975).
282. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971); see also Rock v. Arkansas, 483
U.S. 44, 52-53 (1987) (discussing Harris).
283. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999) (noting that where a
witness testifies he waives the privilege against self-incrimination as to the subject of
the testimony).
284. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
285. Id. at 807. The trial court in that case initially accepted Faretta's waiver of his
right to counsel, but, after quizzing him on the hearsay rule and the state law
governing the challenge of potential jurors, the judge ruled "that Faretta had not
made an intelligent and knowing waiver of his right to the assistance of counsel, and
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"[w]hen an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a
purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with
the right to counsel." 6  However, unlike the other examples of
election, the Court decided in Faretta that "in order to represent
himself, the accused must 'knowingly and intelligently' forgo those
relinquished benefits."'  Having elements of both intentional
relinquishment and forfeiture, election thus constitutes a distinct
variety of waiver.
Since the right to the prosecution's disclosure of material favorable
evidence is not paired with any mutually exclusive right the exercise of
which would relinquish it, election is not the appropriate framework
for analyzing Brady waivers. Instead, occurring as a part of a plea
bargain with the prosecution, such waivers manifest as alienation.
4. Alienation
The transactional nature of some waivers raises the issue of
alienability. Many criminal waivers, particularly but not exclusively
those associated with plea bargains, occur during a negotiation with
the government. In order for a right to be relinquished in such a
context, the right must not only be "waivable," but also "alienable," in
the sense of exchanging the non-exercise of the right for some
consideration, and it must be permissible for the government, rather
than simply another private party, to negotiate for such a waiver. 2
Unless all three requirements are met, the right may not properly be
also ruled that Faretta had no constitutional right to conduct his own defense." Id. at
809-10. Looking at the history of self-representation in this country, as well as the
text of the Sixth Amendment-which "does not provide merely that a defense shall
be made for the accused," but "grants to the accused personally the right to make his
defense," id at 819-the Supreme Court vacated Faretta's conviction, determining
that a defendant has a "constitutional right to conduct his own defense." Id. at 836.
286. Id. at 835.
287. Id. After citing Johnson v. Zerbst, the Court explained that "[alithough a
defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order
competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware
of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will
establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with his eyes open."
Id (internal quotation marks omitted). This reference to "knowing and voluntary"
waiver is misleadingly suggestive of intentional relinquishment. In no other context
does electing to exercise a right, rather than intentionally relinquishing one, require
such awareness. The difference in the context of self-representation between election
and intentional relinquishment is meaningful, since, due to the prosecutor's burden of
proof, a defendant may waive the right to counsel and stand mute without attempting
to represent himself. On balance, the "knowing and intelligent" requirement in
Faretta for electing self-representation may best be understood, though it is not
explicitly designated, as a competency requirement. A defendant may not exercise
his right to self-representation if he is incompetent to do so. The Court suggested as
much when it noted that "[t]he record affirmatively shows that Faretta was literate,
competent, and understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his informed
free will." Id.
288. See Kreimer, supra note 4, at 1386.
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"waived" as part of a bargain with the government. Thus, the
manifestation of waiver as alienation may be seen as a subspecies of
intentional relinquishment that places further restrictions on its
enforceability.
Some rights that may be intentionally relinquished may
nevertheless be "inalienable." For example, one may purposefully
forego the right to vote in an upcoming election by choosing to avoid
the polling place on the critical day. Nevertheless, one may not enter
into an enforceable contract with a neighbor not to vote in exchange
for fifty dollars.9" This situation is analogous to "market-
inalienability," defined by Margaret Jane Radin as property
restrictions on sales but not gifts." °  Other rights may be freely
alienable between private parties, but not in a transaction with the
government. Thus, while a contract with one's grandparents to attend
religious services may be enforceable, such an agreement with the
government is precluded by the First Amendment. a"' This is true
regardless of the voluntariness, awareness or mutual desire of the
parties concerned.2"
In the criminal context, the distinction among alienation, forfeiture,
and intentional relinquishment is well illustrated by the limitations on
waiving the federal statutory right to a speedy trial. Defendants are
protected from undue delays of the prosecution in bringing charges
against them both by statute and by the Sixth Amendment.2 93 The
Supreme Court has long held that the Sixth Amendment right to a
"speedy and public trial" may be intentionally relinquished by
knowing and voluntary waiver.294  However, with respect to the
federal Speedy Trial Act, every circuit that has examined the issue has
determined that a defendant generally "cannot waive his right to a
289. See Kreimer, supra note 4, at 1389-90.
290. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849, 1853(1987).
291. Kreimer, supra note 4, at 1391. "Thus, even if a parolee were to agree to a
parole conditioned on regular church attendance, the condition would be ineffective,
for the government would be barred from seeking such a waiver." Id. The same is
probably true for the right to travel, and the right to choose to have (or not to have)
an abortion. However, the government may nevertheless utilize certain incentives in
these areas. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev.
1413, 1415 (1989).
292. See Alschuler, supra note 11, at 698 (questioning whether a criminal defendant
should be allowed to choose to accept a sentence of ten years of church attendance
rather than 10 years' imprisonment as an intelligent waiver of his First Amendment
rights).
293. See United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302,304 n.1 (1986).
294. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529 (1972) (upholding a waiver of the
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial); see also United States v. Geelan, 520 F.2d
585, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1975) (applying the principle of Barker); 21A Am. Jur. 2d
Criminal Law § 1043 (1998) ("In order to be effective, a waiver [of the Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial] must be shown to have been knowing and
voluntary on the part of the accused.").
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speedy trial under the Act."'295 The reasoning behind this limitation
on the defendant's ability to "waive the time constraints of the Speedy
Trial Act is that the public has as great an interest in a prompt
criminal trial as has the defendant." 296
The statute itself nevertheless provides for some exceptions to the
non-waivability rule. First, the defendant may forfeit his right to a
speedy trial by failing "to move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a
plea of guilty ....,9 Moreover, under the Act, the speedy trial clock
may be tolled with the defendant's consent if the court determines, for
example, that tolling serves the "ends of justice."'  Finally, many
circuits have crafted an equitable exception to the non-waiver rule,
holding that "where the defendant has induced the district court to
misapply the Act," he cannot then rely upon the error to seek
dismissal.29 Taking these exceptions together, a defendant's speedy
trial protections under the Act may be forfeited, either by
inadvertence or by the act of pleading guilty, and may under some
circumstances be intentionally relinquished, but the defendant may
not alienate either the statutory or constitutional right to the
government in exchange for consideration.
In sum, waivers of additional rights as part of a plea agreement
must be analyzed with the recognition of the limitations inherent in
the context of bargaining with the government. Thus, the concept of
alienation recognizes that certain waivers occur, not as unilateral
decisions by the right-holder, but as part of a negotiated transaction
with another party, private or public. The transactional nature of this
type of waiver raises concerns about the relative knowledge and
bargaining strength of the parties. This distinction between alienation
and the other forms of waiver is wholly separate from the requirement
that a waiver be voluntary and intelligent."'
295. United States v. Keith, 42 F.3d 234, 238 (4th Cir. 1994) (listing supportive
cases); see also United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353,359-60 (2d Cir. 1995) (same).
296. Gambino, 59 F.3d at 360; see also United States v. Willis, 958 F.2d 60, 63 (5th
Cir. 1992) (refusing to allow a defendant to waive the Act because such waiver would
subvert the Act's purpose of protecting society's interest in speedy justice).
297. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (1994); see also Gambino, 59 F.3d at 360. A guilty plea
also forfeits the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial as a non-jurisdictional
antecedent claim. See Nelson v. Hargett, 989 F.2d 847, 850 (5th Cir. 1993).
29& See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A)(1994); United States v. Saltzman, 984 F.2d
1087, 1091 (10th Cir. 1993); Willis, 958 F.2d at 64.
299. Willis, 958 F.2d at 63; see also Gambino, 59 F.3d at 360; Keith, 42 F.3d at 238-
39. However, the courts have limited that exception to deliberate "sandbagging" by
the defendant, explaining that "[ojur holding that the provisions of the Act are non-
waivable would be meaningless if we adopted the rule that the defendant waives his
ability to move for dismissal of the indictment simply by asking for or agreeing to a
continuance." Willis, 958 F.2d at 64.
300. See, e.g., 21A Am. Jur. 2d Crimzinal Law § 1043 (1998) ("The prosecution may
not make the right to a speedy trial an item of barter in plea bargaining situations.").
301. As articulated by one commentator
The policy that some rights can never be waived and others can be waived
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As demonstrated by the Tollett decision, some antecedent claims
that would not be alienable to the government as part of a negotiated
agreement, such as intentional racial discrimination in the
composition of a grand jury, may still be automatically forfeited by the
act of pleading guilty.3" However, for those rights that are not
automatically forfeited by pleading, such as the right to disclosure of
material favorable evidence, the best analytic framework is alienation.
The next section applies four doctrinal disciplines to determine
whether a defendant may alienate that right to Brady material as part
of a plea agreement.
B. Applying Legal Pragmatism to Determine the Limitations on
Alienating Rights to the Government
The courts have yet to recognize any universal theory clarifying the
potential limits on a defendant's ability to alienate his rights to the
government as part of a plea agreement. In fact, pursuit of a singular
theory would miss the point raised by Legal Pragmatism that such
problems are best solved by considering multiple theoretical
viewpoints. In this section, theoretical constructs from four legal
disciplines-unconstitutional conditions, contracts, property and
procedural due process-are applied to determine whether a
defendant may alienate his rights under Brady v. Maryland and its
progeny to disclosure of material favorable evidence. Such plea
bargain Brady waivers include scenarios where the prosecution was
aware of the favorable evidence at the time of the plea, where the
prosecution reasonably should have been aware of the evidence at the
time of the plea, and where the evidence first came to light after the
plea was entered. In any of these three scenarios, an enforceable
Brady waiver would preclude the defendant from withdrawing his or
her guilty plea. Each legal discipline considered below points to the
same conclusion, that Brady is among the few rights that may not be
waived as part of a plea bargain. On a holistic level, this section
demonstrates the utility of the Legal Pragmatist approach of
simultaneously considering multiple theoretical viewpoints in
analyzing whether a right may be alienated to the government as part
of a plea agreement.
1. Unconstitutional Conditions
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions provides that "even if a
only in noncapital cases is not part of the Johnson framework, there being
no reason to assume that all the forbidden waivers are not voluntary and
knowing. Rather, the doctrine of unwaivable rights limits the operation of
that framework.
Rubin, supra note 4, at 494.
302. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258,266-67 (1973).
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state has absolute discretion to grant or deny a privilege or benefit, it
cannot grant the privilege subject to conditions that improperly
'coerce,' 'pressure,' or 'induce' the waiver of constitutional rights."'
Rooted in the Due Process Clause, the doctrine "constrains the ability
of a state to impose punishment on an individual for the exercise of a
constitutional right," recognizing that "[w]ithholding a benefit upon
such a condition imposes a penalty on the exercise of the right that is
indistinguishable from a punishment imposed directly by the state."'
On its face, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions seems
particularly well suited to the analysis of plea bargain waivers. By
recognizing the detrimental impacts of the unequal bargaining
strength of defendants relative to the prosecution, unconstitutional
conditions should be instructive in determining whether rights may be
alienated to the prosecution as part of a plea agreement. However,
unconstitutional conditions ultimately fails to provide a basis for
distinguishing plea bargain waivers that are enforceable from those
that are unenforceable. This failure could not be predicted by looking
within the four comers of the doctrine itself and points up the danger
of fixating on a single theoretical construct.
In modem cases applying the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, the Supreme Court has struck down various "schemes
granting a variety of benefits in return for the individual's waiver of
fundamental rights."3'5 Of these, numerous cases have addressed how
the government's withholding of a benefit can impinge on the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. For example, in
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, the Supreme Court considered whether a
political party officer could be removed from his position by the State
of New York, and, by statute, "barred for five years from holding any
other party or public office, because he has refused to waive his
constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination."'
Emphasizing that "direct economic sanctions and imprisonment are
not the only penalties capable of forcing the self-incrimination which
303. Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Foreword:
Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 Harv. L
Rev. 4,6-7 (1988).
304. McCoy & Mirra, supra note 11, at 887.
305. Id. at 892.
306. 431 U.S. 801, 802 (1977). The Court began by recalling that in previous cases
it had held that "when a State compels testimony by threatening to inflict potent
sanctions unless the constitutional privilege is surrendered, that testimony is obtained
in violation of the Fifth Amendment and cannot be used against the declarant in a
subsequent criminal prosecution," id. at 805 (discussing Garrity v. New Jersey, 385
U.S. 493 (1967)), and that by the same token "a State may not impose substantial
penalties" upon a witness, like termination of employment, because the -witness
elects to exercise his Fifth Amendment right not to give incriminating testimony
against himself," id. (discussing Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968)). Taken
together, the Court explained, "[t]hese cases settle that government cannot penalize
assertion of the constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination by
imposing sanctions to compel testimony which has not been immunized." Id. at 806.
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the [Fifth] Amendment forbids,"3°7 the Court held that, although there
is no constitutional or statutory right to serve as a political party
official, a State may not condition the benefits of service on the
relinquishment of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination."°8 Not even a "State's overriding interest in preserving
public confidence in the integrity of its political process justifies the
constitutional infringement," since citizens may not be coerced into
incriminating themselves merely "because it serves a governmental
need."3"
The Court has also recognized that not merely threats of
withholding a benefit but also promises of more lenient treatment in
exchange for relinquishment of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination can constitute impermissible coercion. For
example, in Arizona v. Fulminante, a majority of Justices held that the
promise of one prisoner to protect another prisoner from physical
harm at the hands of other inmates if he confessed to the murder with
which he was charged was so coercive as to require overturning his
conviction and death sentence.310 In the form of such a promise, the
Court emphasized, coercion "'can be mental as well as physical,
and.., the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an
unconstitutional inquisition.""'3 "
Applied to the context of plea bargain waivers, the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions would seem to preclude the government
from seeking a waiver of the defendant's rights under Brady v.
Maryland. Although the defendant has no right to a plea bargain, the
government may not condition the benefit of leniency in the form of a
lower sentence or lesser charge upon the defendant's relinquishment
of his due process right to the prosecutor's disclosure of material
favorable evidence. Whether seen as a threat to withhold the bargain
if the defendant refuses to comply or a promise to grant the bargain to
induce the defendant to comply, the tactic is impermissibly coercive
under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
The problem with the application of the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions to the issue of plea bargain waivers is that
it proves too much: All plea bargains arguably should constitute an
impermissible unconstitutional condition. During a plea bargain, the
prosecution routinely "offers criminal defendants the benefit of a
307. Id. at 806. Rather, even a more subtle means of persuasion, such as the
"threatened loss of such widely sought positions, with their power and perquisites, is
inherently coercive." Id. at 807. Induced self-incrimination diminishes reputation in
the community and imposes significant "economic consequences." Id. Most
importantly, the Court held, it requires one "to forfeit one constitutionally protected
right as the price for exercising another." Id. at 807-08.
308. See id.
309. Id. at 808.
310. 499 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1991).
311. Id. at 287 (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960)).
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reduced sentence on the condition that they forgo the exercise of their
right to trial and their right to refuse to incriminate themselves." '
Accordingly, the entire practice of plea bargaining itself "imposes an
unconstitutional penalty on the right to trial. 3 3
In fact, prior to the Brady Trilogy, the Supreme Court appeared
poised to invalidate the practice of plea bargaining under the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions. As far back as the late nineteenth
century, the Supreme Court had begun to suggest that a conviction
could not rest upon a bargained-for guilty plea because an admission
of guilt, induced either by threats or promises, is presumptively
involuntary. The Court in Branz v. United States"4 held inadmissible a
custodial confession, made in response to the state's suggestion that
the confession would benefit Brain, because a confession cannot be
free and voluntary if extracted through any improper influence, which
equally prohibits threats and violence as well as direct or implied
promises.315
Half a century later, the Court in Walker v. Johnston applied this
presumption of involuntariness to a defendant who claimed that he
had pleaded guilty only after he had been denied a request to see his
lawyer and told he would get "twice as great" a sentence if he refused
to plead.316 The Court remanded for a hearing on the claims, holding
that if he "did not voluntarily waive his right to counsel, or if he was
deceived or coerced by the prosecutor into entering a guilty plea, he
was deprived of a constitutional right."3 7
More recently, the Court remanded in Machibroda v. United States,
when the defendant, after pleading guilty to robbery and receiving a
sentence of forty years, challenged his plea as involuntarily induced by
the prosecutor's promise that he would get no more than twenty years
if he pleaded guilty.318 The Court held that Machibroda was entitled
to a hearing on his claims since a "guilty plea, if induced by promises
or threats which deprive it of the character of a voluntary act, is
312. McCoy & Mirra, supra note 11, at 887.
If the right to trial... is a fundamental constitutional right, any state attempt
to deter its exercise should violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment unless the state can demonstrate a justification sufficient to
meet the stringent 'compelling interest test.' If the right to trial without self-
incrimination is fundamental, plea bargaining should be found
unconstitutional unless the state is able to show that it is the least restrictive
means available to effectuate a compelling state objective.
Id at 888 (footnotes omitted).
313. Id at 905; see also Sullivan, supra note 291, at 1502.
314. 168 U.S. 532,564-65 (1897).
315. Id. at 542-54.
316. 312 U.S. 275, 281 (1941).
317. Id. at 286 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1934) (defendant must be
aware of right to counsel before he can waive that right), and Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U.S. 103 (1935) (conviction cannot be based on prosecution's knowing use of
pejury)).
318. 368 U.S. 487, 488-89 (1962).
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void."319 Likewise, the Court held in Lynumn v. Illinois that a
confession induced by threats that the defendant's children would be
taken away if she did not cooperate, combined with promises of
lenient treatment if she confessed, was involuntary. In each of these
latter cases, the Court simply assumed without explanation that the
defendants were entitled to relief if their allegations were proven.
The Court's suggestions that a conviction could not rest upon a
bargained-for guilty plea attained their fullest expression in United
States v. Jackson.321 The Jackson Court invalidated a provision of the
Federal Kidnapping Act that provided for the potential imposition of
the death penalty for conviction by jury verdict but not by guilty
plea.322 Using the language of unconstitutional conditions, the
Supreme Court upheld the district court's determination that because
a defendant could assert his right to trial only if he was willing to risk
the death penalty, the provision imposed "an impermissible burden
upon the exercise of a constitutional right.'3
23
Justice Stewart for the Court rejected the Government's argument
that any "incidental effect of inducing defendants" not to go to trial
was irrelevant since the sentencing differential in the statute actually
"operates to mitigate the severity of the punishment. '324 Rather, the
Court stated that "[w]hatever might be said of Congress' objectives,
they cannot be pursued by means that needlessly chill the exercise of
basic constitutional rights."3" The question, the Court explained, "is
not whether the chilling effect is 'incidental' rather than intentional;
the question is whether that effect is unnecessary and therefore
excessive. ' '32
6
The answer, according to the Court, was that the sentencing
provision was both unnecessary and excessive: "Congress can of
course mitigate the severity of capital punishment. The goal of
limiting the death penalty to cases in which a jury recommends it is an
entirely legitimate one. But that goal can be achieved without
penalizing those defendants who plead not guilty and demand jury
trial. 3 27 Thus, while not purporting to address the constitutionality of
319. Id. at 493.
320. See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 531-34 (1963).
321. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
322. Id. at 571.
323. Id. at 572. However, the judgment of the district court dismissing the
indictment was reversed on the grounds that the sentencing provision was "severable
from the remainder of the statute." Id. at 572.
324. Id. at 582.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. Recognizing that not "every defendant who enters a guilty plea to a charge
under the Act does so involuntarily," the Court nevertheless held that "[tihe power to
reject coerced guilty pleas and involuntary jury waivers might alleviate, but it cannot
totally eliminate, the constitutional infirmity in the capital punishment provision of
the Federal Kidnapping Act." Id. at 583. Justice White, joined by Justice Black,
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plea bargains in general, the Court in Jackson seemed to suggest that
if the practice of plea bargaining had the result of needlessly
"'chilling,' burdening,' or 'encouraging the waiver of' the
constitutional right to plead not guilty, the system as a whole would be
unconstitutional. 328
The Court in Jackson had reached the doctrinal verge of
invalidating plea bargaining across the board. However, by the time
Jackson was handed down, plea bargains had become a fixed feature
of criminal adjudication.329 In any event, Jackson forced the moment
to its crisis. Just two years later, the Court handed down its trilogy of
cases concluding once and for all that plea bargaining,
notwithstanding its system of promises and threats, is a presumptively
valid and necessary aspect of our criminal justice system.3
The Court in Brady v. United States returned to precisely the same
kidnapping statute considered in Jackson,33I and without explicitly
overruling Jackson, Justice White, who had dissented in that case,
wrote for the majority in Brady and turned Jackson on its head.
Where Jackson had suggested that the system of inducements to plead
guilty inherent in the Federal Kidnapping Act's sentencing provision
was constitutionally impermissible, even while recognizing that not
"every defendant who enters a guilty plea to a charge under the Act
does so involuntarily, 33 2 Justice White quoted that passage out of
context to suggest just the opposite: that since not every defendant is
coerced to plead guilty by the inducements in the Act, guilty pleas
remain presumptively valid, as long as they are "both 'voluntary' and
'intelligent."'333  In effect, Justice White in Brady reinterpreted
Jackson as if his dissent had been the majority opinion, and, in doing
dissented on this point, arguing that, since not every defendant would be affected by
the sentencing provision, reliance upon the trial courts to carefully examine the guilty
pleas and jury waivers is sufficient "to make sure that they have been neither coerced
nor encouraged by the death penalty power in the jury." Id. at 592 (White, J.,
dissenting).
328. Becker, supra note 6, at 793 (discussing Jackson).
329. See, eg., Guidorizzi, supra note 22, at 762 ("The Supreme Court did not
address the constitutionality of plea bargaining until after its establishment as a part
of the criminal justice system.").
330. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 (1970).
331. Id. at 743.
332. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 583.
333. Brady, 397 U.S. at 747 (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238. 242 (1969)).
Where Jackson had emphasized that "[a] procedure need not be inherently coercive
in order that it be held to impose an impermissible burden upon the assertion of a
constitutional right," Jackson, 390 U.S. at 583, Justice White wrote in Brady: "Plainly,
it seems to us, Jackson ruled neither that all pleas of guilty encouraged by the fear of
a possible death sentence are involuntary pleas nor that such encouraged pleas are
invalid whether involuntary or not." Brady, 397 U.S. at 747; see also Guidorizzi, supra
note 22, at 762 ("Noting that not every plea made for fear of the death penalty was
invalid, the Court stated that Jackson merely required that guilty pleas be intelligent
and voluntary.").
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so, treated plea bargaining as unilateral waiver-unconnected to any
external pressures.
The Supreme Court in the Brady Trilogy abruptly repudiated its
suggestions in cases leading up to and including Jackson that plea
bargains may be unconstitutional. Without any explicit
acknowledgment, the Court simply removed plea bargaining (as
somehow distinct from confessions) from the jurisprudential ambit of
unconstitutional conditions, which seemed to compel a determination
that the practice was an impermissible burden on a defendant's right
to go to trial. As noted by one commentator, "[w]hat is remarkable
about these opinions is not the result they reached; rather, it is the
essential lawlessness of the opinions themselves." 3
The Court apparently saw cataclysmic potential in carrying Jackson
to its logical conclusion and finding plea bargaining unconstitutional.
A contrary holding would require the States and Federal
Government to forbid guilty pleas altogether, to provide a single
invariable penalty for each crime defined by the statutes, or to place
the sentencing function in a separate authority having no knowledge
of the manner in which the conviction in each case was obtained. In
any event, it would be necessary to forbid prosecutors and judges to
accept guilty pleas to selected counts, to lesser included offenses, or
to reduced charges.3
35
Although the Court left itself an out, suggesting that it might later
reconsider its decision "if the encouragement of guilty pleas by offers
of leniency substantially increased the likelihood that defendants,
advised by competent counsel, would falsely condemn themselves, 3 36
the Court has never flinched from its determination that plea
bargaining must be valid notwithstanding the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions.
Following the Brady Trilogy, the Court briefly revived
unconstitutional conditions analysis in the context the forfeiture of
antecedent claims by a guilty plea. The Court in Blackledge v. Perry
reached back to Jackson to hold that a "person convicted of an
offense is entitled to pursue his statutory right to a trial de novo,
without apprehension that the State will retaliate by substituting a
more serious charge for the original one, thus subjecting him to a
significantly increased potential period of incarceration.137  In
334. Becker, supra note 6, at 795.
335. Brady, 397 U.S. at 753.
336. Id. at 758. This suggestion is somewhat disingenuous since the Court did not
explain how, given the presumptive validity of the plea bargaining, it would ever learn
that the defendants were in fact falsely condemning themselves.
337. 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974). After Perry exercised his statutory right to appeal a
misdemeanor assault conviction to the superior court, but before he appeared for his
new trial, the prosecutor obtained a new indictment covering the same conduct for
which Perry was convicted in the district court but charging Perry with felony assault
with intent to kill rather than misdemeanor assault. Id. at 23. Perry pleaded guilty
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Blackledge v. Perry, the "functional equivalent of a plea bargaining
case," the Court "seemed to imply that the increased sentence
imposed after trial because the defendant rejected the bargain was an
unconstitutional penalty on the right to trial." 3- Nevertheless, it is
unclear whether Blackledge v. Perry retains any force in the plea
bargaining context, and in any event how, under the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions, the validity of plea bargain waivers could
be distinguished from the validity of the practice of plea bargaining
itself.
In sum, under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the
prosecution should not be able to seek a plea bargain waiver of the
defendant's right to disclosure of material favorable evidence.
However, starting with the Brady Trilogy, the Court has resolutely
reaffirmed, apparently on a crass accounting of judicial economy, that
plea bargaining and its attendant waivers are immune to a claim of
unconstitutional conditions. Most recently, the Court in Mezzanatto
rejected the argument that an agreement to waive the exclusion of
statements made in the course of plea discussions would be
"inherently unfair and coercive," and "invite prosecutorial
overreaching and abuse" due to the "gross disparity in the relative
bargaining power of the parties to a plea agreement," '339 on the
grounds that the waiver agreement is "indistinguishable from any of a
number of difficult choices that criminal defendants face every day" as
part of the plea bargaining process.' While throwing the Court's
and was sentenced to seven years, but petitioned in federal court for writ of habeas
corpus on the grounds that the felony indictment in superior court constituted double
jeopardy and deprived him of due process of law. The federal district court granted
the writ, holding that, despite his guilty plea, Perry had not waived the right to bring
his claims. See id. at 24. Justice Stewart, who had authored Jackson, began for the
Court by narrowing the focus to Perry's claim that "the indictment on the felony
charge constituted a penalty for his exercising his statutory right to appeal." Id. at 25.
After reviewing cases holding that the threat of increased punishment upon retrial
after appeal violates due process if motivated by "vindictiveness," see id. at 25-27
(reviewing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), Colten v. Kentucky, 407
U.S. 104 (1972), and Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973)), Justice Stewart
framed the question as "whether the opportunities for vindictiveness in this situation
are such as to impel the conclusion that due process of law requires" that an increased
sentence cannot be imposed on retrial. Id. at 27.
338. McCoy & Mirra, supra note 11, at 908.
339. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 209 (1995) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
340. Id- at 209. The Mezzanatto Court conceded that plea bargaining "necessarily
exerts pressure on defendants to plead guilty and to abandon a series of fundamental
rights." Id. at 209-10. However, the Court reiterated that "the imposition of these
difficult choices is an inevitable-and permissible-attribute of any legitimate system
which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas." Id. at 210 (citations, internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted). The possibility that a particular waiver
agreement may not be the product of an informed and voluntary decision, the Court
maintained, "does not justify invalidating all such agreements." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). Absent "clear evidence" of particular instances of prosecutorial
misconduct, or an "affirmative indication that the agreement was entered into
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evasive jurisprudence on plea bargaining into stark relief,
unconstitutional conditions on its own fails to distinguish rights that
may be waived as part of a plea bargain from those that may not.
Instead, other disciplines must be brought to bear.
2. Contracts
Into the doctrinal vacuum created by the Court's removal of plea
bargaining from unconstitutional conditions analysis, courts and
commentators alike have thrust contract principles. 4 Picking up on
hints in the Brady Trilogy positing the "mutuality of advantage"
inherent in plea bargains,2 the Court in Santobello v. New York
explicitly applied contract principles to plea bargaining in deciding
that the prosecutor's failure to keep a commitment concerning a
sentence recommendation entitled the defendant to a new trial. 3
The justification for plea bargaining, the Santobello Court
explained, "presuppose[s] fairness in securing agreement between an
accused and a prosecutor." '  As such, pleas that rest "on a promise
or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the
inducement or consideration," are acceptable as long as "such
promise must be fulfilled."3" Thus, Santobello marked a shift away
from treating plea bargains as unsolicited unilateral waivers, as in the
Brady Trilogy, to treating them as balanced and fair commercial
transactions in which prosecutors and defendants have "'bargained'
and negotiated for a particular plea.""3 6
Some legal commentators criticized the Court's contract-based
approach, arguing that "the image of plea bargaining as adversarial
unknowingly or involuntarily," not alleged in his case, Mezzanatto's waiver
agreement was held presumptively "valid and enforceable." Id.
341. See Calhoun, supra note 109, at 150 (suggesting that the failure of the Court to
address plea bargain waivers in light of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is
best explained by the fact that "current theory dictates that the plea bargaining
process reflects an arms-length transaction in which the defendant is totally free to
accept or reject the government's offer"); McCoy & Mirra, supra note 11, at 910.
The Supreme Court's insistence that plea bargaining is constitutional in spite
of the apparent applicability of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and
in spite of the Court's application of that doctrine in closely analogous
situations seems attributable to an assumption that plea bargaining is merely
a contractual arrangement between a defendant and the state.
Id.; see also Westen & Westin, supra note 11, at 471 ("[I]n a legal system where most
convictions are based on guilty pleas and most guilty pleas are based on bargained-for
promises, the most important right of the criminally accused may be found not in the
law of trial procedure, but in the law of contracts.").
342. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,752 (1970).
343. 404 U.S. 257, 257-58, 262 (1971).
344. Id. at 261.
345. Id. at 262.
346. Id.; see also Becker, supra note 6, at 825 ("Santobello cannot be explained by
assuming that the Court found the plea either involuntary or unintelligent."); Westen
& Westin, supra note 11, at 473-76 (discussing contract-based analysis of Santobello).
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negotiation leading to contract-like agreements obscures the
significant costs current methods of plea bargaining impose on the
criminal justice system." 7 These costs include the unequal treatment
of defendants, the undermining of "legislative intent on the correct
punishment for defendants convicted of specified crimes," and the
elimination of the criminal trial as a "morality play."' s Nevertheless,
since Santobello, the Court has continued to stress the "give and take
of plea bargaining,"" resting its decisions on the explicit assumption
that the prosecutor and defense "arguably possess relatively equal
bargaining power."350
Other legal commentators have embraced the Court's focus on
contract principles as the best way to explain the validity of plea
bargaining. For example, Peter Westen and David Westin suggested
that the law of contracts was "pertinent to the formulation of a
constitutional law of plea agreements on several levels."35  Along
these lines, Westen and Westin called for the courts to
"'constitutionalize' the preliminary contractual questions of formation
and breach" in interpreting and enforcing plea bargainsY
Still other scholars have applied contract theory itself in arguing for
the abolition of "any bargained-for allocation of criminal
347. Gifford, supra note 11, at 40; see also Tigar, supra note 3, at 9 ("Just as
freedom of contract offered a justification for outright robbery by a fortunate few,
ranging from employers extracting unconscionable concessions from the unorganized
employees to merchants driving unconscionable bargains with their customers, so it
has been in the criminal process the theoretical construct in whose name men are said
to have voluntarily given up their liberty.").
348. See Gifford, supra note 11, at 40-41.
349. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 802-03 (1989)
(noting the "mutual interests that support the practice of plea bargaining").
350. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 362 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). The Court has recognized some limits to contract-based analysis of plea
bargains. For example, the defendant in Mabr' v. Johnson, charged with burglary
and assault, accepted the prosecutor's offer of concurrent 21- and 12-year sentences if
he pleaded guilty. 467 U.S. 504, 505-06 (1984). However, prior to entry of the plea,
the prosecutor told Johnson "that a mistake had been made and withdrew the offer,"
proposing instead consecutive 21-year sentences. Id. at 506. Johnson initially rejected
the new offer and elected to stand trial, but plea negotiations resumed after the judge
declared a mistrial, ultimately resulting in Johnson's acceptance of the prosecutor's
second offer. Id. The Supreme Court held that a defendant's acceptance of a
prosecutor's proposed plea bargain does not create a constitutional right to have the
bargain specifically enforced. See id. at 507-08, 510. Thus, while contract analysis
would require that the prosecutor be held to the terms of his offer once accepted by
the defendant, the Court concluded that since Johnson ultimately pleaded guilty
"with the advice of competent counsel and with full awareness of the consequences,"
id. at 510, he "was not deprived of his liberty in any fundamentally unfair way," id. at
511.
351. Westen & Westin, supra note 11, at 529; see also Easterbrook, supra note 172,
at 309 (concluding that the benefits derived by both defendants and prosecutors from
plea bargaining makes the process socially desirable).
352. Westen & Westin, supra note 11, at 529.
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punishment. 3 53  For example, Albert Alschuler cited familiar
contracts and economics concepts of duress and externalities in
arguing that "pretty pictures of well-informed parties striking a
rational balance of litigation risks miss an important part of what
invariably happens when a system of plea bargaining moves from
abstraction to reality. '354  Rather, as noted by Donald Gifford,
"[d]efendants are coerced into pleading guilty because they face the
risk of far more severe penalties if tried and convicted than if
sentenced after a guilty plea."355 In particular, waivers of additional
rights as part of the plea agreement have come under fire as
"contracts of adhesion."356
Faced with these criticisms, even contract theory advocates have
conceded some limits on plea bargain waivers. Westen and Westin,
for example, acknowledged that "the state cannot obtain a valid
waiver by threatening defendants or their loved ones with physical
abuse, or by threats of illegal trial tactics or an illegal sentence." '357
Echoing the unconstitutional conditions approach, they also suggested
that "a guilty plea is invalid if based on an inducement that is so
advantageous compared to the alternative value of standing trial that
even a defendant who believes himself to be factually innocent would
plead guilty.""35 Thus, they noted, some plea bargain waivers must be
precluded under a contract-based approach.
A similarly nuanced contract-based analysis of plea bargains is
presented by Robert E. Scott and William J. Stuntz in Plea Bargaining
as Contract.35 9 Acknowledging that "there are fundamental structural
impediments in the plea bargaining context,"'360 Scott and Stuntz
nevertheless argue that "[t]hese barriers to efficient bargaining are
353. Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining, supra note 11, at 1910 (citing Albert W.
Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 Cal. L. Rev. 652, 695-703 (1981),
and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J.
Legal Stud. 43, 70-74 (1988)).
354. Alschuler, supra note 11, at 690; see also Gifford, supra note 11, at 38 (arguing
that plea bargains are not similar to commercial arms-length agreements because
prosecutors substantially dictate the terms in most cases).
355. Gifford, supra note 11, at 39 (footnote omitted).
356. See, e.g., United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 216 (1995) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("As the Government conceded during oral argument, defendants are
generally in no position to challenge demands for these waivers, and the use of waiver
provisions as contracts of adhesion has become accepted practice."). But see Scott &
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining, supra note 11, at 1922 (contrasting plea bargains and
traditional contracts of adhesion).
357. Westen & Westin, supra note 11, at 479.
358. Id. at 494 (emphasis omitted).
359. Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining, supra note 11.
360. See id. at 1910; see also id. at 1934 ("Contract norms might justify some
constraints, both to reduce the risk of process defects and to enhance the dignitary
values associated with an exchange involving the entitlement to personal liberty.").
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not, however, grounds for abolition, but instead suggest more focused
reforms of current practices. 361
Central to this conditional defense of plea bargaining as contract
are the ameliorative effects of such protections drawn from the "law
of consumer transactions" as "[e]nhanced disclosure and cooling-off
periods. 362 For plea bargaining to live up to its billing as a "voluntary
exchange" that "offers people more choices than they would
otherwise enjoy," Scott and Stuntz emphasize that it must be based on
"a free, informed, and rational choice." '  Preserving the core of this
idea, they conclude, "requires rules that prohibit enforcement where
individual promises were the product of duress or unconscionable
information deficits, or where the parties lacked the capacity and
judgment to evaluate the risks being exchanged." -'  Thus, while not
cited explicitly, the prosecution's disclosure of material favorable
evidence appears to play an important role in the contract-based
defense of plea bargaining proposed by Scott and Stuntz.
Other theorists applying contract analysis to plea bargains have
specifically focused on the importance of disclosure in ensuring the
validity of the plea bargains. 36  The justifications for preplea
disclosure of favorable evidence under a contracts-based defense
include empowering the defendant, producing fairer bargains and
advancing societal values.3" As these commentators have pointed
out, numerous contract principles recognize that disparities in
information between the parties can render an agreement
unenforceable. 367 Each of these principles suggests that Brady rights
may not be alienated to the government in a plea bargain.
Duress, for example, is a defense to the formation of a contract if
one party "can prove that he would not have entered into the contract
absent the improperly coercive behavior of the other contracting
party."3" Accordingly, a plea agreement formed under duress is
unenforceable under contract principles: 9 Some legal scholars have
361. See id. at 1910; see also id. at 1913 (If force, fraud and distributional unfairness
"are pervasive in the plea bargaining process, then plea bargaining should be
abolished-not as a matter of constitutional law, but as a matter of contract law and
contract principles.").
362. Id at 1926. "Indeed, plea bargaining doctrine already uses these to some
extent." Id. at 1926-27.
363. See id. at 1918.
364. See id.
365. See, e.g., Ostrow, supra note 167, at 1606 ("If accepted as the basis for the
legitimacy of the guilty-plea process, the consensual-transaction conception provides
a rationale for instituting a broad preplea duty to disclose to the defendant all
information that bears on the likelihood of trial conviction.").
366. See id. at 1606.09.
367. See id. at 1609-10 ("[T]he contract-law doctrines of duress and mistake lend
strong support to the case for preplea disclosure.").
368. Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining, supra note 11. at 1919.
369. See id. at 1920.
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suggested that the overall imbalance in the relative bargaining
strengths of the defendant and the government in the plea bargaining
process presents "striking similarities to a contract made under
duress. "370
Commentators have argued that, at a minimum, the doctrine of
duress "calls for substantial disclosure by the prosecutor." '371 Without
preplea disclosure of favorable evidence, the prosecutor can "inflate
the pressure to plead guilty by misrepresenting the strength of the
government's case; that is, by bluffing. 3 7 On the other hand, refusing
to enforce a waiver of the prosecution's duty to disclose "would
diminish the apparent likelihood of threatened punishment and
thereby reduce the coercion inherent in the choice confronting the
defendant." '373
Another contract defense, the doctrine of unilateral mistake, holds
that a contract is voidable at the instance of the mistaken party if "a
material mistake by one side either was or plainly should have been
known to the other side."374 A party that lacks material information
may void the bargain "if the other engaged in misrepresentation or its
functional equivalent. 3 75  This resembles the situation when the
defendant waives the prosecution's duty to disclose Brady material:
by exercising superior bargaining power, the prosecution is able to
negotiate away its duty to disclose information that must be known by
the defendant in order to enter a valid guilty plea.
Thus, as with duress, the contract principle of unilateral mistake
"supports the introduction of a disclosure requirement into the plea-
bargaining process. 3 76 The principle of unilateral mistake recognizes
that the "assumption of efficient contracting breaks down where the
contracting parties cannot reliably exchange important
information. 3 77 Without unwaivable preplea disclosure to minimize
the potential for such mistake, the rationale for the constitutionality of
a plea bargain as a contract diminishes. As noted by Scott and Stuntz:
370. Ostrow, supra note 167, at 1609. "Taken to its logical conclusion, the analogy
between duress and the circumstances of plea bargaining would entail abolition of the
plea-negotiation process." Id.
371. See id. at 1609.
372. See id. at 1609-10. "The force of duress increases with the credibility and
magnitude of the threat relative to the offer; in particular, the higher the possibility of
conviction, the stronger the duress." Id. at 1609.
373. See id. at 1609-10.
374. Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining, supra note 11, at 1957.
375. See id.
376. Ostrow, supra note 167, at 1610; see also Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining,
supra note 11, at 1958 n.163 (advocating a "commonsense application of unilateral
mistake doctrine: the government could easily have prevented the defendant's error
(indeed, the government induced it), and the defendant was accordingly excused from
his bargain").
377. Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining, supra note 11, at 1940. "All this argues for a
more generous mistake or excuse rule in plea bargaining (on the defendant's side)
than in ordinary contract cases." Id. at 1959.
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The assumption that contracting parties will reach mutually
advantageous and efficient bargains (so long as transaction costs are
less than the gains from trade) ignores significant barriers to efficient
contracting, barriers found in a wide variety of relationships.
Despite the parties' seeming ability to transact at low cost, strategic
considerations may block the disclosure of necessary information or
inhibit the development of the kinds of credible commitments that
are needed for the relationship to go forward. 'a8
The contract principle of unconscionability "describes a defective
bargaining process-an unreasonable failure of one party to inform
the other about important aspects of the exchange." -
Unconscionability "serves as a kind of backstop, a means of granting
relief where defects in the bargaining process, though serious, do not
rise to the level of fraud or duress."'  This principle as well is
suggestive of the problems that would result if a waiver of preplea
disclosure were enforced since the "most common claim of
unconscionability is really a claim of fraudulent concealment."'-
Under the materiality requirements of Brady and its progeny, the
prosecutor's duty to disclose by definition encompasses only the
information that is critical to the exchange, information that would
have led the defendant to forego the plea agreement and insist on a
trial. Thus, a plea bargain containing a Brady waiver appears to be an
unconscionable contract. As with the principles of duress and
mistake, while plea bargaining in general might othervise survive a
challenge of unconscionability,2 the failure of the prosecution to
comply with its duty to disclose favorable evidence within its
constructive notice by obtaining the defendant's waiver as part of the
bargain would appear to invalidate the plea agreement itself as a
matter of contract law.
As noted by the Supreme Court, a contract is also void when its
enforcement would violate "public policy. ''  As applied to plea
agreements, the threshold question of this doctrine is whether the
enforced waiver of "constitutional rights impairs to an appreciable
extent any of the policies behind the rights involved."'  Policies
378. Id. at 1935.
379. Id- at 1921 n.42.
380. See id. at 1921.
381. Id. at 1922.
382. See id.
383. See Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) ("The relevant principle is
well established: a promise is unenforceable if the interest in its enforcement is
outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy harmed by enforcement of the
agreement."); see also Calhoun, supra note 109, at 160 ("The concept that a promise
or agreement may be unenforceable at law because its terms conflict with public
policy is one which derives from traditional common law principles." Iciting
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178(1) (1981))).
384. Newton, 480 U.S. at 392 n.2 (citation, alterations, and internal quotation marks
omitted).
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threatened by Brady waivers include the fairness and efficiency of
criminal adjudications, as well as "the public's need to perceive the
criminal justice system as accurate. '385  Moreover, the public policy
status of preplea disclosure was recently codified by the Citizens
Protection Act of 1998, which provides that it shall be "punishable
conduct" for any federal prosecutor to "fail promptly to release
information that would exonerate a person under indictment.13 6
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the
ethical responsibilities of prosecutors to disclose favorable material
evidence to the defense exceeds the due process requirement of Brady
and its progeny. 87 Finally, the affirmative nature of this duty to
disclose suggests that a plea agreement that relieved the prosecutor of
that duty would arguably constitute fraud.388
Thus, the contract principles of adhesion, duress, mistake,
unconscionability, and public policy all suggest that, even if the
practice of plea bargaining as a whole can pass constitutional muster
under contract analysis, waivers of the right to disclosure of Brady
material cannot. Accordingly, under a contract-based approach, a
defendant may not waive his Brady rights as part of a plea bargain.
3. Property
The applicability of property principles to criminal waiver has
followed the view that the value of a right, whether constitutional or
title to land, includes its alienability. 389 In this perspective, a right the
exercise of which cannot be bargained in exchange for consideration
385. David S. Kaplan & Lisa Dixon, Coerced Waiver and Coerced Consent, 74
Denv. U. L. Rev. 941, 953 (1997) (footnote and internal quotation omitted); see also
Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204 ("There may be some evidentiary provisions that are so
fundamental to the reliability of the factfinding process that they may never be
waived without irreparably 'discredit[ing] the federal courts."').
386. H.R. 4276, 105th Cong. title VIII, § 821(a), (a)(2) (1998).
387. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) ("[T]he rule in Bagley (and,
hence, in Brady) requires less of the prosecution than the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice, which call generally for prosecutorial disclosures of any evidence
tending to exculpate or mitigate." (citing ABA Standards for Criminal Justice,
Prosecution Function and Defense Function 3-3.11(a) (3d. ed. 1993) and Model Rules
of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8(d) (1984))); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427
n.25 (1976) ("[A]fter a conviction the prosecutor also is bound by the ethics of his
office to inform the appropriate authority of after-acquired or other information that
casts doubt upon the correctness of the conviction." (citing Code of Professional
Responsibility EC 7-13 (1969) and ABA Standard § 3.11)); see also Franklin, supra
note 178, at 594 (citing Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-103(B)). But
see McMunigal, supra note 6, at 1027 (suggesting that existing federal ethical rules and
statutes "are clearly inadequate to ensure a guilty pleading defendant the right to
disclosure of Brady material.").
388. See 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 144 (1968 & 1999 Supp.).
389. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary
Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 309, 346-47 (1981)
(explaining that alienability is part of the inherent value of a constitutional right).
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"is worth less than an otherwise-identical right that may be sold. ' 31
For example, in deciding whether a defendant could waive the
procedural rule requiring that alternate jurors be dismissed at the time
the jury retires to consider its verdict, Judge Posner referred to the
property value of a constitutional right in asking, "If the defendant
would prefer to take his chances with the jury in its reconstituted form
rather than undergo the expense and uncertainty of a new trial, why
should he not be allowed to?" '391
However, even such ardent property-rights advocates as Richard
Epstein have recognized some limits on the alienability of rights.
Epstein acknowledges that "[a]s a first approximation it appears that
any restraint upon the power of an owner to alienate his own property
should be regarded as impermissible," under concepts of both
individual freedom and social utility.39 He suggests, however, that
"matters cannot be this simple, for everyvhere throughout legal
culture we find important restrictions upon the power of individuals to
alienate their property or labor to third parties in voluntary
transactions.
393
In fact, many legal theorists have recognized a strong tradition
regarding the inalienability of certain rights, stretching back to John
Stuart Mill who famously declared: "'The principle of freedom cannot
require that [a person] should be free not to be free. It is not freedom
to be allowed to alienate [one's] freedom.' '3  The framers themselves
proclaimed the inalienability of certain fundamental rights in the
Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable rights; among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness." 95
The inalienability of rights, which may be broadly defined as any
restriction on the transferability, ownership, or use of the right, is thus
390. Sullivan, supra note 291, at 1478.
391. United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 588 (7th Cir. 1985).
392. Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 Colum. L Rev. 970. 971
(1985).
393. Id at 972. While contending that some restrictions like rent control and fossil
fuel price control are the "undesirable outgrowth of interest group politics," Epstein
argues that "interest group politics does not supply the entire explanation for
restraints on alienation." Id. Rather, restraints on alienability have been properly
applied in the areas of gun control, liquor, narcotics and drugs, and even to speech
activities like selling books on how to build an atom bomb. See id. at 974-78.
394. Alschuler, supra note 11, at 697 (quoting J. Mill, Utilitarianism, liberty And
Representative Government 213 (A.D. Lindsay ed. 1951)); see also Sullivan, supra
note 291, at 1476-77 ("[S]ome constitutional rights are inalienable, and therefore may
not be surrendered even through voluntary exchange.").
395. The United States Declaration of Independence, para. 2 (1776); see also
Kreimer, supra note 4, at 1386 n.337 (citing Townsend v. Townsend, 7 Tenn. (Peck) 1,
12 (1821) ("Constitutional rights are vested, unexchangeable, and unalienable."), and
Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) ("A man may not barter
away his life or his freedom, or his substantial rights.")).
20001 2075
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
a traditional and pervasive concept. It recognizes that there are
certain rights so fundamental that, although they may be forfeited
through inadvertence or conduct inconsistent with their assertion,
they may not be transferred, sold, relinquished or given away; "in
short, they are rights that a person cannot waive. 396
Although inalienability has been self-effacingly called "the step-
child of law and economics,"3" it is particularly well-suited to the
constitutional analysis of fights that are not merely relinquished but
are affirmatively traded to the government as in a plea bargain.
Contract analysis, by contrast, is more limited in its responsiveness to
the dynamics of such an exchange.398
Thus, while contract analysis has been the dominant theoretical
construct applied to plea bargaining, property theory provides an
alternative rationale for why some rights may not be relinquished as
part of a plea agreement with the government.
To be sure, it is not enough merely to assert that some rights are so
fundamental that they cannot be alienated. That would invite the
wholesale setting off limits of "favorite" rights. Instead, some
rationale must be proposed for determining which fights should be
inalienable. Building on the groundbreaking work of Guido Calabresi
and A. Douglas Melamed on inalienability in the area of pollution
control,399 Susan Rose-Ackerman has articulated such a rationale for
the inalienability of certain rights.4" Rose-Ackerman starts with "the
supposition that unencumbered market trades are desirable unless we
can locate a valid reason for their restriction," rejecting "the idea that
396. Kreimer, supra note 4, at 1389. "Even when a right is waivable, there may be
aspects of the alienation of the right that would overcome any presumption of
legitimacy arising from a desire to vindicate individual choice." Id.; see also Peter
Westen, Forfeiture By Guilty Plea-A Reply, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 1308, 1335 (1978)
("But that does not mean that they are rights he cannot lose. On the contrary, the
framers of the Declaration understood, as Locke and Blackstone understood before
them, that while the rights to life and liberty cannot be alienated, they can be forfeited
by conduct inconsistent with their assertion.").
397. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85
Colum. L. Rev. 931, 931 (1985). "Too often, economists note the existence of
restrictions on transferability, ownership, and use, only to dismiss them as obviously
inefficient constraints on market trades." Id.
398. As noted by Aschuler:
Contract of course is always a device by which people restrict their future
actions. If one would uphold any contract in any situation, he must believe
that it is freedom to be allowed to alienate one's freedom, at least up to a
point. If the preservation of future autonomy were truly more important
than the realization of present desire, all contracts would be forbidden; and
although Mill certainly did not intend this result, his formulation offered no
useful distinction between the restrictions of future autonomy that he would
approve and those that he would condemn.
Alschuler, supra note 11, at 698.
399. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1111-15 (1972).
400. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 397, at 931.
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market trades are inherently coercive."'" Nevertheless, she suggests
that "some forms of inalienability do have valid public policy
justifications in a democratic market society."' Of the rationales she
sets forth in defense of inalienability, at least two are especially
relevant to plea bargains waivers of the right to disclosure of favorable
evidence: economic efficiency and "the responsible functioning of a
democratic state."4 3
Some theorists, such as Margaret Jane Radin, have criticized Rose-
Ackerman's approach for being "couched almost exclusively in
market rhetoric." Radin argues persuasively that the justifications
for inalienability should not be limited to economic rationales, and
should instead reflect a greater conception of "personhood."'
Nevertheless, even Rose-Ackerman's narrowly tailored justifications
for inalienability amply demonstrate that a defendant should not be
able to waive as part of a plea bargain the prosecution's duty to
disclose Brady material.
Efficiency rationales for inalienability, Rose-Ackerman suggests,
are "second-best" responses to market failures that arise because of
externalities that do not lend themselves to collective measurement,
such as imperfect information, prisoner's dilemmas, free rider
problems, and the cost of administering alternative policies.4  For
example, the economic efficiency of market transactions is reduced
401. Id at 932.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 932-33. A third rationale for inalienability proposed by Rose-Ackerman
is distribution: "While analysts primarily concerned with efficiency may view a
policy's redistributive impact as an unwelcome side effect, sometimes the distributive
effects of a rule will be its primary justification." Id. at 940; see also Kreimer, supra
note 4, at 1390 ("Even when there are no effects on third parties, it may be that we
have constitutional preferences regarding the distribution of the right in question.").
Other theorists, like Epstein, question this rationale, suggesting that the distributional
justification for inalienability is "unsound," and concluding that "[riules restraining
alienation are best accounted for, both positively and normatively, by the need to
control problems of external harm and the common pool. In essence the restraint on
alienation is a substitute for direct remedies for misuse when these are costly and
uncertain to administer." Epstein, supra note 392, at 990; see also Sullivan, supra note
291, at 1483 ("Making rights inalienable in exchange for benefits may or may not
improve the welfare of the beneficiary class; it depends on whether the government
would continue or discontinue the benefit in the absence of the condition.").
404. Radin, supra note 290, at 1870.
405. Id at 1903-04. Radin's description of the "double bind," such as the one
created by prohibiting the alienation of sexual and reproductive services without
addressing the needs that lead some women to try to sell those services, id. at 1915-16,
seems at first glance to apply to the issue of plea bargain waivers. With defendants in
an unequal negotiating position relative to the prosecution, will not prohibiting them
from using one of their bargaining chips place them in a worse position? However,
unlike sexual and reproductive services, the right to disclosure of favorable evidence
is neither personal to the defendant nor tied up in his or her "personhood." Rather,
Brady rights are structural protections owed by the prosecutor to society.
406. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 397, at 938; see also Calabresi & Melamed,
supra note 399, at 1111.
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when "third parties would be willing to pay to obtain the benefits or to
avoid the harms imposed on them, but because they are not part of
the transaction, benefits are too low and costs are too high. ' '4° Justice
Kennedy recognized this problem when he suggested in his concurring
opinion in United States v. Olano408 that significant "systemic costs"
would result from enforcing a waiver of the rule requiring that
alternate jurors be dismissed when the jury retires.4" Thus, although
efficiency objectives may seem at first glance to be undermined by
restraints on the alienability of rights, "closer analysis suggests that
there are instances, perhaps many, in which economic efficiency is
more closely approximated by such limitations."410
Particularly in the context of plea bargaining, difficulties of
coordination may cause resources to be allocated inefficiently.4 ' For
example, while many contract-centered plea bargaining advocates
focus on the presumed ability of an individual defendant to accept or
reject a plea offer, property theory recognizes that, "[w]here
constitutional rightholders would prefer to keep their rights rather
than exchange them for government benefits as a general rule, they
will nonetheless bargain singly with government to give them up. ' 412
The potential efficiency of plea transactions is further restricted
when the defendant lacks information that is relevant to the potential
plea agreement.413  Since markets are hindered by imperfect
information, relieving the government of its duty to disclose material
favorable evidence makes the plea bargaining process less
407. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 397, at 938; see also Kreimer, supra note 4, at
1389 ("[T]he transfer of the right from one party to another might have undesirable
ramifications for other members of society."). As explained by Calabresi and
Melamed, if Taney wanted to sell himself into slavery, Marshall may be harmed
"simply because [he] is a sensitive man who is made unhappy by seeing slaves."
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 399, at 1112. Marshall could pay Taney not to sell
his freedom, but "because Marshall is not one but many individuals, freeloader and
information costs make such transactions practically impossible." Id. "The state must,
therefore, either ignore the external costs to Marshall, or if it judges them great
enough, forbid the transaction that gave rise to them by making Taney's freedom
inalienable." Id.
408. 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
409. Id. at 742 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
410. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 399, at 1111.
411. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 397, at 939-40.
412. Sullivan, supra note 291, at 1482. They do so because they lack information
about others' preferences, or to "freeload on others' individual decisions to retain
their rights." Id. Institutional externalities as well may undercut the ability of an
individual defendant to accept or reject a plea offer. For example, a District of
Columbia attorney was suspended from practice because of his unwillingness to allow
criminal clients to plead guilty. See Loren Singer, D.C. Won't Reinstate Lawyer Who
Opposes Plea Bargains, West's Legal News 10312, 1996 WL 552055, at *1 (Oct. 1,
1996). The lawyer explained that he "believes that attorney-assisted guilty pleas are
unconstitutional because 'systemic pressures' prompt clients to plead guilty." Id. As a
result, he was not permitted to advise defendants not to accept the government's plea
offers.
413. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 397, at 939.
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economically efficient. Thus, restricting the alienability of the
defendant's right to the prosecution's disclosure of material favorable
evidence would help promote the economic efficiencies of plea
transactions.414
Rose-Ackerman's considerations of citizenship and "the
responsible functioning of a democratic state" also support
restrictions on the alienability of the Brady right to preplea disclosure.
Although "[i]nalienability is frequently justified not as an ideal policy
but as a second-best response to the messiness and complexity of the
world,' 415 Rose-Ackerman notes, even without transaction costs few
people would tolerate the sale of political votes.1 6 Epstein agrees,
proposing that "[p]rohibiting the sale of votes is thus a low-cost way of
preventing these extreme forms of abuse. 4t7
Calabresi and Melamed cast this rationale for inalienability in terms
of paternalism, including both "self paternalism and true
paternalism. ''418  Self paternalism, they explain, "may cause us to
require certain conditions to exist before we allow a sale of an
entitlement; and it may help explain many situations of inalienability,
like the invalidity of contracts entered into when drunk, or under
undue influence or coercion. "419 True paternalism, on the other hand,
is based on a belief that "the most efficient pie is no longer that which
costless bargains would achieve, because a person may be better off if
he is prohibited from bargaining. ''4- These paternalistic rationales for
alienability have elicited spirited objections suggesting "that the
conceptions of the good life from which such choices flow should be
personal, not collective. '42' However, as noted by Kathleen Sullivan,
the very existence of constitutional rights, "unlike consumer tastes or
preferences, results from the prior 'paternalistic' act of enacting a
Constitution. ' 41
A potentially less controversial way of viewing this rationale is as an
implicit limitation of non-ownership. Rose-Ackerman, for example,
recognizes that "problems arise in controlling the opportunistic
behavior of a person who purports to act on behalf of another."4' To
the extent that the right in question is not the exclusive property of
414. Some might argue that the most "efficient" means of criminal adjudication
would be to lock up the most defendants as quickly as possible. However, this
argument ignores the gross inefficiencies and societal costs of punishing the innocent.
Under such a facile approach, the most efficient step would be to jettison the Bill of
Rights itself.
415. Id. at 969.
416. Id.
417. Epstein, supra note 392, at 988.
418. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 399, at 1113.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 1114.
421. Sullivan, supra note 291, at 1480.
422. Id
423. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 397, at 940.
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the person seeking to barter it, alienation is properly prohibited.
Along these lines, Justice Souter emphasized in his dissent in
Mezzanatto that a defendant cannot waive a rule that does not serve
merely as his "personal right," but rather was "meant to serve the
interest of the federal judicial system. 4124 Thus, if preplea disclosure is
viewed as the right of the society that accepts plea bargains in lieu of
trials, then it is not the defendant's personal right to waive. In this
formulation, the right to receive disclosure may be exercised but not
alienated by the defendant.
Viewing the right from the other direction, one might instead ask
whether the government should be permitted to contract out of its
duty to provide preplea disclosure. Laurence H. Tribe proposes that,
where rights are linked to affirmative duties, they are "relational and
systemic" and "necessarily inalienable: individuals cannot waive them
because individuals are not their sole focus."4 5 "This sort of right,"
Tribe explains, should be "inalienable because the relationships its
enforcement secures would otherwise be too vulnerable to destruction
by private bargains. 426
Along these lines, the disclosure of material favorable evidence has
been characterized by the Supreme Court not merely as a right of the
defendant but as the "affirmative duty" of the prosecution under the
Due Process Clause.42 7 Moreover, as noted above, that duty is also
both an ethical and a statutory obligation of the prosecution.4 8 In
other words, the prosecutor's institutional duty to disclose favorable
material evidence is owed not merely to the defendant personally but
to society as a whole. Because that duty is broader than the
defendant's personal right, the defendant may not relieve the
prosecutor of it, even through consensual transaction.
This recognition that such "structural protections" are inalienable
can be found in cases cited by the Supreme Court in Mezzanatto. In
Peretz v. United States, 4 9 for example, the Court noted that a litigant
may not waive Article III structural protections. 30 Likewise, the
Court in United States v. Wheat4 31 held that a defendant may not waive
his right to conflict free representation on the grounds that "[n]ot only
the interest of a criminal defendant but the institutional interest in the
rendition of just verdicts in criminal cases may be jeopardized by
424. 513 U.S. at 214 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 294-300 and
accompanying text.
425. Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights,
Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 330, 333 (1985)
(emphasis in original).
426. Id. at 335.
427. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432 (1995).
428. See id. at 432-41.
429. 501 U.S. 923 (1991).
430. Id. at 937.
431. 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
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unregulated multiple representation. 4 '  Allowing such a waiver,
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, "not only constitutes a breach of
professional ethics and invites disrespect for the integrity of the court,
but it is also detrimental to the independent interest of the trial
judge. 433
Thus, under both efficiency and structural rationales, Brady rights
should be inalienable. Due to the information gains resulting from
the prosecutor's duty to disclose material favorable evidence,
prohibiting defendants from waiving the right would promote the
efficiency of criminal adjudications. Moreover, as a structural right, it
is simply not the defendant's right to alienate; "an individual decision
to waive it is irrelevant."' 414  As the Supreme Court noted in
Commodity Futures Trading Cominission,43 1 when such structural
protections "are at issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot be
dispositive because [they] serve institutional interests that the parties
cannot be expected to protect. 4 26
4. Procedural Due Process
Many courts have explicitly recognized broad due process
limitations on the application of contract principles to plea bargains.
For example, the Fourth Circuit in Cooper v. United States'- held that
a defendant has a constitutional right to expect that a formally
advanced governmental plea proposal will not be revoked without
sufficient reason on the grounds that, in the plea bargaining context,
"the constitutional right to 'fairness' [is] wider in scope than that
defined by the law of contract. ' 4-
Commentators have likewise developed theories regarding plea
bargains and criminal waiver based upon procedural due process and
432. Id. at 160.
433. Id. at 162 (quoting United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1184 (3d Cir. 1978)).
434. Kreimer, supra note 4, at 1387; see also Sullivan, supra note 291, at 1479
(explaining that Kreimer "has proposed that the inalienability of a right generally
should constitute an alternative ground for invalidating a conditioned benefit in the
absence of coercion. Kreimer suggests that grounds for inalienability may include the
effects of alienation of constitutional rights on 'the structure and power of
government,' 'the structure of society,' and 'other members of society."').
435. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
436. Id. at 851.
437. 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979).
438. Id. at 16-17; see also United States v. Barron, 172 F.3d 1153, 1158 (1999) ("A
plea bargain is not a commercial exchange."): James E. Bond, Plea Bargaining and
Guilty Pleas § 2.11 (1983).
Courts that view plea agreements as contracts may find that a particular
agreement denies the defendant due process if it violates traditional contract
principles. Other courts, declining to treat plea agreements as enforceable
contracts, will nevertheless scrutinize them to see if they violate that
fundamental fairness guaranteed by the due process clause.
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fundamental fairness. In each instance, the prosecution's disclosure
under Brady of favorable material evidence is portrayed as an
essential component of the plea bargaining process, without which the
process would be invalid.
Thomas R. McCoy and Michael J. Mirra have proposed a due
process explanation for the Supreme Court's ongoing support of the
practice of plea bargaining. Contending that it is impossible to
reconcile the Court's contract-based defense of plea bargaining with
"its continued commitment to the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine," '43 9 McCoy and Mirra suggest instead that "the Court's
consistent endorsement of plea bargaining in the face of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is best understood as an implicit
due process holding that plea bargaining is a constitutionally adequate
alternative procedure for the determination of guilt."" Thus, under
the theory put forward by McCoy and Mirra, "the Court's plea
bargaining cases are understandable as holdings that plea bargaining
provides the procedural accuracy required by due process, without
offending other constitutional interests arising from substantive due
process notions of fundamental fairness." 41
Additional waivers as part of the plea agreement ought to be
acceptable under such a due process approach to the extent that the
waivers do not undermine the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding. 4 However, McCoy and Mirra repeatedly emphasize the
importance of the prosecutor's disclosure of material favorable
evidence in ensuring that plea bargaining comports with the minimal
level of due process:
Because the defendant bases his choice of plea ultimately on the
subjective assessment of his chances of conviction, the state can
make the bargain appear more attractive to him by encouraging him
to overestimate his chance of conviction at trial. Thus, manipulation
of the defendant's perception of his chance of conviction can create
a substantial risk of incremental inaccuracy. Procedural due process
requires that defendants be given the information and assistance
439. McCoy & Mirra, supra note 11, at 914.
The Supreme Court's insistence that plea bargaining is constitutional in spite
of the apparent applicability of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and
in spite of the Court's application of that doctrine in closely analogous
situations seems attributable to an assumption that plea bargaining is merely
a contractual arrangement between a defendant and the state.
Id. at 910.
440. Id. at 915.
441. See id. at 916 n.131.
442. Cf Saltzburg, supra note 6, at 1277 n.62 ("I doubt whether the defendant
could waive the right to fundamentally fair procedures in a criminal case, since the
very concept of waiver itself assumes a context in which it can fairly be determined
that someone is validly giving up something.").
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necessary to make a reasonably reliable assessment of their chance of
conviction at trial.
443
Under this formulation, while plea bargaining in general comports
with due process sufficient to pass constitutional muster, a waiver of
the right to preplea Brady disclosure would not." Moreover, without
preplea disclosure, the entire plea bargaining process would fail as
fundamentally unfair. Thus, the constitutionality of plea bargaining
itself depends on the availability of preplea disclosure. "
Edward L. Rubin, in proposing a "general theory" of waiver,
similarly focuses on a due process standard. Rubin argues that for all
"adjudication-related" waivers, such as plea bargains, "courts should
require that the functional equivalent of due process protection be
provided in the interaction between parties."' " This due process
standard as applied to plea bargains "would protect against the
dangers of waivers; under a rigorous application of such a standard, a
waiver would be no more likely to produce injustice than would a full-
scale procedure." 447
Using the basic measure for due process applied by Rubin, a plea
bargain waiver "is valid only when the equivalent of notice and a
hearing is provided by the interaction between the parties
themselves."" 8 In this context, Rubin, like McCoy and Mirra, stresses
the importance of preplea disclosure in ensuring the fundamental
fairness of the entire plea bargaining process. The right to preplea
disclosure cannot be waived, he argues, because "[tihe functional
equivalent of notice is the presentation of certain information to the
443. McCoy & Mirra, supra note 11, at 933 (emphasis added).
444. See id
In the plainest possible terms, a defendant must be told what facts the state
must prove to convict him of the crime charged, and he must be fully
informed of the evidence available to the state and the defense on those
factual issues. Thus, all the opportunities for discovery and construction of
defenses usually available to a defendant prior to or during trial must be
made available to a defendant before he is confronted with plea bargaining
negotiations.
Id.
445. See McCoy & Mirra, supra note 11, at 933 n.173.
All constitutionally mandated pretrial discovery must be extended to benefit
the defendant prior to arraignment and choice of plea. For example, the
state must disclose any evidence that would have created a reasonable doubt
if introduced at trial. Otherwise, defendants whose guilt would not be
supported by the evidence at trial will plead guilty because the prosecution
has hidden the weaknesses of its case. A prosecutor's concealment of
exonerating evidence or his use of falsified evidence during plea negotiations
would cause erroneous guilty pleas in the same manner that these illegal
practices lead to erroneous convictions at trial.
Id.
446. Rubin, supra note 4, at 538.
447. Id
448. Id. at 539.
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party being asked to execute the waiver."" 9 Again, without preplea
disclosure, plea bargaining itself would fail under the due process
standard.
The fundamental fairness approaches proposed by Rubin and
McCoy and Mirra echo both the structural integrity rationale for
inalienability under property theory and the public policy rationale for
finding a transaction invalid under contract theory. Recent
scholarship attempting to reconcile the "doctrinal disarray" of
unconstitutional conditions, as well, has applied a similar "systemic
approach.""45 Thus, all four theoretical disciplines considered in this
section raise common themes supporting the inalienability of Brady
rights.
Moreover, as noted above, an explicit purpose of the prosecution's
duty to disclose favorable material evidence is to permit defense
counsel to provide competent advice to the defendant.45' The
suppression of such evidence by the prosecution, therefore, precludes
defense counsel from providing effective assistance to the defendant
in deciding whether to plead guilty, and renders the guilty plea itself
presumptively invalid. This point is especially critical in light of the
Supreme Court's placement of primary, if not exclusive, reliance on
assistance of counsel in ensuring that a defendant's guilty plea is
voluntary and intelligent. 3 The connection between assistance of
counsel and preplea disclosure of material favorable evidence is
further underscored by the fact that the standard for materiality under
Bagley mirrors the Strickland standard for effective assistance of
counsel: "The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been different."4 Thus, if the
undisclosed evidence is material under the definition in Bagley, the
defendant has necessarily been prejudiced by the denial of effective
assistance of counsel under Strickland.
Finally, it is worth recalling that the duty of the prosecutor to
disclose material, favorable evidence articulated in Brady and its
progeny is itself a due process requirement. 55 If, as determined by the
courts of appeals that have considered the issue, the right to preplea
449. Id.; see also Sheppard, supra note 151, at 166 (noting the inherent unfairness in
plea bargaining when vital information is peculiarly within the knowledge and
possession of the prosecutor).
450. See Sullivan, supra note 291, at 1417. Such an approach, Sullivan argues,
recognizes that "the preferred constitutional liberties at stake in unconstitutional
conditions cases do not simply protect individual rightholders piecemeal. Instead,
they also help determine the overall distribution of power between government and
rightholders generally, and among classes of rightholders." Id. at 1490.
451. See supra Part II.A.
452. See Sheppard, supra note 151, at 188-89.
453. See supra text accompanying notes 76-161.
454. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
455. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,432 (1995) (quoting Brady).
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disclosure is necessary to ensure due process in the disposition of the
criminal charges against the defendant,"6 then it cannot be
relinquished without a denial of due process. Ultimately, because
preplea disclosure is required to ensure that a guilty plea comports
with due process, then it cannot be waived without the plea itself
being invalidated.
IV. CONCLUSION: APPEAL WAIVERS REVISITED
This Article has proposed a new approach for analyzing the
enforceability of plea bargain waivers. The first part of this approach
is a taxonomy intended to clarify the various types of criminal waiver.
Section Ill.A identified four species of waiver: intentional
relinquishment; forfeiture; election; and alienation. Whether a
particular right may be "waived" as part of a plea agreement depends
at the outset upon the variety of waiver applicable to that right.
Although the four kinds of waiver are distinct, they can be
understood as a series of narrowing questions by a court looking back
at a criminal adjudication to determine if there was a defect that calls
for reversal of the defendant's conviction or sentence. After
identifying the scope of the right at issue, the conditions for its
exercise and any effects from other applicable interests,' -' the court
can then examine the circumstances under which the right was lost or
denied. Did the defendant's failure to exercise a right result in its
forfeiture? This might occur on account of negligence or a lack of due
diligence, or on account of acts inconsistent with the assertion of the
right. Did the defendant's decision to exercise one right result in the
defendant's election of that right to the exclusion of another right? If
not, did the defendant intentionally relinquish the right by unilateral
act, or did he alienate the right by agreeing not to exercise it as part of
a bargain, either with another private party or with the government?
By following this progression, a court can determine which variety of
waiver is applicable.
Notwithstanding this systematic approach, however, determining
the applicable type of waiver can be tricky in practice. As
demonstrated by the Supreme Court's vacillation on whether a double
jeopardy claim is automatically forfeited by a guilty plea or is instead
a surviving claim that may nevertheless be alienated as part of a plea
agreement,458 the appropriate form of waiver analysis to apply to a
claim brought after a defendant's otherwise valid plea may not always
be obvious. Although it appears that the non-jurisdictional
456. See supra Part II.B.
457. This would include whether the defendant was divested of the right due to
prior misconduct. For example, the prior commission of a felony may cause the
defendant to lose the right to bear arms or to vote in elections.
458. See supra notes 87-183 and accompanying text.
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antecedent claims that survive the act of pleading guilty are those, like
the rights to Brady material and effective assistance of counsel,
necessary to ensure that the plea itself is knowing and voluntary, the
Supreme Court has never expressly articulated anything close to such
a rule. Nevertheless, recognizing the distinctions among the four
types of waivers will at a minimum help to ensure that the right at
issue is not improperly subjected to a generic "presumption of
waivability."45 9 Having determined the circumstances under which the
right was supposedly lost, the court can then consider whether such a
loss is enforceable.
The second part of the approach applied in Part III.B of this Article
addresses the question of whether to enforce the loss of a particular
right with a communicative model of consensus through dialogue. By
concurrently applying different and potentially inconsistent theories
with the understanding that no one theory is dispositive but that all
may have useful insights to add to the analysis, this model avoids any
dogmatic adherence to a single theoretical construct and instead
strives to simulate the combined wisdom of a symposium of legal
theorists. The legitimation of such an approach is the major
contribution of Legal Pragmatism."W
Recognizing that "pragmatism is the implicit working theory of
most good lawyers, '4 61 proponents and critics alike have suggested
that this contribution is somewhat "banal."462  An understandable
criticism of Legal Pragmatism is that it "does not supply distinctive
standards for constructing or evaluating theories, but instead
admonishes thinkers to adhere to standards that they already
accept. "463
459. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196,202 (1995).
460. Grey, supra note 16, at 26 ("Unlike the other recent jurisprudential
approaches, legal pragmatism is inclusive, treating the current theories as
perspectives, each of which can add to the understanding of law.").
As against the jurisprudential grand theorists-the proponents of law-and-
economics, hermeneutics, committed critique, and updated natural law-
pragmatists remind lawyers that their activities are complex and
multifarious, and unlikely to be completely accounted for by any single
theory, however compelling its application in any particular context. As
against the much more numerous anti-theoretical lawyers, pragmatists argue
that the grand theories, if understood as partial perspectives, do not cancel
each other out, but rather that each of them has something to contribute to
the understanding of law.
Id. at 37-38.
461. Grey, supra note 1, at 1590.
462. See Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 787, 814
(1989) ("At its most abstract level [pragmatism] concludes in truisms: Law is more a
matter of experience than of logic, and experience is tradition interpreted with one
eye on coherence and another on policy."); see also Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of
Pragmatism, 100 Yale L.J. 409, 429 (1990) (criticizing pragmatists for failing to offer
methods for theorizing, other than those already existing); see generally Rorty, supra
note 16, at 1811.
463. Smith, supra note 462, at 446.
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And yet, it does more than that. What Legal Pragmatism offers is
"freedom from theory-guilt. ' 464 As noted by Thomas Grey,
"pragmatist jurisprudence is a theoretical middle way between grand
theorizing and anti-intellectual business-as-usual."' Along these
lines, Grey argues that "the best response to neglect of theory is not
pragmatist jurisprudential sermonizing, but concrete demonstrations
of how theoretical approaches can help solve practical problems.""
Applying theoretical approaches drawn from the doctrines of
unconstitutional conditions, contracts, property and procedural due
process, this Article has shown that a waiver of the right to disclosure
of material favorable evidence cannot be enforceable.
Daniel Farber explains that the eclectic spirit of Legal Pragmatism
"provides no reason to exclude consideration of original intent,
precedent, philosophy, social science, or anything else that might be
appropriate and helpful in resolving a hard case. Ideally, all of these
factors point to the same outcome."4 7 In the case of the plea bargain
waiver of Brady rights, all of the factors do point to the same
outcome. However, even where the plea bargain innovation's validity
is not as plainly discernable as the Brad), waiver because all factors
may not point to the same outcome, Legal Pragmatism still provides a
useful approach for making the best decision possible under the
circumstances."6 The remainder of this Article briefly revisits the
issue of plea bargain waivers of the right to appeal. Although a
majority of courts have held that most appeal waivers are
presumptively enforceable, the theoretical justification for this result
has been shaky at best. Recognizing this problem, some courts have
recently begun carefully scrutinizing plea bargain appeal waivers. An
approach in the spirit of Legal Pragmatism would greatly facilitate
those efforts. 9
As discussed above, while the Supreme Court has long held that
imposing a chilling penalty upon a defendant's exercise of his
"'statutory right of appeal or collateral remedy would be... a
violation of due process of law,""'47 most courts have determined that
464. Rorty, supra note 16, at 1815 (citing Grey, supra note 1, at 1569).
465. Grey, supra note 16, at 38.
466. Id.
467. Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the Twenty-
First Century, 1995 U. Ill. L. Rev. 163, 169 (1995).
468. See id.
469. Such a reconsideration of the validity of plea bargain waivers of the right to
appeal are particularly ripe in light of the 1999 amendment to the Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11(c)(6), which was added to include in the required plea
colloquy 'the terms of any provision in a plea agreement waiving the right to appeal
or collaterally attack the sentence.' The advisory committee notes accompanying the
1999 amendment to Rule 11 explain: "Although a number of federal courts have
approved the ability of a defendant to enter into such waiver agreements, the
Committee takes no position on the underlying validity of such waivers."
470. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 25 (1974) (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce,
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as a general matter defendants can waive their rights to appeal as part
of a plea bargain.471 However, the articulated justifications for the
enforceability of appeal waiver have progressed only slightly from the
facile assertion rejected by the Supreme Court in Mezzanatto that
since a defendant can waive many constitutional rights as part of a
plea bargain it necessarily follows that he can also waive any statutory
right.
For example, Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski, dissenting in
United States v. Gonzalez from the Ninth Circuit's denial of the
government's motion to dismiss the defendant's appeal on the ground
that the right to appeal had been waived as part of the plea bargain,
offers only a superficial contract defense for the enforceability of
appeal waivers.4" Citing Judge Easterbrook for the conclusion that
"[p]lea bargains are an important-indeed an essential-component
of our criminal justice system; they provide vast benefits to the
government, to our courts, to the public and to criminal
defendants," '473 Judge Kozinski argues that the waiver must be upheld
under a hornbook contract formulation since "[t]he defendant
breaches the contract when he nevertheless files a notice of appeal
after agreeing not to do so, thereby denying the government, the
public, and the courts the benefit of the plea agreement." '474
Judge Easterbrook himself presents for the Seventh Circuit in
United States v. Wenger only a slightly more nuanced Law and
Economics justification for the enforceability of plea bargain appeal
waivers.475 Judge Easterbrook begins by mocking the defendant's
claim that his waiver was not knowing or voluntary since it was not
attended by "elaborate warnings after the fashion of those used for
the most vital constitutional rights, 476 stating that "other rights may
be surrendered without warnings of any kind and with considerably
less formality. '477 Judge Easterbrook places the right to appeal "in
the latter category-not simply because it depends on a statute rather
than the Constitution but because it has long been seen as the kind of
395 U.S. 711,724 (1969) (omission in original)).
471. See Calhoun, supra note 109, at 148-49 ("[E]arly cases invalidating appeal
waivers on due process 'chill' theory simply cannot be squared with current due
process doctrine as articulated by the Supreme Court.").
472. 981 F.2d 1037, 1040, 1042 (9th Cir. 1992) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (contending
that contract law standards apply to plea bargain agreements because they are
products of bargained-for exchange).
473. Id. at 1040 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101
Yale L.J. 1969, 1975 (1992)).
474. Id.
475. 58 F.3d 280, 283 (7th Cir. 1995).
476. Wenger, 58 F.3d at 281 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), and
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)).
477. Wenger, 58 F.3d at 281 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
(Fourth Amendment right to privacy), and United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196
(1995) (right to exclude from evidence proffer made as part of plea negotiations)).
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right that depends on assertion," adding that a "litigant who does not
take a timely appeal has forfeited any entitlement to appellate
review. '  In suggesting that the right to appeal may be lost as part of
a plea bargain due to mere inadvertence, Judge Easterbrook thus
commits the common taxonomic error of conflating the alienation and
forfeiture aspects of waiver.
Judge Easterbrook goes on to assert that "[r]ight holders are better
off if they can choose between exercising the right and exchanging [it]
for something they value more highly. 4 79  However, as discussed
above at length, unfettered alienation of certain rights can make the
criminal justice "market" less rather than more efficient. Moreover,
Judge Easterbrook's argument completely ignores the error-
correcting role that appeals play in ensuring the structural integrity of
criminal adjudications. In fact, most circuits, including the Seventh,
have since held that a waiver of the right to appeal is not enforceable
with respect to such claims as ineffective assistance of counsel in
deciding to plead.'
The Second Circuit recently began to apply a more developed
contract-based approach to appeal waivers."' As a preliminary
matter, the Second Circuit has insisted, in determining whether to
enforce plea bargain waivers of the right to appeal, that the waivers be
both knowing and voluntary, and that the waiver provision of any plea
agreement be construed narrowly.' Moreover, the Second Circuit
has taken seriously the public policy limitations on contract
enforceability as applied to appeal waivers." Along these lines, the
Second Circuit has explicitly considered "institutional and societal
values,"' as well as the integrity of the courts and the legitimacy of
the sentencing process," in determining whether to enforce appeal
waivers.
The Second Circuit, nevertheless, has refused to invalidate most
appeal waivers, explaining that "[i]t is not our intention to hamper or
restrict parties' ability to enter pleas, so long as the agreement does
not result in a serious detriment to important public or private
478. Wenger, 58 F3d at 282.
479. Id (citing Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 208).
480. See United States v. Woolley, 123 F.3d 627, 634-37 (7th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Henderson, 72
F.3d 463, 465 (5th Cir. 1995); Watson v. United States, 165 F.3d 486, 489 (6th Cir.
1999).
481. See United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 555-56 (2d Cir. 1996); cf United
States v. Rosa, 123 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that the analogy between plea
agreements and contract law is imperfect and, therefore, cannot be strictly applied).
482. Ready, 82 F.3d at 556.
483. See United States v. Yemitan, 70 F.3d 746, 748 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that
public policy constraints applicable in contract law are equally applicable to plea
agreements); see also United States v. Rosa, 123 F.3d 94, 98 (same).
484. Ready, 82 F.3d at 555.
485. See id at 556.
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interests, and we thus ordinarily enforce these waiver provisions. "486
However, the Second Circuit has categorically forbidden certain types
of appeal waivers. For example, the Second Circuit has repeatedly
stated that it will not enforce a waiver of the defendant's right to
appeal a sentence that has not been adequately explained by the
district court,487 or a sentence based on racial or ethnic bias,48 or the
defendant's naturalized status.489 The Second Circuit has also stated
that it will not enforce an appeal waiver where the government has
breached the terms of the plea agreement,490 or where the defendant
claims ineffective assistance of counsel in deciding to plead.491
Most recently, the Second Circuit has carefully scrutinized
innovative appeal waivers providing that the defendant is forbidden
not only from appealing "a sentence falling within a range explicitly
stipulated within the agreement itself, ' '49 but from appealing any
sentence as long as it is "'within or below the applicable Sentencing
Guidelines range as determined by the Court.' 493 In United States v.
Rosa the Second Circuit expressed serious reservations about such an
"unorthodox" appeal waiver,494 noting with concern that the estimated
range in the plea agreement provides "no protection to the
defendant" and "presents grave dangers and implicates both
constitutional questions and ordinary principles of fairness and
justice. 495
Recognizing that "the waiver provision used by the Government in
this case leaves a criminal defendant entirely to the mercy of the
sentencing court, '49 6 particularly with regard to upward departures for
486. Rosa, 123 F.3d at 97; see also Yemitan, 70 F.3d at 748 ("If this waiver does not
preclude a challenge to the sentence as unlawful, then the covenant not to appeal
becomes meaningless and would cease to have value as a bargaining chip in the hands
of defendants.").
487. See Yemitan, 70 F.3d at 748 (reaching this conclusion without deciding it on
the facts).
488. See Rosa, 123 F.3d at 98; Yemitan, 70 F.3d at 748.
489. See United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19,22-23 (2d Cir. 1994).
490. See Rosa, 123 F.3d at 98.
491. See id.
492. See id. at 96.
493. See id. at 99 (quoting Rosa's plea agreement) (emphasis in original).
494. See id. In Rosa, a defendant charged with firearm offenses agreed to plead
guilty in exchange for an estimated sentence of 15 to 21 months based upon a federal
sentencing guideline offense level of 14. Id. at 96. The Probation Department's Pre-
Sentence Report, however, recommended sentencing at an offense level of 22 based
upon uncharged "relevant conduct," and the court ultimately sentenced Rosa to 27
months, the low end of offense level 18. Id. Although Rosa's plea bargain contained a
provision waiving the right to appeal, he challenged the increase in the offense level
from 14 to 18 and the commensurate increase in the duration of his sentence. Id. at
96-97. The plea agreement provided: "The defendant agrees not to file an appeal in
the event that the Court imposes a sentence within or below the applicable
Sentencing Guideline range as determined by the Court." Id.
495. Id. at 99.
496. Id.
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"relevant conduct," the court in Rosa rejected the government's
"economic efficiency argument" that in exchange for its "attractive
offers, it ought to be assured that it will not have to engage in
protracted appellate litigation," on the grounds that "the relevant
conduct provision of the Guidelines can make illusory what appears in
advance to be a good deal."4" The court further suggested that it
would be hard for such a broad waiver to be "made knowingly and
voluntarily" since it "is complex, and may be ambiguous and
confusing to a defendant."49
Nevertheless, the Rosa court held that the waiver provision was not
"facially invalid,"4 concluding that "[i]ts terms will not automatically
achieve an unfair result, and it does not inherently violate the
Constitution."5" Instead, the court decided to review appeal waivers
on a case-by-case basis .5 1  The Rosa court recognized that such
careful scrutiny would negate "much of the benefit that the
Government receives from the waiver provision, i.e., deterrence of
appeals and savings in the time and expense of appeal," '  and
recommended that the government reconsider the use of such
waivers.
Giving credence to this recommendation, the Second Circuit has
twice gone on to invalidate this type of appeal waiver as applied.
First, in United States v. Martinez-Rios, the Second Circuit considered
the same appeal waiver provision as in Rosa, but this time held that
the waiver was "ineffective" because the record did not demonstrate
that "the defendants understood and knowingly agreed to this unusual
497. Id. at 100.
49& 1&
499. Id. at 101.
500. Id.
501. Id
Our oversight role permits us to accept appeal of a case where the sentence
or the agreement calls for it, despite our preference for deferring to the
parties' freedom to contract. We will certainly often be willing to set aside
the waiver and accept appeal when constitutional concerns are implicated,
whether those concerns be related to a particular constitutional provision
such as the ex post facto clause, or whether it simply appears that the
ultimate sentence is so far beyond the anticipated range that to deny the
right of appeal would raise serious questions of fundamental fairness. We
may also be willing to accept such an appeal for lesser improprieties,
including abuse of judicial discretion. We are not prepared today to outline
an exhaustive list of the circumstances under which we would or would not
accept such an appeal.
Id.
502. Id. at 101 n.7.
503. Id. (urging the U.S. Attorney's office to follow the court's comments in
drafting future plea agreements); see also Comment, Criminal Law-Plea
Agreements-Second Circuit Upholds Plea Provision That Waives Appeal Without
Fixed Sentence Range, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1116, 1121 (1998) (criticizing the court for its
failure to impose a categorical rule requiring that appeal waivers contain a specified
sentence range).
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form of appellate waiver. ' '" °" Then, in United States v. Goodman, the
Second Circuit held unenforceable an appellate waiver provision even
broader than that considered in Rosa and Martinez-Rios.5"
The waiver in Goodman purported "to deny the defendant any
appellate challenge not only to the selection of an applicable guideline
range but also to any upward departure from that range, as long as the
statutory maximum is not exceeded."5" Declining to decide "whether
this broad form of waiver might ever be enforceable," the Second
Circuit held merely that "it is not enforceable in this case."5°
Nevertheless, with Goodman, the Second Circuit seemed to move a
step beyond its case-by-case approach, and a step closer to an across
the board ban of at least that type of appeal waiver.
Such an across the board ban on broad plea bargain appeal waivers
is currently in effect in the District of Columbia. Although the D.C.
Circuit itself has not yet spoken on the issue, the D.C. district court
has repeatedly held that plea agreement provisions waiving both
direct and collateral appeals "on any ground whatsoever" are facially
unenforceable since as a matter of law they cannot be knowing and
voluntary. 08 In doing so, the D.C. district court judges have relied
principally on Fifth Circuit Judge Parker's concurrence in United
States v. Melancon,509 which provides the best articulation to date of a
Legal Pragmatist approach to appeal waivers.
The majority in Melancon recited in tired syllogism: "The right to
504. 143 F.3d 662, 668-69 (2d Cir. 1998).
505. See 165 F.3d 169, 174 (2d. Cir. 1999).
506. Id.
507. Id. Taking the "close look" prescribed by Rosa, the court in Goodman noted,
first, that the defendant "received very little benefit in exchange for her plea of
guilty" to the one count changed by the government, since none other could have
been charged. Id. Second, "although Goodman obtained the Government's
agreement to recommend a four-level downward adjustment for her role in the
offense and a two-level adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, she received
neither at sentencing." Id. Third, the district court misstated the terms of the waiver
provision during allocution, suggesting that Goodman retained the right to appeal her
sentence if the court departed upward or chose a different offense level. See id.
Finally, the court noted that "the discrepancy between the sentence imposed-30
months in prison-and the predicted sentencing range-10 to 16 months-is
substantial." Id. "In light of all these circumstances," the court held, "we will not
enforce the broad form of waiver in this case, one that would subject the defendant to
,a virtually unbounded risk of error or abuse by the sentencing court."' Id. at 175(quoting United States v. Rosa, 123 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1997)).
508. See United States v. Johnson, 992 F. Supp. 437, 439 (D.D.C. 1997) (noting that
at the time of the plea, the defendant cannot know that he may be waiving his right to
appeal an illegal or improper sentence); United States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 44(D.D.C. 1997) (concluding that a waiver of the defendant's right to appeal his
sentence before it is imposed is by definition uninformed and unintelligent).
509. See Johnson, 992 F. Supp. at 439 (quoting United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d
566, 571 (5th Cir. 1992) (Parker, J., concurring)); see also United States v. Melancon,
972 F.2d 566, 570 (5th Cir. 1992) (Parker, J., concurring) ("I concur specially because
I cannot dissent. This panel is bound by the unpublished, per curiam opinion, United
States v. Sierra.").
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appeal is a statutory right, not a constitutional right. The Supreme
Court has held that a defendant may waive constitutional rights as
part of a plea bargaining agreement, so, clearly, a defendant may also
waive the statutory right to appeal."510 Judge Parker dissented on
several compelling grounds, including that an appeal waiver can never
be knowing and intelligent 51 1 that its enforcement is contrary to the
public interest,51 that it is void both as an "unconstitutional
condition 513 and as presenting a realistic likelihood of "prosecutorial
vindictiveness, '514 that the costs of its enforcement outweigh its
benefits,515 and that, unlike plea bargains in general, appeal waivers
are "devoid of systemic or societal value."51 6
Following Judge Parker's dissent in Melancon, the D.C. district
court has added that the "glaring inequality" of appeal waivers that do
not limit the government's right to appeal a sentence are
impermissible contracts of adhesion,5 7 that such unconditional appeal
510. 972 F.2d 566, 567 (5th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
511. See id at 571 ("I do not think that a defendant can ever knowingly and
intelligently waive, as part of a plea agreement, the right to appeal a sentence that has
yet to be imposed at the time he or she enters into the plea agreement; such a 'waiver'
is inherently uninformed and unintelligent.").
512. Judge Parker argued that the statutory right to appeal, -along with the
Sentencing Guidelines themselves, speak directly to the power of the federal courts
and should be read as imposing limitations upon individual and judicial authority.
Such limitations cannot be 'waived' by parties." Id. at 573; see also id. at 574-75
(contrasting non-waivability of the Speedy Trial Act and plea bargains, both of which
protect the systemic value of speedy justice, with a defendant's waiver of review,
which offends the goals of the Sentencing Guidelines).
513. Id. at 578; see also Dyer & Judge, supra note 117, at 657 (urging universal
invalidation of appeal waivers on the grounds that they violate the due process
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions). But see Calhoun, supra note 109, at 150
(arguing that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions "is ill-suited to application
to" waivers of the right to appeal since it has been consistently rejected by the
Supreme Court in the plea bargaining context).
514. Melancon, 972 F.2d at 578. But see Calhoun, supra note 109, at 151 (noting the
limitations of applying the doctrine of vindictive prosecution to the appeal waiver
context since "the Court has been quite unequivocal in its declared intent to
distinguish plea bargaining practice from the rule established in the vindictiveness line
of cases").
515. "[Fiar from decreasing the Court's workload in this area of the criminal law,"
Judge Parker argued, "the Sierra rule appears certain to increase it" regarding
whether the waiver of the right to appeal was voluntary and intelligent in the absence
of a Rule 11 requirement. Melancon, 972 F.2d at 579. Moreover, Judge Parker added,
"[a]uy small 'gain' in 'speed,' 'economy', or 'finality' derived from Sierra's continued
sovereignty is overwhelmed by the rule's exorbitant, unacceptable cost to judicial and
congressional integrity, and individual constitutional rights." Id. (citations omitted).
516. Id. "Certainly, the (due process violation) risks run by the Sierra Waiver are
not necessary to the survival of the generally beneficial institution of plea
negotiation." Id; see also Dyer & Judge, supra note 117, at 661 (arguing that waiver
of appellate rights is not a necessary element in the plea bargaining process).
517. United States v. Johnson, 992 F. Supp. 437, 439 (D.D.C. 1997); see also United
States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 49 (D.D.C. 1997) (noting the impermissible
interference such waivers will have on the appellate process).
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waivers are fatally overbroad, 51 8 and that they are void for public
policy reasons.519  Along these lines, Robert K. Calhoun recently
presented a fully developed public policy argument for the
unenforceability of plea bargain waivers of the right to appeal.5 20
Most recently, United States District Judge Gertner issued a carefully
reasoned and thorough opinion invalidating a narrow appeal waiver as
against public policy. 521 Although the issue of appeal waivers is not as
clear-cut as Brady waivers, these arguments call into question the
518. See Johnson, 992 F. Supp at 439 n.3 ("Presently under the government's plea
agreement, a defendant could not appeal even from a sentence that was cruel and
unusual in the Eighth Amendment sense."). The court in Raynor further noted that
"the government itself concedes that certain of defendants' rights were not meant to
be waived, and it therefore admits that the waiver provision in the plea agreements in
this case is not even an accurate statement of the law." 989 F. Supp. at 46. The
Raynor court then quoted an October 1995 memorandum from Acting Assistant
Attorney General John C. Keeney stating:
A sentencing appeal waiver provision does not waive all claims on appeal.
The courts of appeals have held that certain constitutional and statutory
claims survive a sentencing appeal waiver in a plea agreement. For example,
a defendant's claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at
sentencing, United States v. Attar, [38 F.3d 727 (4th Cir. 1994)]; that he was
sentenced on this basis of his race, United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19 (2d
Cir. 1994); or that his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum, United
States v. Main, 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992), will be reviewed on the
merits by a court of appeals despite the existence of a sentencing appeal
waiver in a plea agreement.
Id.
519. Johnson, 992 F. Supp. at 439 ("[A] defendant's waiver of the right to appeal
from an improper sentence runs contrary to the very purpose underlying the
Sentencing Guidelines."); see also Dyer & Judge, supra note 117, at 654 ("[P]ublic
policy forbids prosecutors from insulating themselves from review by bargaining away
defendants' rights to appeal.").
520. Calhoun challenges policy arguments raised in favor of plea bargain waivers of
the right to appeal, including the claims that the courts are currently being
overwhelmed by frivolous appeals, that precluding the waiver would deny defendants
an important bargaining chip in their plea negotiations, that the interests of
defendants who plead guilty are already adequately safeguarded, and that the waivers
promote finality. See Calhoun, supra note 109, at 179-200. Concluding that a public
policy challenge to appeal waivers has a better chance of success than the due process
challenge, Calhoun argues that the availability of appellate review helps ensure
"procedural fairness" through its error correction function. Id. at 213. He also argues
that appeals "serve a variety of broader, 'institutional' purposes which include the
articulation and systematic development of the law, the assurance that the law will be
applied with some degree of uniformity and, finally, the legitimation of the criminal
justice system in the eyes of the public." Id. In response to the policy arguments in
favor of appeal waivers, he contends that in fact most appeals are not frivolous. See id.
at 214. Calhoun also responds that, far from being a valuable bargaining chip, the
defendant's waiver of his right to appeal is treated as "the price of admission to plea
bargain." Id. at 215. Finally, he argues that even if the waivers promote finality and
efficiency, it is "at the cost of other important goals-most notably, accuracy and
fairness of adjudication." Id.
521. See United States v. Perez, 46 F.Supp. 2d 59, 60-61 & n.3 (D. Mass. 1999)
(noting the absence of controlling First Circuit precedent, and striking a narrow
appeal waiver from the defendant's plea agreement on the grounds that the provision
is unlawful and against public policy).
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majority rule that such waivers are presumptively valid. While
beyond the scope of this Article, the resolution of the issue of appeal
waivers, no less than Brady waivers, would benefit from a healthy
dose of Legal Pragmatism.
The market for plea bargains is highly adaptive. We can expect that
innovations in plea agreement waivers will become both more
numerous and more frequent. However, the courts have thus far been
ill prepared to deal with these innovations. Deprived of any reasoned
explanation from the Supreme Court for the validity of plea
bargaining itself, the fine tuning of individual plea agreement waivers
has until recently been all but nonexistent. The approach proposed in
this Article of precision in taxonomy and pragmatism in applying legal
theory provides a flexible and comprehensive methodology for
weighing the validity of plea bargain waivers.
Notes & Observations
